The Return of Geopolitics

Albert J. Bergesen and Christian Suter (Eds.)

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The Return of Geopolitics

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About the World Society Foundation

The World Society Foundation (WSF) was established in 1982 by Peter Heintz with the aim of encouraging and supporting research on world society, that is, its emergence and historical evolution, its structure, its dynamics, and current transformation. Until 2003, the main purpose of the Foundation's sponsoring activities was to finance entire research projects focusing on the various processes of social integration and disintegration within worldwide systems—world culture, world economy, world politics, and intergovernmental systems—and on how global processes affect the perceptions and actions of individual and collective actors worldwide. Its current sponsoring policy is to provide award programs for research papers and to support international conferences on world society topics. In accordance with this new policy, the Foundation has introduced its WSF Award Program for Research Papers on World Society and held a series of international conferences (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017) in order to maintain a network of excellent scholars interested in transnational and global research topics. The World Society Foundation Award honors outstanding research papers on world society that address a specific topic announced by the Foundation in its Award Program. The World Society Foundation also publishes the book series "World Society Studies." The World Society Foundation is domiciled in Zurich, Switzerland. The current members of the Board are: Volker Bornschier, Mark Herkenrath, Hans-Peter Meier, and Christian Suter (President). Former members of the Board included: Peter Heintz, Karl W. Deutsch, Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, and Bruno Fritsch. More detailed information on past research projects sponsored, the topics and recipients of the 2007–2013 WSF Awards, the WSF book series "World Society Studies," and the call for papers of the current WSF conferences (2018–2019) can be found on the Foundation's website at www.worldsociety.ch.

Preface

In April 2016, the School of Sociology of the University of Arizona, the Institute of Sociology of the University of Neuchâtel, and the World Society Foundation (WSF) organized an international conference on "The Return of Geopolitics" within the framework of the WSF program for research papers on world society. The conference was cosponsored by the International Studies Association and took place at the University of Arizona, Tucson. The conference brought together about fifty researchers and participants to investigate and debate the causes and consequences of the increasing global political and economic conflict in different world regions of today's world society—in five plenary presentations, five panel discussions and four workshop sessions. The aim of the conference was to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the reemergence of geopolitical rivalry in the early 21st century, characterized by increasing political and economic tensions, and the rise in nationalism. This "return to geopolitics" has been analyzed from historical, comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives. This volume contains a selection of ten contributions presented and discussed at the 2016 conference.[1]

Many people have contributed to the realization of this volume and of the 2016 conference. First and foremost, the World Society Foundation and the editors would like to thank the authors for their stimulating contributions and their patience during the reviewing and copyediting process. A big thank-you is due to the staff and the students at the University of Arizona, notably to Allyson L. McAdams, Ryan Byrne, Andrew Davis, Erin Heinz, Kelly Huff, Beksahn Jang, and Heidi Reynolds-Stenson, for helping to prepare and organize the conference. Our thanks also go out to Thomas J. Volgy (University of Arizona) for help in selecting names of participants and contacting the office of the International Studies Association (ISA) to seek their sponsorship and support. In that regard we also want to thank ISA Executive Director Mark A. Boyer for his support and Jeanne White, ISA Director

1 More details on the 2016 conference, the World Society Foundation, and the WSF conference and research paper sponsoring program are available on the WSF website at http://www.worldsociety.ch.

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Neuchâtel/Zurich and Tucson, January 2018
Christian Suter, President of the World Society Foundation Zurich and
Director of the Institute of Sociology, University of Neuchâtel
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1

The Return of Geopolitics in the Early 21st Century: The Globalization/Geopolitics Cycles

Albert J. Bergesen and Christian Suter

Introduction

The dramatic expansion of the world-economy after 1945 came to be characterized as one of "globalization." Similarly, we have resurrected the older term of geopolitics to characterize the re-rise of nationalism, border disputes, economic protectionism and declining multilateral trade. Geopolitics had appeared before, and it soon became apparent that so had globalization, if that were to mean accelerating cross border flows capital, labor, product and ideas. And while different moments of world history can be so characterized, it also becomes apparent that such repetitions point toward a more cyclic dynamic, which we will call here the Globalization/Geopolitics Cycle (GGC). From this point of view, the so-called return of geopolitics of the early 21st century is but the latest cyclic turn of a larger and much longer world historical process. While the GGC is not fully understood, we can identify a few of its properties and historical instances.

Being cyclic in nature GGC theory has no starting point and so for an example of how the reasoning goes let us begin with the mid-19th century economic expansion which we could call an earlier globalization moment. By the last quarter of the century though, British led economic expansion was slowing and Imperial Germany and the United States were emerging as new economic powers.[1] The emergence of geopolitical rivalry as seen in both the second wave of colonialism and the then great depression of 1873–1896 marks a transition from globalization to geopolitics as the dominant international logic governing the behavior of nations. It would seem a world of full blown nationalist imperative geopolitical motives is an unstable situation for by 1914 the system breaks down into World War One. The two world wars can be considered a single thirty years war—the Second Thirty Years War—running from 1914–1945. At this point, we transition to another phase of economic

1 The standard account does not include Imperial Russia as a rising power but international economic statistics on the rate of growth of the Russian economy suggests that it should also be included. When the origin of the war itself is more closely examined the importance of Russia is made clearer.

expansion and globalization under the hegemony of the 20th century United States which has now replaced the 19th century hegemony of Britain.

Late 20th century globalization seemed to confirm the obsolescence of national borders. But as we move further into the 21st century it is increasingly clear that nationalism has not only not gone away but is resurgent. From the Scots to the self-styled Islamic State, groups want their own nations and Japan's Shinzo Abe, China's Xi Jinping, Russia's Vladimir Putin, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, India's Narendra Modi and Donald Trump of the United States all have nationalistic agendas. At the regional level, the transnational experiment that was the European Union is also suffering from economic tensions between its southern periphery and northern core along with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. And, on the national front, again, there is the rise of right wing parties such as France's National Front, Greece's Golden Dawn, and even in Germany the most prosperous of European Union countries, the Alternative for Germany argues that German interests have been subordinated to those of Europe. Within Eastern Europe there is a similar rise in nationalism, with the Russian annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. In the Middle East, there is continuing chaos and in the Far East there are disputes over islands and air space in the South and East China Seas. All of this compels us to recognize that world events are increasingly driven by the ancient forces of geopolitics.

The globalization/geopolitics cycle while not completely understood, has a number of distinctive properties that can be identified and on the basis of research better understood. We can identify a few of them here.

Globalization

It remains a somewhat ironic fact of international life, that periods of economic globalization are also periods of hegemonic dominance by a single state politically. One thinks of mid-19th century Britain and mid-20th century United States. Multi-lateral trade agreements, for instance, appear under the condition of a uni-polar international state system. And of course, the opposite is true; periods of multi-polarity, or hegemonic decline and increased equality between the great powers is also one of an increase in bi-lateral trade agreements. Uni-polar politically and multi-lateral economically and multi-polar politically and bi-lateral economically seems to fly against common sense reasoning that a uni-polar world would have others to the hegemon trade deals (eg. bi-lateral) while the multi-polar political world should be one characterized by more multi-lateral trade agreements. But it is not.

At the more general level of determining the ingredients of hegemony/uni-polarity the *Thompson* chapter argues that hegemony, or dominance, is based upon both economic and military power and that there can be a decline in one or in both dimensions of international power. Utilizing empirical data Thompson finds a great-

er relative economic than military decline for the United States today. These findings point to the complexity of international power and dominance, for if it were not for the rapid economic growth of Japan, China, and other east Asian economies the absolute American economic advantage would probably still be quite large. Also, the dynamic documented by Thompson seems general. It was not so much that Spartan military power had declined as Athenian economic power had so dramatically grown, and turn of the century British naval power was still quite large but relative to the economic growth of Imperial Germany and the United States it was in decline.

That hegemony is comprised of economic and political/military components seems reasonable. A second question arises as to exactly how it works? Meaning, how does a state or national economy actually exercise dominance over other states and their economies. As to economics there is a long literature dealing with the economic dependence of developing countries, or the third world, the global south, or the periphery in world-system theoretic terms. Exchanges of raw materials for manufactured goods, international agreements that favor the powerful rich countries (the core in world-system terms) and varieties of trade concentrations of both type of export and number of partners, often listed as a dominance mechanism of hegemonic economic states.

There is also something like Global Gramscianism that no doubt operates as well, where the hegemon poses as not so much the universal class, but as the universal state—but not an empire—that others buy into, such that hegemonic power is masked and thereby legitimated. As a process, this is not well understood at all and little studied. In response to the more conflict orientation of the original Wallersteinian idea of the operations of the political economy of the capitalist world-system, a more Durkheimian and Weberian cultural perspective also emerged in sociological theory. Variously called the world-society or world-culture perspective associated with John Meyer and the Stanford School of world-system theorists, it studies global cultural templates, but not as agents of specific powers. As such world society/world culture perspectives are not Gramscian in nature; they are not concerned with the legitimation and normalization of power differentials but more Durkheimianly concerned with something like the collective representations of world society.

The *Babones* chapter adds a very provocative perspective on how hegemony works in today's world. As an example, he argues that the United States does not necessarily pose as the universal nation thereby masking its own power, but instead, in some global Gramscian way, other states come to feel that their society is a part of American society. Babones nicely notes the similarity of international influence, rule, hegemony—call it what you want—of the imperial Chinese system of tianxia: "all under heaven," with that of American hegemony. Here of course it is all under the United States, and historically no doubt all under Rome, or Athens, or Britain,

and whoever else exercised such imperial systems.[2] Tianxia hegemony has important implications for the traditional Westphalian state system in existence since 1648. It is less a system of equality amongst states and more one of deference and subservience to a single state (our idea of the hegemon) and to China in what was earlier the East Asian world-system. The analogy with the Chinese system then and an American Tianxia now is interesting and will no doubt open eyes and further discussions about the distinctive side of hegemony within the international system.

There is a broader issue here. It may be that the earlier Sino-Centric East Asian World-System operated in its cultural aspects as a Tianxia system and the Euro-Centric Western World-System operated economically in as dependency core-periphery hierarchy system. The wedding of East and West into a unified world-system may combine both the distinctive cultural contributions of the Chinese with the hierarchic economic structure of the West to produce a fully rounded economic, social, political, and cultural totality. This, of course, is at this point largely speculative and certainly something that with future empirical research will be sorted out one way or another.

As with the notion that the alternating globalization and geopolitical currents shift back and forth constituting a unique world-systemic cycle, it may also be the case that the hint of global hegemony may also not be unique with America. For as there have been earlier "globalization" epochs so too have great powers always sought to meddle in the internal affairs of those they seek to influence. And identification of the weak with the strong, something like an international Stockholm Syndrome[3] also seems a universal in human history.

In some sense, it was the distinctive geography of Europe, that gave rise to Westphalian like entities, from classic Greek city states to the European state system. But would a Westphalian world of equal, separate, states have emerged on the Eurasian steppes? If not, it is not entirely clear how generalizable the Westphalian state system is, such that intervention in the affairs of other states might not be as radically different as the Babones chapter suggests. Or put another way, perhaps the world-system cycle of real interest is not so much globalization to geopolitics and back again, but Asian Western to Asian originated logics which govern the operating principles of the world-system as a whole. So, if in some sense, we see the rise or re-rise of east Asian dominance, then with it may very well come, the Tianxia model of interstate relations and its accompanying social psychology.

2 Almost all cultural aspects of the modern world-system have come out of non-Wallersteinian traditions, and Babones, trained at Hopkins with Chase-Dunn, has added a distinctly non-Meyerian perspective on the culture accompanying political economic dominance.

3 This is when captives or prisoners identify with their captors.

Between globalization and geopolitics

Historical movement is sometimes clear cut but often one set of logics slowly gives way to another, and we can see this in the present transition from a period of globalization under American hegemony toward a more multi-polar world operating under more classic geopolitical logic. As in all social liminal periods the transition zone is one of uncertainty when numerous paths seem possible, but as time passes and larger logics click into place historical direction becomes more easily identified. As historians often say, we are best at predicting the past, and while social scientists are prone to generalization, trend identification, and pointing out cyclic behavior, it turns out that most of that is about what has already happened. At the height of either globalization or geopolitics the nature of the epoch is very clear. But these in between times are no doubt shrouded in the fog of transition.

The *Denemark* chapter is very much a contribution to the hegemonic decline literature with its thesis of pre-emptive decline experienced in late hegemony. The chapter argues that hints of decline can lead to overreactions which if anything accelerates actual decline. The chapter provides examples from British preemptive responses to decline in the latter 19th and American ones in the latter 20th century. If these preemptive reactions are general enough one should find them in the declines of the Netherlands and Spain in earlier world-system history, and perhaps with ancient Rome as well. Again, depending upon the level of generality that can be extracted from his examples, one could also image the preemptive process operating on almost any kind of social entity that experiences rise and fall cycles. Interestingly, and perhaps a stretch, but one naturally wonders if there is, somehow, a kind of preemptive decline activity that can be found in the later stages of the historical epoch of different styles of art, music, architecture, or drama.

Geopolitics

Almost by definition the return to geopolitics represents a rise in nationalism. The *Karatasli* chapter focuses upon state seeking secessionist movements since the late 16th century within the context of the larger cyclical dynamics of the world-system, as groups involved in revolution, civil war, and secessionist activity in the name of seeking statehood appear with conjunctures of different world-systemic cyclic crises. This is an important observation and accompanying empirical research, for up till now, by and large, the consequences of disorder and hegemonic decline have been on the possibilities of great power conflicts. While hierarchical order is foundational for economic exploitation (core-periphery hierarchies in political economy of the world-system [PEWS] theory) it is also foundational peace amongst the great powers. It is a double hierarchy, where the states of the core dominate those of the periphery economically, but within the core the hegemonic state dominates the other core powers, e.g. the Great Powers. And that yields periods of peace (Bergesen

and Schoenberg, 1980). Hegemonic breakdown, or multi-polarity, though, is also associated with state seeking social movement activity, which is nicely documented in the Karatasli chapter, which also includes a reference to a unique data set Karatasli assembled, the State-Seeking Nationalist Movements (SSNM) database (1492–2013). This should be of great use to scholars interested in social movements over long historical periods.

While the nationalism generated by geopolitics, or perhaps said nationalism is that which constitutes geopolitics, manifests in social movements, it is also present in established states. The return of nationalism has been dramatic and seen everywhere. It is conventionally noted in nationalist poll results in Britain (Brexit); nationalist election themes in Europe and the United States; national claims and counter claims in Ukraine/Russia; civil war in Syria; and the jostling over who owns, controls, what aspects of the South China Sea.

Fitting into this trend, the *Melville* chapter highlights contemporary nationalist sentiment in Russia. Of particular interest is Melville's discussion of the ideology of Eurasianism and the societal location from which various strands of Russian nationalist sentiments arise. Taken together the Karatsali and Melville chapters nicely highlight the range of social and cultural movements that accompany the geopolitical turn in early 21st century world politics. In some sense, when the trans-national fades, evaporates or recedes, what is left is country, nation, state, which is culturally emphasized as in Russian and other countries of course, nationalism, and in movements of various groupings to themselves realize a nation of their own.

More specifically, Eurasianist ideas reflect the fundamental observation of Weber that the modern state is a distinctly territorial entity, and for Russia as the United States, or any other country, it is land, on which have existed peoples and societies, that together constitute a clear geo and political mix; geopolitics. These sentiments are also expressed in the United States (Kaplan, 2017) and clearly articulated in a review of the book with the title, "Geography Made America Great. Has Globalization Undone Its Influence?" (Rauch, 2017). One can easily imagine a similar title, "Geography Made Russia Great. Has Globalization Undone Its Influence," and for that matter substitute any number of other countries and one can see the more universalist aspects of the tendencies highlighted by Melville.

The return of geopolitics is hegemonic decline, episodes of pre-emptive decline, rising nationalism in major powers and social movements within states. In some sense, a mix of this geopolitical stew is nowhere better seen than in the politics of today's turbulent Middle East and North Africa, which is the focus of the Kumral and the Miles chapters.

The topic of the *Kumral* chapter is a case study of the continuing Turkish/Kurdish violence set in the context of the geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War, which acts as an ethnic violence accelerator. Kumral argues that the Turkish state of Erdogan devised a plan to incorporate the Kurdish minority through a democratic opening along with an accompanying repression. The effort, though, turned more toward repres-

sion with the internationalization of the Syrian Civil War. As the Kurds fought the Islamic State group (IS), the Turks reacted by aiding the IS as a way to counter the Kurds. The issues are complex and this chapter does a good job outlining the twists and turns of how the return of geopolitics in the form of the internationalization of the Syrian Civil War affected the relations between Turkey and its Kurdish minority.

The *Miles* chapter argues that, "[r]adical Islamist organizations in Africa . . . constitute branches of a transcontinental movement aimed at replacing a basically secular geopolitical order with a fundamentally faith-based (qua Islamic) one" (p. 147). In explicating this thesis he focuses upon such jihadi groups as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), El-Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, Al Shabab, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The idea of Muslim *Umma*, the community of all believers, is an alternative model of global order to the Westphalian idea of the sovereign independent nation-states where each one is allowed to pursue their own religious persuasion. This chapter focuses upon insurgent groups on the ground, but the idea of a "transcontinental" as opposed to a "transnational" movement highlights differences between the Western and Islamic model of global political order.

The final two chapters address the very meaning of geopolitics; but from two different perspectives. The *Dalby* chapter is concerned with the idea of geopolitics from the perspective of what professional geographers call "critical geopolitics." Classic geopolitical theory argues for the effects of the geographic upon the political; but in what is called critical geopolitics the reasoning is reversed. It is the political which affects the geographic. Using the idea of the Anthropocene (the idea of human effects upon the environment as a distinguishable geologic epoch Dalby argues that it is the political that affects the geographic (e.g. the environment). There is, of course, a possible feedback model here that would allow for classic and critical geopolitical effects. Human economy, politics, capitalism, and so forth affect the environment (critical geopolitics) but said altered environment acts back upon politics in one way or another (classic geopolitics).

Finally, the *Bergesen* chapter takes a different perspective on the idea of geopolitics. It begins with the traditional emphasis upon the constraining influences of the earth's geography upon politics. It then notes that any study of geopolitics is also one of state power and, that in turn, is one of military capacity which has to include orbiting satellites. In effect, land and sea power not only is supplemented by air power, but also increasingly by space power, such that one has to ask if one needs an astropolitical perspective to accompany that of geopolitics. Bergesen goes on to discuss potential problematic aspects of traditional international relations when the political is exported into orbit, such that, for instance, an armed satellite circling the earth every ninety minutes would make any number of countries face the military presence of any number of other countries (through their military satellites) almost constantly. While it is clearly too early for actual studies of space politics, nonetheless, there is enough politicization and militarization of space today, with a good

chance of its weaponization tomorrow, that any serious discussion of geopolitics must be accompanied by one of astropolitics as well.

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2

The Problem with Unipolarity

William R. Thompson

With the end of the Cold War, the United States is said to have entered a unipolar era in which it had no real competition, thereby encouraging the Afghanistan and Iraq involvements. I argue that this categorization of the post-Cold War era as unipolar is something of an error based on six types of analytical problems: a univariate emphasis, operationalization disagreements, the absence of threshold definitions, the conflation of relative power and the absence of challengers, the adoption of static over dynamic views, and privileging military over economic capabilities. After discussing these issues, a new metric is developed that combines energy and power projection resources. From this perspective, the United States has been unipolar since the end of World War II and its relative power position has been declining since the 1950s. It remains more powerful than its rivals but its edge has been slipping for some time. From this vantage point, the explanatory utility of the unipolarity concept is much less than it might seem. Relative decline and the ambitions of major power challengers are more useful.

Introduction

One of the reasons the world seems confusing to onlookers, especially in the United States, is that it was not very long ago that a very large number of people were convinced that the United States had won the Cold War, ideological history was dead, and a new era of the United States' predominance in a unipolar world had emerged. Then came 9-11, along with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and an almost return to world depression on a scale not seen since the 1930s. How can these disparate impressions be reconciled? Is/was the United States' triumphalism warranted or was it a matter of misreading the structure of world politics? My argument is that the United States' triumphalism was not justified and the world did not really turn unipolar over night with the collapse of the Soviet Union. What happened after the end of the Cold War, more accurately, was a temporary deviation from a longer sequence of protracted relative decline by the system's lead economy—the United States. Starting from a very high level of power concentration *vis-à-vis* other states in the interstate system, the United States has a long way to go to fall out of first place in this global hierarchy. Yet that does not mitigate its gradually weakening foundation for power and influence. Some of that relative decline is natural and

inevitable; some of it is traceable to poor U.S. decision-making that privileges the short term over long term considerations.

Part of the misinterpretation of systemic structure of power can be traced to the way in which we study polarity or distributions of power. collective approach is characterized by six problems that lead to debatable conclusions about how world politics works. After a discussion of the problem set, some solutions are advanced and a new operationalization of global power is developed. The new metric is used to both characterize polar distributions since 1816 and to assess the durability and conflict-proneness of variations in power distributions. In the end analysis, power concentrations come and go. Whether it is associated with differential propensities to conflict remains an open question given the empirical outcome established in this chapter.

Six problems

The study of unipolarity is characterized by six problems—some of which are distinctive to the topic while others are more generic to the study of international relations.[1] The two generic problems are a tendency to exaggerate the impact of any single variable, that is, a univariate explanation and the absence of any consensus about how to go about measuring the distribution of power—something that is fundamental to arguments about what difference greater or lesser concentrations of power might make. The four non-generic problems are related to the generic ones. One is the absence for any threshold for the attainment of polar status. As a consequence, weaker and stronger candidates are lumped together. The second problem is the conflation of relative power and the presence or absence of challengers. People who study unipolarity assume that high relative power is accompanied by the absence of significant opposition when in fact that has not been the case. It may be that the presence or absence of challenges to leading states is actually more important than the actual distribution of power. But, it will be argued, it is difficult to talk about one without considering the other. Yet the third non-generic problem overlaps with the second one. Polarity is strongly static.[2] If a slice of time is coded as possessing the attributes on one type of polarity, it is assumed to be so characterized equally throughout the designated time period. Such stationarity seems highly

1 For the unipolarity literature, see, among others, Krauthammer (1990/91), Layne (1993), Owen (2003), Buzan (2004), Mowle and Sacko (2007), Brooks and Wohlforth (2008; 2015), Ikenberry et al. (2011), and Hansen (2012).

2 See, for instance, the older polarity literature: Deutsch and Singer (1964); Waltz (1964; 1979); Bueno de Mesquita (1975); Siverson and Sullivan (1983); Wayman (1984); Sabrosky (1985); Hopf (1991); Wayman and Morgan (1991); and Kegley and Raymond (1994). Not all of the analyses of this earlier era were static—see, for instance, Thompson (1986), Spiezio (1990), and Mansfield (1993).

unlikely, especially over a long period such as a century or even a half century. The alternative is to focus more on dynamics. How the distribution of power is changing may be more important than identifying the category in which it falls roughly over some specific interval. Finally, the fourth non-generic problem is the tendency to view power distributions solely through a military lens. Military power is certainly important but it hardly operates in a vacuum. The economic foundation that pays for military power is just as important. To examine one dimension while ignoring the other is simply distortional. Polarity needs to be examined in the context of its military-economic base.[3]

Each of these problems deserves some elaboration and resolution if we are to figure out what to make of unipolarity claims. However, since the question of power metrics, thresholds, and military-economic considerations are readily linked, it is most convenient to collapse these three problems under one heading, leaving us with four clusters to discuss.

Univariate explanations

The entire history of polarity analysis has been plagued by the tendency to assume or to proceed as if the only thing that matters is the distribution of power. Waltz's (1979) structural realism framework is the leading example. Even if one wished to privilege structural factors over others, how, one might ask, is it possible to reduce structure to a single variable? The irony is all the more complete since most students of international relations are quick to claim great complexity for their subject matter. Yet, even when we know better, we proceed to promote univariate explanations. Power distributions do this. Arms races or alliances make decision-makers do things they might not have done otherwise. Living on islands encourages the development of navies while surrounding mountains make people more insular. Democratic regime types do a great deal of that. The presence or absence of groupthink makes all the difference in crisis outcomes. Without Hitler, there would have been World War II. If Archduke Ferdinand had not been assassinated, no World War I would have occurred.

While we need to advance generalizations linking variables, we should be cautious in taking any two-variable generalization too seriously. If one variable could explain a great deal of variance, would we not have stumbled on this magic elixir by now? Of course, many analysts think we have found powerful univariate explanations. The only problem is that if one holds their breath long enough, significant objections are usually forthcoming. The reason is simple. International relations is more complex than many other fields of inquiry. Even Albert Einstein knew that.

3 Lest one dismiss this perspective as overly materialistic, there is certainly more involved in establishing and maintaining a foundation for power. Cultural and ideational factors can play a role but soft power does not lend itself readily to an empirical examination of power distribution.

The problem is that we tend to overlook complexity when assembling our explanations. Maybe we have to do this lest the sheer complexity of world politics paralyze us from advancing any explanations. But, in doing so we need to keep in mind just how limited is the probability that any one variable is going to account for a considerable amount of variance in whatever it is that we are trying to explain.[4]

Polarity, in general, is usually relied upon to explain system stability and levels of conflict. The distribution of power should possess some link to these topics. It does not seem implausible that a system in which power is highly concentrated might be more stable and less conflictual than one in which power is widely dispersed. What happens in between the two ends of the concentration continuum may be less easily predicted. Even within the polarity literature, there is some recognition of complexity in the occasional tendency to differentiate between polarity and polarization (Rapkin et al., 1979). A bipolar world, for instance, need not be highly bipolarized with all or most of the population adhering to one pole versus the other. It follows that a bipolar system that is also highly bipolarized could very well be more conflictual than a bipolar system which is not particularly bipolarized. We do not have to travel very far back in international history to find an example in the waning years of the Cold War.

That some analysts persist in assuming that polarity and polarization mean the same thing is unfortunate and perhaps part of the more general analytical problem. Here, however, it is only invoked to suggest that one does not have to go very far to find qualifications to the power of information about power distributions.

Static versus dynamic interpretations

The 16th through much of the first half of the 20th century are often described as multipolar in structure. Is it conceivable that 445 some years were equally multipolar? At various points in time, Spain, France, and Germany held predominant positions within Western Europe. Did that not alter the way in which a multipolar distribution of power might be expected to work? Alternatively, the following bipolar era in the second half of the 20th century was characterized by a long period in which the United States held a monopoly on the capability to deliver nuclear bombs/missiles over sufficient distances to reach its main opponent. At some point in the 1960s this began to change and by the 1970s the United States was according nuclear parity with the Soviet Union. Should we expect bipolarity to have the same impact in the 1950s as in the 1980s? Of course, other processes such as learning to avoid full-fledged confrontations may have intervened as well. But the initial bipolarity was at the very least highly asymmetrical at the global level in the early years of the Cold

4 One of the ultimate ironies in the polarity literature is that Waltz (1979) devoted some space to criticizing reductionist theories and then proceeded to develop a univariate, structural realist explanation based on polarity.

War. It became less asymmetrical in terms of relative capabilities after the 1970s but remained lop-sided in favor of the United States nonetheless.

Kirshner (2015) attributes the emphasis on static structure to the development of Waltz's (1979) structural realism but static polarity arguments were of course quite common in the 1960s. Structural realism may have further reinforced static structural arguments but it certainly did not invent them. Yet Kirshner is correct to stress that classical realists such as Gilpin have argued for looking at how power distributions change as a more important factor than how we might code structure at any given point in time. The question, of course, remains an empirical one but the dynamic interpretation certainly sounds more plausible if we have to make a choice.[5]

Power metrics, thresholds, and military-economic foundations

International relations analysts have never done well at measuring one of our most central variables. To be sure, measuring power is not simple. Ideally, we would like to be able to assess who influences whom to do what but we usually have to settle for identifying who possesses varying shares of resources that are thought to provide foundations for influencing other people and states. Unfortunately, we do not agree precisely on which resources are thought to be most important. Waltz (1979, 131) threw out a long list of possible resources: population size, territorial size, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. The Correlates of War power concentration index (CINC) enthrones six indicators as something akin to an industry standard: iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, energy consumption, total population, and urban population.[6] Other scholars, especially those working in the power transition research program, emphasize gross domestic product as the best single indicator of national strength.

The multiple indicator indexes represent the most prevalent approach to measuring power distributions. When in doubt, hedge your bet by combining a number of different indices and hope that something works.[7] Of course, this interpretation is more than a bit cynical. An argument can be made for focusing on each and ev-

5 See, as well, Thompson (1986) which demonstrates the advantages of looking at structural change over structural statics.

6 Despite the widespread and professed dissatisfaction with the index, it is used repeatedly if for no other reason that it is readily available and intermittently updated. But it is fair to say that some of the components are quite attractive indicators—the real question is whether they should all be combined and combined in an unweighted fashion.

7 It is not clear that anyone has ever followed Waltz's advice in operationalizing his list of power indicators.

ery one of the indicators found in the Waltz and Correlates of War (COW) menus. The question, however, is whether an argument can be made to look at all of the indicators at the same time with equal weight given to each one. This type of argument, in fact, is usually missing altogether. Once one lists the factors that observers have thought to be relevant, it is just assumed that we can throw them together and see what happens. Yet what tends to happen is that bulk is privileged over quality. Large populations, economies, and armies can be useful resources. Their utility can also be exaggerated if the population is undereducated and impoverished or if the economy or army lacks cutting edge technology. By and large, bulk resources are more useful in local or regional defensive situations in the sense that large countries are hard to occupy and control. Alternatively, large countries can overwhelm small neighbors. Historically, states that have dominated their home regions (think India in South Asia, China in East Asia, Russia in Eastern Europe, or France in early modern Western Europe) have often depended on bulk predominance. Other things being equal, the bulk resources are less useful in global contexts because they are hard to mobilize for power projection purposes. Large populations can provide ample cannon fodder but not necessarily much else. Large underdeveloped economies generate little surplus that can pay for complex weapon platforms. This liability has long been a problem and was certainly manifested when India and China's gross domestic products were the largest in the world prior to the Industrial Revolution. Their large economies did not prevent their defeats by relatively small forces with advanced cohesion and technology. For large armies to be effective they need appropriate firepower and relatively scarce (historically) naval and aerospace capabilities to be transported over long distances.

When one looks only at bulk resource indicators, the outcome can be misleading. When one combines bulk resources with non-bulk resources (for instance, energy consumption, gross domestic product per capita, or naval size), they either cancel one another if they are equal in number or the bulk resources trump the non-bulk factors because bulk indicators tend to lead to concentrated outcomes. States with large economies also tend to have large populations and armies. Thus, our indexes of power give too much weight to bulk considerations and not enough to qualitative considerations.

Some of this problem is intertwined with problems in interpreting "great powers." Since most international relations analysts assume that the history of international relations should be equated with regional international relations in Western Europe, we begin with a checkered understanding of which states have been major powers—and thus potential poles. If 18th century Prussia or 19th century Italy can be counted as great powers, it becomes clear that the standards for major power status have not been uniform historically. This practice has been maintained by the Correlates of War codification of post-1816 major power status which ignores the non-European world prior to the mid to late 19th century and awards status promotions to the United States and Japan after they defeat other states not viewed

as major powers. France and Britain retain their major power status after World War II dubiously. Germany and Japan regain their major power status after 1990 for reasons that are not altogether clear. In general, we simply lack consensual understanding of what counts for power purposes or where the threshold for promotion might lie even though we have proceeded as if we have agreed to something when we adopt COW standards.

A more defensible position is to suggest that there are three classes of states in international relations. Most states are minor powers with restricted military and/or economic capabilities. They may be stronger in one sphere than in the other but they do not rank highly in both spheres. There are states that do rank relatively highly in military and economic capabilities but their ability to project economic and military power are restricted for the most part to their home region. Then there are the few states that have the capability to project power beyond the home region to other regions. These states are global powers.

While we cannot assume that this alternative framework will find widespread appeal, it does have clear implications for how one goes about measuring the distribution of power. If the tripartite classification is adopted, measurement of power distributions must be careful about mixing regional and global powers or, alternatively, bulk and non-bulk resource capabilities. If we are addressing the global distribution of power, global powers should take precedence over regional powers. To make this distinction, some threshold distinguishing regional from global powers is necessary.

But there is another way in which the absence of thresholds becomes problematic. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we can count the number of global powers accurately. If there is only one, must the system be unipolar? Yet what about bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar situations? Where do we draw the lines between and among these categorizations. Too often, polarity discussions proceed as if there is no problem in moving back and forth among these designations when that is simply not the case. Take the following example. What should we make of a system with two global powers, one of which claims 75% of the total capabilities that count and the other states possesses only 25%. Is the system unipolar or bipolar? If it is bipolar, is it bipolar in the same sense that a system with a 50:50 split in capabilities could be said to be bipolar?

Another illustration of the problem is to imagine two systems with three or more global powers. In one system, the capability distribution of the three leading states is 50, 25, and 25%. In the other, it is 36, 34, and 30%. How should we code system 1 or system 2? System 1 might be unipolar or maybe it is tripolar/multipolar but certainly not tripolar/multipolar in the same sense that system 2 is. Putting aside for the moment the categorization problem, how should we view a system in which the leading state has declined in relative position from a 25% lead over its nearest rival (as in 50% versus 25%) to a 2% lead (as in 36% versus 34%)? Most polarity discussions have no answer for these questions because they choose to ignore precise

thresholds. A state that leads by 2% is still considered the leader even if in reality such a lead amounts to rough equivalence with other leading states. Yet no matter how these situations are construed, there can be little question that a lop-sided edge over rivals is different from not much of an edge.

An alternative approach is to talk about algebraic qualifications of unipolarity. Buzan (2004) and Brooks and Wohlforth (2015) have talked about a single superpower (i.e. unipolarity) but accompanied by one or more relatively weak challengers—as in 1 + X or 1+ X + Y. The X and Y qualifiers suggest that the predominance of the single leading state is somehow qualified or in the process of becoming qualified. X and/or Y are significant actors but not yet in the "superpower" category. The problem here is that not much more information is conveyed beyond the caveat that unipolar leaders are confronted by challengers. At what point do these challengers rise to high enough status to change 1 into 2 or more great or super powers?[8] In the absence of any explicit thresholds, the X and Y will remain nominal qualifiers for some time to come. But what if X and Y are allied or act in concert? Do we aggregate their combined resistance? It is good to highlight the presence of challengers. Yet leaving them as X or Y remains awkward for operationalizing the distribution of power, just as forgoing the application of explicit thresholds leaves us in a subjective limbo when it comes time to estimate degrees of change.

The third problematic dimension of this cluster is the proclivity to differentiate between military and economic capabilities. For most polarity analysts (but not all), only military capabilities count. This tendency may reflect disciplinary preferences for analysts to specialize in one domain or the other. Thus, many international relations scholars have chosen to do security or international political economy (IPE) exclusively. Not surprisingly, it is the people who have taken the security path who are most likely to stress the significance of military capabilities alone. Similarly, IPE analysts are the ones who are most likely to argue that it is difficult to focus on one sphere and to ignore the other.

Yet it seems hard to deny that some states have economic clout but little military technology. Others have military technology but weak economies. Both types of states are handicapped in what they can do in world politics. In extreme cases, former superpowers cannot afford to send their submarines to sea for fear that they will never return. Major economies with limited military capability have to rely on allies to defend them from military attack. States moving up the hierarchy have to

8 This approach is reminiscent of the older, Cold War tendency to refer to the Asian balance of power as a 2.5 power configuration. The Soviet Union and the United States were counted as 2 powers. China was the 0.5 power. Yet at least this approach had the merit of implying two states were roughly equal and the third was not equal to the first two. What was left open-ended was whether China's relative position was closer to 0.25 or 0.75 the weight of the other two states? Or, perhaps it would have been more accurate to say that the capability distance between China and the Soviet Union was less than the distance between China and the United States?

make choices between expanding military capabilities or economic investments. They also have to decide what kind of military platforms they can afford or figure out how to build. Even singular superpowers have significant problems financing their military activities abroad. It seems unlikely, therefore, that we can divorce discussions of military capabilities from the context of economic limitations. Nor should we overlook the economic motivations for improved military capabilities. Moving up the economic hierarchy puts pressure on decision-makers to expand their military arsenal to better advance and protect their expanding interests. Polarity needs to be measured in both military and economic terms.

Conflating power concentration and the presence or absence of challengers

The mention above of the 1+X+Y practice raises an additional problem. In unipolarity discussions it is only natural to stress the dominance of the single leading state. But we need to combine the absence of thresholds and the temporary vicissitudes of world politics in order to generate a cautionary note. The absence of explicit thresholds means that if the challengers are temporarily absent from the picture, the state left standing, almost regardless of its relative capability position, can be said to qualify as the unipole. In the interval most celebrated as a unipolar era—from the end of the Cold War to some indefinite time thereafter—the United States was said to be at the apex of a unipolar hierarchy in large part because the Soviet Union had disintegrated and China had adopted a strategy stressing domestic development over foreign adventures. If the United States was catapulted to the top of the heap by default—that is, by the temporary absence of strong competition—it is not surprising that that situation did not last long or that the unipole did not manage to get much accomplished. The question remains, however, just how predominant the United States was in that unipolar interlude? Was it a genuinely unipolar interval or just a passing fluke of world politics? Must a unipolar state have no real competition to be able to claim unipolarity? However unlikely that may be, the moral of the story is not to ignore what else is going on besides the perceived predominance of the leading state. Thresholds or no thresholds, the systemic situation is apt to be different when the unipole is very strong and uncontested than when it is moderately strong and challenged. Thus, we need to know not only how high up the hierarchy the leading state is but also just how far ahead the leading state is from the competition.

Problems that deserve resolution and attempts to do so

Polarity discussions continue to be too subjective—who counts, what counts, and how much counts? Explicit criteria for delineating different types of, and changes in, power distributions should be desirable. Explicit thresholds for rank are also necessary. Otherwise, we will continue to talk around each other with varying but

ambiguously defined notions of what we are talking about. We probably also need to consider different data bases than those that are conventionally relied upon. It is not clear that the "industry standards" have served us well. Moreover, we need to integrate military and economic capabilities in assessing how power is distributed in the international system.

A possible solution for explicit polarity criteria (Modelski, 1974; Rapkin et al., 1979) has been around for some time but has never caught on. Whether this reflects a resistance to explicit criteria, disapproval of the specific criteria, or some combination is not clear. One criticism that has been broached (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2015) is that the threshold for unipolarity is too high because no state has ever exceeded it is simply wrong as long as one calculates the threshold in terms of the pooled capabilities of the most likely elite culprits as opposed to using world capabilities as the denominator.[9] It also depends, of course, on what specific capabilities are examined—an issue we will examine shortly.

The polarity rules or critieria are simple and can be expressed in one complex sentence:[10] *In a unipolar system, one state holds more than 50% of available power; in a bipolar system, two states combined hold at least 50% of available power, and each holds at least 25%; in multipolar systems, power is concentrated in three or more states with each possessing at least 5% of available power but no two states holding more than 25%.* The logic is that a state that can match the capabilities of any combination of elite opponents (50%+) is a highly concentrated power configuration that can qualify as unipolar. This type of logic harks back to the original 19th century interpretation of great powers qualifying for their elite status by being perceived as capable of defeating another great power. In this case, however, the configuration allows for the possibility that one state could defeat a coalition of all of the other elite powers in the system. Bipolarity needs power to be concentrated in the capabilities of the leading two states and some semblance of symmetry between the two is most desirable. Consider an extreme alternative. Two states control 60% of the capabilities but one state claims 45% and the other 15%, giving one state a 3:1 advantage. Highly asymmetrical bipolarity is unlikely to work exactly as whatever effects are attributed to symmetrical bipolarity. For multipolar systems, some asymmetry is tolerable but not too much lest the system move towards a genuinely non-multipolar system in which a number of states more or less are equal in their relative capability positions.

Nonetheless, there are a few possible holes in the schedule. One that was encountered earlier is that it is conceivable that one state could possess an impressive lead that still fell short of the 50% threshold. If one state controlled a capability share

9 Interestingly, the criticism did not move the critics to suggest a threshold that they thought was more realistic.

10 These rules have been slightly modified at the multipolar level from the original specifications.

in the 1940s (40–49%) and no other state controlled as much as 25% (otherwise the system might be unevenly bipolar), it is not clear what to designate such a configuration. "Near unipolarity" was the category used earlier and it seems useful to retain this in between structural situation. It is also possible to imagine an exceptional multipolar system in which there are only three states with one or more states exceeding a 25% share. The question would then be whether such a clearly tripolar system would be expected to function differently than a typical multipolar (or bipolar) system.[11] That seems to be a question that can be put off until it is actually encountered or becomes a theoretical puzzle.

The polarity schedule provides concise instructions on how to tell the difference among various polarity types. It does not tell us how to construct the percentage shares which are needed for identification purposes. For that purpose, a new, three indicator index is proposed which combines economic and military resources for distinguishing systemic-level power distributions. It relies on energy consumption to substitute for more conventional economic indicators in part because it does not require extensive manipulation to create a series back to 1816. The data are already available and do not have to be converted into a common currency or adjusted for parity purchasing equivalence or inflation. But, beside their convenience, energy consumption captures the very heart of modern economic development. The first two industrial revolutions, usually dated from the later 18th and 19th centuries, respectively, ushered in revolutionary new technology for production and transportation purposes that were fueled by coal, petroleum, and electricity. Up to a point, those economies that adapted best to these new expectations became increasingly heavy consumers of the new sces of energy that now powered their economic growth.[12]

Energy consumption, therefore is a good indicator of modern economic and technological development. Yet it has its bulk and qualitative dimensions just like GDP. The first two proposed indicators, thus, are energy consumption and energy consumption per capita. Total energy consumption tells us how powerful the overall economy is, assuming that the energy is consumed in an efficient manner. Energy consumption per capita tells us how complex the energy package is. Moreover, one of the more attractive features of an energy consumption focus is that it captures perhaps the main way in which the world changed as it began to modernize after the first industrial revolution's transformations in new technology and energy sources.[13]

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11 Schweller (1998) once thought tripolarity was or could be distinctive.

12 Advanced industrial economies eventually level off in their energy consumption.

13 Buzan and Lawson (2015) contend that international relations scholarship has not fully recognized the significance of changes introduced in the 19th century. In terms of the energy shifts associated with the two industrial revolutions (coal, petroleum, electricity), I would certainly agree.

Figure 1 depicts the fluctuations in relative energy consumption for the past two centuries.[14] Total consumption and per capita shares are combined in one index. Britain's energy lead as the first economy to commit to coal and steam engines was phenomenal and its lead was clearly maintained through the 19th century as long as COW major power rules are observed for entry into the elite pool. The figure shows an abrupt transition at the turn of the century with the inclusion of the United States as newly-minted great power. The United States went on to peak in the late 1940s before beginning its own relative decline in position. The decline was interrupted by the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 but, interestingly, the "bounce" in the United States' position did not rise above the 0.5 threshold. As China rises, the United States has resumed its positional decline trajectory.

The third indicator focuses on power projection capabilities. The leadership long cycle research program (Modelski and Thompson, 1988) committed early to what Posen (2003) later called "command of the commons" capabilities. For centuries the only way to project force beyond one's home region involved ships. Up to World War I and the advent of militarized air power, only navies could provide inter-continental reach. But leadership long cycle capability concentration hitherto has focused predominately on sea power measures. Beginning with state-owned vessels at the tail end of the 15th century and moving through the escalating number of guns required to serve a ship of the line in the 17th and 18th centuries, to the 20th century development of heavy aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and nuclear ballistic submarines with long range missiles of varying number, lethality, and accuracy.

All of these naval resources for projecting force at distance need to be accompanied by their land and space equivalents. Land missiles have different numbers of warheads of varying lethality and accuracy. Non-US aircraft carriers tend to be relatively light and small vessels most useful for carrying helicopters or a few vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) planes. So far, only the United States has invested in heavy carriers. But other states have invested in nuclear missiles, both at land and sea. Air forces also emerged in World War I. These weapons need to be measured as well. The power projection index treats land missiles the same way it treats ballistic missiles at sea (warhead lethality and accuracy). Strategic bombers are counted from 1916. Military satellites in service are also indexed to go beyond land, air, and sea to include space.[15]

The final operationalization decision involves which states to include in the pool. If the modern world were not so concentrated in power capabilities, this deci-

14 It seems more straightforward to rely directly on the percentages at the expense of the polarity categories. This approach has always been the hallmark of leadership long cycle analyses. See, as well, Mansfield (1993).

15 Michael Lee of Hunter College, CUNY has been critical to the expansion of this index.

Figure 1: Energy consumption shares (combined total and per capita shares)



Source: Data based on Correlates of War (COW).

sion would be more significant than it is now. Given high capability concentration, it does not make too much difference whether one adds or subtracts comparatively weak states. As a matter of operational conservatism, the power capability data are pooled using the Correlates of War rules for great power status. This decision means that Britain, France, and Russia are included for the entire period. Austria-Hungary drops out in 1918. Prussia-Germany drops out in 1945. Italy enters in 1860 and leaves in 1943. Japan and the United States enter the system in 1895 and 1899, respectively, with Japan bowing out in 1945. China begins its great power status in 1950. The Correlates of War approach also brings Germany and Japan back into elite subsystem in 1990 but that seems an easy change to ignore. Using this interpretation of elite powers does not imply that the author is endorsing the wisdom or

Figure 2: Power projection shares



Source: Data based on Correlates of War (COW).

accuracy of the operational specifications. Utilizing what is the industry standard simply eliminates one possible source of perceived bias.

Figure 2 portrays the fluctuations in relative power projection capabilities over nearly the past two centuries. A maximal list of elite actors is adopted on the presumption that their relative shares will help sort them out. That is, marginal power projectors will show up in the figure towards the bottom of the scale, as in the cases of Austria-Hungary or China. What comes through most clearly in Figure 2's crowded array is Britain's long slide, the United States abrupt ascent and relative decline that is less linear than Britain's, and the Soviet Union's abortive challenge in the mid-to-late 20th century.

What remains is to integrate the three series (shares of total energy consumption, energy consumption per capita, and power projection) into one index. There

Figure 3: British and U.S. relative power capability shares



Source: Based on data discussed in Lee and Thompson (2018).

are different ways of going about computing this combination. All three indicators capture power potential—the power to produce or do damage at distance. If that potential is highly concentrated in one state economic-military inventory, it may not really matter all that much how one combines the three indicators. Yet the two spheres—economic and military—are very different. Imagine a state with high energy scores but limited military capabilities. Contemporary Germany and Japan come quickly to mind. They are important actors but highly dependent on others to do their fighting for them. Reverse the combination—low energy scores but advanced military capabilities. Such states are also handicapped in the extent to which they can engage in world politics but they can punch above their weight from time to time. Contemporary Russia is a good illustration of this phenomena. For this reason, one could argue that power projection capabilities deserve more weight in the aggregated index than the energy indices—of which there are already two—do. Thus, the two energy indices are given equal weight while the power projection shares are doubled in terms of their input so that the resulting index is based half on the two energy shares and half on the power projection shares.

Figure 3 shows the outcome for an 1816–2007 depiction of the two leaders share. Britain emerged from the Napoleonic Wars at its high point and declined more or less continuously for the next 130 years. The only departure from this trend line was the brief and restricted revival of Britain's relative fortunes in the interwar years due to the defeat of some of its rivals in World War I. The United States' ascent was quick and towering after World War II. But it also began to lose relative share position fairly quickly and more or less continuously as well, with two exceptions. The United States' relative share of power capabilities rebounded after the end of

the Cold War thanks to the temporary side-lining of Russian capabilities (and the slow emergence of Chinese capabilities).

The other exception is that the United States' relative decline started at a very high point which gives it some leeway in allowing others to catch up. For instance, if one starts at a 50% peak and relative decline takes away, say, a quarter of one's leading position, the lead state is down to a 37.5% share. If one starts at an 80% peak and relative decline takes away a quarter of the lead, the lead state is still at an impressive 60% position. Other things being equal, we should expect that the higher one's starting point, the slower the progress of relative decline.

Coding for polarity

Table 1 lists relative power capability shares for selected years. The reader is reminded that this approach focuses on the global distribution of relative power shares. If we were only interested in the European region, a different calculus with different indicators would need to be made. The point, however, is that we have been conflating the global system and the European region for too long. Some distinction needs to be maintained even if it runs afoul of our Eurocentric versions of world history.

Table 1 shows the 1816–1945 period beginning in unipolarity, continuing as unipolar for five decades, followed by four decades of near unipolarity, one decade of bipolarity and three decades of multipolarity, and ending in 1945 in a return to unipolarity. The post-World War II era began in unipolarity and has yet to move away from it. Despite the similarity in the two movements (see Figure 4), the outcome will not seem very familiar to most analysts.

The relative positions of both global leaders declined overall, with some deviations from decade to decade. In the British case, one of the causes for the bump up in the fifth decade was mobilizing for the Crimean War. In the United States' case, the reversal in trend was primarily due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Britain lasted five decades before dipping below the unipolar threshold. The United States has stayed above the threshold for seven to eight decades but has resumed a downward movement in the eighth decade (not shown in Figure 4). Whether the United States' trajectory will continue to resemble the British trajectory remains to be seen. Both the Chinese and Russians are working hard to see that it does.

Not only does unipolarity re-emerge after the Cold War, there is no bipolarity evidenced during the Cold War. Should that caution a re-think of the measurement apparatus? Perhaps, but not necessarily so. One thing that is missing in the measurement apparatus is any reflection of nuclear warhead "overkill." In other words, once one possesses a second strike capability, does it matter how many more warheads are available? The index simply counts the distribution of nuclear warheads (in terms of lethality and accuracy). Yet at some point the utility of more warheads is limited. Thus the way the index is constructed ignores the substantive parity that was achieved in the late 1960s or early 1970s in the Cold War. Giving more credence

Table 1: Major power relative power shares, selected years

	Great Britain	France	Austria-Hungary	Russia	Germany	Italy	Japan	United States	China
1816	0.730	0.125	0.016	0.085	0.015				
1825	0.659	0.166	0.008	0.110	0.024				
1835	0.608	0.168	0.012	0.143	0.024				
1845	0.576	0.184	0.008	0.148	0.035				
1855	0.608	0.195	0.007	0.098	0.050				
1865	0.446	0.194	0.014	0.067	0.096	0.055			
1875	0.489	0.171	0.024	0.099	0.120	0.052			
1885	0.472	0.244	0.023	0.051	0.099	0.073			
1895	0.441	0.172	0.023	0.075	0.380	0.079	0.010		
1905	0.349	0.101	0.019	0.070	0.153	0.030	0.026	0.251	
1915	0.340	0.059	0.036	0.050	0.208	0.038	0.055	0.215	
1925	0.277	0.139		0.013	0.057	0.080	0.053	0.381	
1935	0.224	0.071		0.199	0.145	0.036	0.071	0.254	
1945	0.229	0.040		0.067	0.033		0.017	0.614	
1955	0.075	0.038		0.051				0.838	0.006
1965	0.061	0.047		0.188				0.685	0.011
1975	0.051	0.048		0.263				0.595	0.023
1985	0.044	0.063		0.328				0.532	0.034
1995	0.043	0.074		0.280				0.581	0.039
2005	0.049	0.073		0.226				0.621	0.061

Source: Correlates of War (COW) energy data and Lee and Thompson (2017).

to this element would make a stronger case for bipolarity after the late 1960s and through the 1980s—but not before when the Soviet Union had major problems developing accuracy and acquiring the ability to deliver their missiles to the desired targets in North America. But even so, few analysts would argue that Cold War bipolarity was ever symmetrical in terms of capability. It was primarily efforts to overcome the asymmetry that led to the unintended demise of the Soviet Union.

Once the Soviet Union did collapse, the United States was left standing as the sole surviving "superpower" but without the major lead in its economic/energy foundation that it had possessed earlier. It had the military capability to project power in a number of directions but it was less able to pay for it. As it turned out, the temptation to use that military capability, in a brief interval that was unconstrained by rival opposition, did not necessarily lead to the military capability being used prudently. Nor did the military expenditure outlay lead to much in the way of upgrading the power projection military capability—as opposed to spending money on ground activities in Afghanistan and Iraq.

What is often described as the "unipolar moment" did not quite measure up to a full-scale unipolar episode. Moreover, it was due almost solely to the temporary absence of Soviet/Russian activities and the lower profile strategy adopted by the Chinese in the late 20th century that prioritized economic development over inter-

Figure 4: Two successive leading global powers' relative position by sequential decade



national adventures. Both of these developments seem to have run their course. The Russians have become more active in an attempt to regain some of their lost status. It did not have to work out that way but there was probably some probability that it would. The Chinese are now more prepared to engage in military operations in the East and South China Seas, and perhaps elsewhere.[16] Whatever the appropriate adjective for the moment, it seems to have passed. None of this means that the United States does not remain the most powerful state in the system. That is not the issue about which we are arguing. Rather, the question is how strong the United States' relative position was in the two decades after the end of the Cold War. The argument here is that it was not as strong as decision-makers thought in the heady triumphalism of winning/surviving the Cold War. It was not genuinely unipolar because the military edge component considerably outweighed the economic-energy component of the foundation.

Unipolarity conditions have existed, at least as specified by the standards employed in this chapter, but they are not recognized widely as such. The periods immediately after the Napoleonic Wars and World War II qualified as unipolar from a global perspective. We do not tend to recognize those years as unipolar for several reasons. We do not think globally and instead blur the distinctions between regional and global activities. The Soviet Union could threaten to do various things in Eurasian sub-regions that were close at hand. Even so, often, the perceived and as-

16 A new Chinese naval base in northeast Africa, for instance, suggests some commitment to patrolling western Indian Ocean waters.

serted threats did not correspond to actual Soviet capabilities. U.S. observers tended to give Soviet capabilities too much credit—as demonstrated by alleged bomber and missile gaps.

Another reason for overlooking these periods of high concentration is that unipolarity has come early when global war winners are in a rush to de-mobilize and often before they have fully absorbed their newly leading roles. As lead economies and sea powers, the emphasis has been placed on reviving markets and prosperity, not dictating terms to other states and taking over their territory (Levy and Thompson, 2011). Unipolar powers tend to be reluctant or unable to take full advantage of their strong positions. For instance, the United States' monopoly on atomic weapons was explicitly used to persuade Japan to surrender but it was not used to force concessions from the Soviet Union. Alternatively, one could argue that Britain's gold and sea power in 1815 was of limited relevance to post-war negotiations over what to do about the French problem in Western Europe. Even during the Napoleonic Wars, it had had serious problems maintaining its coalitions designed to defeat the French armies. Thus, it is easy to exaggerate even very strong powers ability to influence other actors. These observations remind us that it is easy to exaggerate the power and influence of even unipolar powers.

Conclusions

Power distributions are not meaningless but their interpretation requires caution and does not appear to be as straightforward as is often assumed. Static characterizations, in particular, can be treacherous if they suppress different dynamics at play. The past two centuries have been characterized by global power concentrations that were initially quite high in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and World War II, respectively. The leading global power controlled a disproportionate share of economic power, as manifested in new technology and energy sources. Each state also virtually monopolized power projection capabilities with global reach. These high concentrations of power capabilities were not infinite in duration. The high concentrations peak and then decay rather slowly. Power projection shares tend to decay more slowly than technology/energy shares do.

Just where unipolarity fits within these long and slow deconcentration propensities will no doubt continue to be debated. However, the argument advanced here is that the much acclaimed, post-Cold War unipolar phase was less than it seemed. It passes muster as a unipolar phase according to a polarity operationalization template but it did so more on power projection capabilities than it did on technology/energy capabilities. Its behavioral manifestations seem less linked to the development of a novel power foundation and more attuned to an exaggerated sense of triumphalism on the part of elites affiliated with the global leader and the very temporary absence of major power challenges. At the same time, ironically, we tend to ignore the strong evidence for unipolarity in earlier, post-war circumstances or,

alternatively, the very strong position of the United States throughout the ostensibly bipolar, Cold War period.

In sum, unipolarity has played some role in contemporary world politics. However, it may not be the role(s) usually ascribed to it. It may very well also be less potent an explanatory variable than we have thought.

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3

Sovereignty in the Millennial World-System

Salvatore Babones

Standard treatments of sovereignty in international relations theory conceptualize it as an absolute, unitary condition. Each state is (nationally) the ultimate constitutional political authority within a given territory. But in a development that has gone unnoticed by international relations scholarship, this Westphalian system of state sovereignty has broken down. At least since 1945 major powers have mutually acquiesced in each others' settling of the internal affairs of their respective client states, and since 1991 the United States has exercised a near-global authority to settle the internal affairs of nearly all nominally sovereign states. This post-Westphalian system closely resembles the imperial Chinese system of *tianxia*: "all under heaven." In the new American *tianxia* the United States is the central state of an interstate system in which the vast preponderance of interstate relationships are (1) associations with the United States, (2) in direct opposition to the United States, or (3) modulated by the United States. Moreover just as was the practice in imperial China, the United States primarily wages war to settle the internal affairs of other states, not to impose external conditions on them. In this new, post-modern world-system the most important lever of power is influence at the imperial center. Thus the post-modern citizen of the world inexorably seeks to become, either metaphorically or (increasingly) literally, a citizen of the United States. The emerging liberal, universal, homogeneous state is not the United States per se, but the American *tianxia* writ large to cover the entire world.

Introduction

The Westphalian era is over. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia symbolized the consolidation of the modern world-system into a coherent system of distinct states with normatively accepted rules of interaction. A world-system in general is "a social system that encompasses a closed or semi-closed social world" (Babones, forthcoming) consisting of overlapping cultural, economic, and political systems. The modern world-system (Wallerstein, 1974) is the global world-system that for the first time incorporated nearly all of the inhabited areas of the world into a single overarching world-economy. The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) that ended with the Peace of Westphalia was one of several watershed conflicts that collectively constituted a global adjustment to the creation of this global world-economy: the Ming-Qing

transition of 1618–1661 in China, the wars that created modern continental Russia (1598–1689), and the Iberian colonization of the Americas. The Westphalian system of sovereignty can be seen as a response to the vast expansion of the world-economy during this period, the price revolution it engendered, and the destabilizing forces it unleashed.

The Peace of Westphalia is customarily used as a symbolic marker for the emergence of the "Westphalian" system of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is conventionally defined as "supreme authority within a territory" (Philpott, 2001, 16). It is well-known and well-understood that the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia did not specifically reserve supreme authority within territories to territorial states, nor did it lay out the axiomatic corollary that sovereign states could not intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. The Westphalian system of sovereignty is merely a normative artifact of the understandings and practices that emerged from the Thirty Years' War and its associated peace (Croxton, 1999), and norms take time to develop and solidify. Whatever the specific causal channels through which the Westphalian system of state sovereignty arose, the practice of exchanging resident ambassadors was established among European states in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia (Wheaton, 1836, 167) and it is perhaps this overt act that should be seen as the marking the beginning of the Westphalian system. After all, the Westphalian system is a norm, and norms are generated through human interaction.

As has been recognized by constructivist international relations scholars, the unitary conceptualization of sovereignty is increasingly at odds with reality. (Biersteker and Weber, 1996). This gap has little to do with quasi-sovereignties like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and the Vatican, nor is it connected with the institutionalist "bugbear" (pick another word here) of the rise of non-state actors. The emperor-has-no-clothes gap between sovereignty in theory and sovereignty in practice is the gross disparity in the character of sovereignty as exercised by, say, the United States and Grenada. This gap is not limited to external sovereignty, where it is well-recognized, but applies to internal sovereignty as well. When a less powerful state alters its internal affairs in accordance with the demands of a more powerful state, "the decision to grant such rights or adjust its policy is the decision of the [less powerful] sovereign state" (James, 1999, 464). Thus the actions of the less powerful state can be influenced but its sovereignty cannot be diluted.

If this de jure device closes a window it also opens a door. James (1999, 464) goes on to say of the less powerful state:

> Were it not sovereign, there would be another entity which, because of its own constitutional dispositions, would be regularly entitled to have a controlling or an overriding voice with regard to both the internal and external affairs of the territory concerned.

The term "constitutional" in this sense refers not to a written constitution (though it may include that) but to the accepted mechanisms through which political authority is legitimately constituted within a territory (Malcolm, 1991, 17–20). James's (1999) scenario prompts a practical question: is the United States "regularly entitled to have a controlling or an overriding voice with regard to both the internal and external affairs of" Grenada, or any other country? Given James' criterion, the answer depends entirely on the word "entitled," since the United States regularly does exercise "a controlling or an overriding voice with regard to both the internal and external affairs of" Grenada—along with many other countries. And though no international legal scholar would say that the United States is constitutionally entitled to interfere in other countries' affairs, many non-governmental organizations, media organizations, policy pundits, human rights activists, and citizens of other countries regularly call for just such interference.

That last group is crucial. It is often the case that a large and/or influential segment of the population of a nominally sovereign country actively calls for the United States (or another country) to exercise "a controlling or an overriding voice" in the internal affairs of their own country. In such cases it should not be taken for granted that the citizenry of the country constitutes a single body politic conferring legitimacy on the existing constitutional arrangement of the country. Accounting for such cases, the number of cases of unproblematic constitutional order (and thus unproblematic sovereignty) among the 193 member states of the United Nations may be relatively small. Even among powerful, long-established countries the adherence of domestic political elites to the formal independence of the domestic constitutional order may be called into question. When European elites place their European identity ahead of their national identities, when East Asian elites request an American military presence or advocate membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, when Central Asian elites maintain their families in Moscow, when Latin American elites call for American military intervention in their own countries, and when Chinese elites seek American passports for their children, they all call into question the bedrock certainty of James's (1999) "key feature" that sovereignty must be a unitary condition, to say nothing of legal and absolute.

The Westphalian system of sovereign states emerged as a creature of the modern world-system. The modern world-system created an environment in which powerful individuals and organizations required the protection and support of state entities to survive and flourish in an otherwise anarchic world-economy (Spruyt, 1994). The formal sovereignty of these states arose out of the everyday practice of their peer-to-peer interactions. Though James (1999) considers the exchange of ambassadors to be three steps removed from sovereignty (after recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations), from an historical and dramaturgical point of view the exchange of ambassadors seems more likely to have come first and to have ultimately given rise to the practice of diplomatic relations and the de facto recogni-

tion of other states' sovereignty. The long and difficult struggles of Russia (Mancall, 1971) and the United Kingdom (Fairbank, 1953) to convince China to accept their ambassadors supports this point of view. However Westphalian sovereignty arose, it was certainly exported from Europe to the rest of the world through the agency of the core European powers. But in an enlarged post-colonial state system dominated by the overwhelming power of the United States the Westphalian conceit that interstate relations are fundamentally peer-to-peer relations is no longer tenable, if it ever was. Now that the material base of the Westphalian system has disintegrated, can the phenomenological superstructure be far behind?

Post-Westphalian sovereignty

In a development that seemingly went unnoticed by international relations scholars, the Westphalian state system disappeared some time ago. The crux of the Westphalian system was that states would have only state-to-state relations with other states; they would not "reach into" the internal affairs of other states except through the mediation of the respective state institutions. Wars between states might result in the transfer of territory, the payment of indemnities, and/or the imposition of miscellaneous penalties. They might even result in the installation of a new sovereign. But they emphatically did not aim at the reconstitution of the society of the defeated state. The Thirty Years' War had begun as a religious war, and the contemporaneous English Civil War had similarly strong religious overtones. These were two of the most (self-) destructive wars in European history before the twentieth century. The Westphalian Peace that followed may not have been much of a peace, but for some 300 years it resulted in wars that were in the main fought between sovereign states for state advantage in an anarchic interstate system. The central conceit of international relations theory—that states are fundamentally external actors *vis-à-vis* other states—ultimately derives from the Westphalian principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states (Lake, 2008).

This principle ceased to operate in 1945. To see this, contrast the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk (1918) and Versailles (1919) with the Yalta Conference of 1945 and its aftermath. The treaties that ended World War I on both the eastern and the western fronts resulted in the transfer of territories and the payment of indemnities. They also coincided with changes in government. But they did not themselves mandate changes in the constitution of political authority in the defeated countries. The Soviet government that ultimately arose in the East was an anathema both to the Germans who facilitated its success and to the Western allies that defeated Germany. The political constitution of Germany also changed between the signing of the Armistice in 1918 and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Yet the new Weimar Republic still had to accept full responsibility for the Kaiser's war. The fact that yet another German government renewed hostilities a mere twenty years later had little to do with whether or not the terms of the treaty were just or fair.

Hitler's Nazi government had the same kinds of Westphalian aims as Wilhelm II's imperial government did a generation earlier, only more grandiose and gruesome.

Similarly, the little-remembered Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 imposed Westphalian-style conditions on the defeated minor powers of World War II. Italy and Finland lost territories and paid reparations—Italy to Yugoslavia and Greece; Finland to the Soviet Union. But they retained their constitutional autonomy. Not so the main belligerents. Germany and Japan lost territories, to be sure. But they were also occupied and their societies radically reshaped by the victorious powers. The political constitutions of both (West) Germany and Japan were more or less dictated by the United States, which also imposed major economic restructuring (including the breaking up of industrial monopolies, land reform, and mass unionization), changes to school curricula, and formal war crimes tribunals. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union imposed even more extensive restructuring on the constitutions and societies of the states that came under its control. These gross violations of Westphalian sovereignty had been agreed in principle at Yalta and became the basis for the postwar settlement. It can fairly be said that the Westphalian system became a dead letter in 1945.

It remains a dead letter today. In the early twenty-first century five states have at least some real capacity to impose regime change on other states—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—and the first four regularly exercise this power. It might be credited to the foresight of the architects of the postwar settlement that these five states are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which in the United Nations treaty system has the sole international legal authority to authorize the waging of war. That the United States and Russia routinely wage war in pursuit of the emphatically non-Westphalian aim of constitutional change is acknowledged by Lake (2008, 55), but the United Kingdom and France have recently done so as well, albeit with support from the United States. And interstate war is only one tool of regime change. The United States employs a wide range of policy instruments to install and maintain constitutional orders that accord with its desires in countries around the world, often in conjunction with its (many) allies. The Westphalian principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states is repeatedly invoked in vain (if often somewhat disingenuously) by Russia, China, and other states that fall outside the American alliance system.

The breakdown of Westphalia does not apply only in the peripheries of the world-system. Though not threatened by forcible regime change, states in the established core of the world-system also lack full constitutional independence. James' (1999) test of regular entitlement to "a controlling or an overriding voice" in the affairs of another country applies to the rich countries of Western Europe and the Pacific, though more subtly. Powerful individuals and organizations insist that their governments remain broadly in compliance with the preferences of the United States. For many national elites, continued access to the United States and its amenities is more important than the sentimental bonds of nationhood. Their preferred course is for

their countries not to come into conflict with the United States, but where their countries' constitutional arrangements do come into conflict with the demands of the United States, the demands of the United States generally prevail. In the twenty-first century this has been demonstrated repeatedly through other states' complicity in American torture rendition programs, the acceptance of the extraterritorial enforcement of American law, the observance of financial sanctions imposed by the United States on third parties, the toleration of American intelligence collection on foreign soil, the acceptance of American intellectual property standards, and of course the routine hosting of American military forces.

If the Westphalian system of state sovereignty truly did arise as a reaction to the emergence of the modern world-system, the cessation of the Westphalian system may be seen as a reaction to the dissolution of the modern world-system. The modern world-system was a world-economy in which the economic system was too large to be controlled by any one political entity. As a result the world-market was an impersonal, exogenous force that placed hard constraints on all political actors, including sovereign states. In the modern world-system states may have been sovereign *vis-à-vis* each other but were not sovereign *vis-à-vis* the world-market. The eventual endogenization of the world-market under the control of the United States started (clumsily) with the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates and limited international trade. It was temporarily set back by the 1970s oil crises but has now matured to the point where all peak markets (oil, metals, money) are politically managed by the United States and its collaborators. More importantly, the highest value economic activities are no longer concentrated in market sectors at all. The commanding heights of the contemporary global economy are in areas like telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and entertainment—areas that depend on state sponsorship through the protection of intellectual property. The only state with sufficient global reach to enforce global intellectual property rights is the United States. Thus the global economy is no longer characterized by the dominance of an overarching world-market. The peak sectors of the global economy have been endogenized under the political sponsorship of the United States (Babones, forthcoming).

In this post-Westphalian world degrees of sovereignty can be gaged by proximity to American power. Only the United States can be said to exercise full state sovereignty, since only the United States is, practically speaking, immune to all external "controlling" or "overriding" voices originating in other states. Outside this American center, three broad, hierarchical circles of more or less limited sovereignty exist in the post-Westphalian state system. These might reasonably be called shared sovereignty, partial sovereignty, and compromised sovereignty.

The closest allies of the United States may not have any voice in the constitution of political authority within the United States itself, but they do share with the United States some influence over the shape of the world-system in which they are embedded. This ring of shared sovereignty consists of the four major Anglo-Saxon allies of the United States: Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. These

four countries are close collaborators in the project of American global governance, or to use a less flattering description they are like barnacles on the American whale. The citizens, companies, non-governmental organizations, and governments of America's four Anglo-Saxon allies participate directly in American global governance through their participation in a common cultural space of opinion formation, their close integration into the American economy (especially Canada and the United Kingdom), and their deep cooperation with the American security services. While these four countries are clearly "outside" the United States itself they are to some extent "inside" the institutions of American global governance. Their inclusion in these institutions goes well beyond official intergovernmental cooperation. For example, while think tanks located in these four countries have virtually no influence on domestic politics in the United States, they are closely interwoven with the American foreign policy community (Babones, 2015).

Other allies of the United States enjoy varying degrees of partial sovereignty in domestic affairs (subject to currency, investment, and trade openness) while ceding nearly all decision-making over foreign affairs. Included in this category are the continental European NATO members, the East Asian treaty allies of the United States, and a few other states scattered throughout the world. These may be the only states in the post-Westphalian system that more or less fit the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty as interpreted by James (1999) and Malcolm (1991). They have voluntarily ceded to the United States the authority to make many of the decisions usually associated with sovereign authority—and could in principle seize it back. The fact that the states that govern every single developed country in the world today have chosen to align themselves, formally or (in a few cases) informally, with the American military alliance structure and the broader mechanisms of American global governance suggests that there may not be much sovereign freedom of choice in this decision after all. Nonetheless, the formal sovereignty of the Western European and East Asian allies of the United States is clear. Partially sovereign in the post-Westphalian system, these might be termed sovereign client states if viewed from a Westphalian perspective (Babones, 2014).

The remaining states of the world are subjected to compromised sovereignty: they (often loudly) proclaim the right of full legal sovereignty but are often unable to make this right effective. Those states that accept compromised sovereignty suffer peripheralization and economic colonialism. Those that do not accept compromised sovereignty face strong external push-back and internal pressure for regime change. From a definitional standpoint the key fact here is not that these countries lack sufficient power to enforce their sovereignty (this issue is fully accounted for in James, 1999 and Malcolm, 1991) but that the constitutional authority of the governments of these states to govern their territories in the ways that they do is not unambiguously accepted as legitimate by the populations they govern, and certainly not by their national elites.

In the new, post-Westphalian state system, many states—perhaps the majority of states—lack full political authority within their own territorial borders for just this reason. In the developed countries of the West it would be difficult to find members of the national elite who openly question the constitutional legitimacy of the states of which they are citizens and rarer still to find any who seek support from foreign governments and organizations to assist them in changing the constitutional orders of their countries. The fact that such support is often forthcoming in less developed countries regularly prompts their states to accuse the United States (and the "West" more generally) of violating international law by interfering in their internal affairs. When a state's political authority is not accepted as constitutionally legitimate by many of its own citizens, including many of its intellectual elite, and when external states similarly question the constitutional legitimacy of that state and actively seek to change the state's political constitution to bring it more into line with their external expectations, it seems only reasonable to consider the state's sovereignty to be compromised.

Importantly, it is not only antisystemic states whose sovereignty is compromised in such a way. All non-western countries host substantial pro-western political elites. It may be politically incorrect for a Western author to make such a provocative assertion. Nonetheless, it seems to be the case that (1) large proportions of the elite citizens of African, Latin American, and Eurasian countries question the constitutional legitimacy of the political authority of the states under which they live and (2) many of these very elites seek Western political interference in the internal affairs of their own countries. If these two propositions hold, and if James' (1999) constitutional interpretation of sovereignty is accepted, the implications for the Westphalian system of state sovereignty seem unavoidable. The passing of the modern world-system governed by the ultimate power of an exogenous world-market and the concomitant passing of the Westphalian state system organized on the principle of unitary state sovereignty may be cause for sorrow or cause for cheer. Either way, it is becoming increasingly difficult in the twenty-first century to file new empirical realities under the old conceptual labels.

An American *tianxia*

The global world-system is in the midst of a transition from the predominance of the global economic system (a "world-economy") to the predominance of a global political system (a "world-polity"). The particular economic system that dominated the world in the second half of the second millennium was the market system; thus the late world-economy might be classified as a "world-market." (Babones, forthcoming) Other peak economic systems could be imagined, and often were. The particular political system that is coming to dominate the world in the first half of the third millennium is more difficult to classify. The Wallersteinian term for a world-system in which the political system is the predominant social system is a "world-

empire," but world-empires are weakly theorized in world-systems analysis. (Woolf, 1990) In any case the word "empire" itself does not accurately describe the ways in which the United States exercises authority in the interstate system (Nye, 2004) and its use has so many meanings and connotations in English that it prompts objections from all quarters (Khong, 2013). The term "world-empire" is probably best reserved for world-systems in which a single state exercises full political jurisdiction over its entire world-system, such as the Roman Empire in the first few centuries AD. Another, less laden—or differently laden—term is required to describe the contemporary world-policy.

The contemporary world-polity dominated by the United States and its allies is unprecedented in scope but perhaps not in structure. It is a hierarchical polity composed of a central state (the United States), a small collection of allied states that are so closely identified with the central state that their military forces, intelligence services, financial markets, publishing houses, and intellectual communities are fully integrated with those of the central state (and have been for some 100 years), a large collection of treaty allies that broadly accept the overarching ideological assumptions of the central state, and an even larger collection of dependent states that generally accede to the existence of a hierarchical state system that places them in a subordinate position. A small number of antisystemic states overtly object to the hierarchical organization of the world-polity, but only three of these states are strong enough to pursue somewhat independent foreign policies (China, Russia, and Iran) while the few other antisystemic states are in practice client states of one or more of these three.

This political configuration is strongly reminiscent of the Roman world of the late Republic (c. 200–92 BC), with Rome as the central state, the Latin allies sharing in Roman sovereignty, and various Mediterranean powers enjoying partial sovereignty in alliance with Rome, while the three Hellenistic successor states vied with Rome as antisystemic powers. The structural correspondence between the two systems is very close. Their trajectories, however, are very different.

Unlike Republican Rome, the United States is not (or at least is no longer) expanding its directly governed territory via the conquest of its neighbors, and the United States is not on the road to world-empire in the Imperial Roman sense. Quite the contrary: the emerging American-centered world-system is near-static in its state borders, with nearly all changes of border since the end of World War II consisting of the division of existing political entities while the external borders of those entities remain intact. The very few external border changes since the 1945 settlement have either been trivial (conflicts over maritime and mountain frontiers where few if any people actually live) and/or of unrecognized legitimacy (e.g., the annexations carried out by Israel and Russia). The world map has changed dramatically since 1945, but the borders that existed in 1945 have hardly budged. In any case most people's understandings of the world-system structure of the Mediterranean world of the late Roman Republic are completely overshadowed by their impres-

sions of the world-system structure of the high Roman Empire. Though the first may have been a world-polity without being an empire the second was unambiguously an empire and a world-empire.

East Asian history suggests a more appropriate model. From AD 1271–1911 a series of three dynasties (Yuan, Ming, Qing) ruled a united China that dominated East Asia from the disintegration of Genghis Khan's Mongol empire until the intrusion of European territorial colonialism. Throughout this period China was the central state of the East Asian political system. The modern Chinese name for China, *Zhongguo*, literally translates as "central state," though it is customarily rendered in English as "Middle Kingdom." Like China itself, the political system of which China was the central state historically did not have a name (as such), since in the Chinese conception of the world it encompassed the entire relevant world. In the words of Mancall (1971, 3), "the Chinese state was not a state at all in the conventional meaning of the word, but rather the administration of civilized society *in toto*." Chinese scholars were certainly aware of the existence of other civilizations—including ancient India (*Tianzhu*) and Rome (*Da Qin*)—and of course India was well-known to be the source of Chinese Buddhism. But geographical factors made these civilizations politically irrelevant to the Chinese governance of the East Asian political system (Mancall, 1971, 7). To the extent that the political system of which China was the central state had a name, or at least a label, it might be identified with the Chinese word *tianxia* ("all under heaven").

Tianxia is an ancient concept in Chinese philosophy (Yan, 2011, 43–46) but it reached its highest development as a practical guide to the governance of a multistate world-polity under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The Ming dynasty was a native Han Chinese dynasty that directly exercised what might be called full state sovereignty over the entire Han cultural area of the time, an area roughly corresponding to contemporary China minus Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet. The founder of the dynasty, the Hongwu emperor, implemented a neo-Confucian civil religion embodied in a legal code that established the emperor as the embodiment of the mandate of heaven (*tianming*) under which all civilized peoples were to be governed (Jiang, 2015). The *tianming* concept was not new to the Ming dynasty, but its application via Chinese law to the entire East Asian world-polity (*tianxia*) was. Wang (2013, 133) contrasts the Chinese concept of *tianxia* with the Latinate concept of *imperium* ("authority"), which is the root of the English word "empire." He writes that *tianxia*:

> . . . depicts an enlightened realm that Confucian thinkers and mandarins raised to one of universal values that determined who was civilized and who was not . . . *tianxia* was an abstract notion embodying the idea of a superior moral authority that guided behaviour in a civilized world. (Wang, 2013, 133)

Whereas the Roman *imperium* connoted an expressly delegated political authority to command obedience, the Chinese *tianxia* encompassed a moral authority that entitled the state to the obedience of its subjects and suzerains alike.

Those suzerains included three classes of external sovereigns. To the east and southeast of China were a ring of organized agricultural states that had adopted Chinese state Confucianism as a governing principle, accepted the Chinese astrological calendar (along with its cycle of official celebrations), and used Chinese as the official language of government: Korea, Japan, the Ryuku Islands, and Vietnam. These states occupied a position that is in some ways analogous to that occupied by the partially sovereign developed democracies of today's world. They were clearly incorporated into and actively participated in the Chinese *tianxia*. To the south and southwest of China were the organized agricultural states of (what is now) Southeast Asia: Sulu (in today's Philippines), Java, the Muslim maritime sultanates, the Khmer Empire, and Thailand. These non-Confucian states nominally accepted Chinese leadership and often turned to China for the settlement of disputes but maintained independent foreign policies *vis-à-vis* each other. They occupied a position that is in some ways analogous to the compromised sovereignty of today. And to the northwest and north of China were a shifting collection of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribal societies, including Jurchen, Mongolian, Turkic, and Tibetan groups. Ming China engaged with these groups much as the United States today engages with failed and conflict-ridden states. Their chronic problems were to be managed through education in the manners of Chinese civilization.

The political geography of the Ming *tianxia* exhibits only minor topical similarities to the political geography of the contemporary American-centered world-polity. Yet the governance structures of the Ming *tianxia* are strikingly similar. The main institutional mechanism through which the Chinese state managed the East Asian world-polity was the tributary system. In this system, the sovereigns of the other states (and quasi-states) of the East Asian world-polity regularly acknowledged the suzerainty of the Chinese emperor, who in exchange legitimized their rule over their various domains. Khong (2013, 9–13) identifies six key features of the Chinese tributary system: Sinocentrism, hierarchy, cultural affinity, non-coercion, diplomatic rituals, and the conflation of the domestic and interstate spheres. Khong identifies close parallels between Chinese and American practices on all six dimensions, but the last dimension is key. In the Chinese *tianxia*, "the Chinese emperor is the 'governor' of not just China, but 'all under heaven'" (Khong, 2013, 28), the "*paterfamilias* of all mankind" (Mancall, 1984, 38). This implied that the Chinese emperor was ultimately responsible for the sound management of the internal affairs of the non-Chinese states within the Chinese *tianxia*. As a result, the "divergent interests of each tributary *or of groups within each tributary* were . . . balanced by their common acceptance of the emperor's power to recognize local political authority" (Mancall, 1984, 39; emphasis added).

Khong (2013, 29) draws an explicit parallel between the constitutional role of the Chinese emperor as "governor" of the East Asian world-polity and the constitutional role of the president of the United States as "leader of the free world." Khong does not use the actual word "constitutional" but the relationship is clearly constitutional in the sense spelled out by James (1999) and Malcolm (1991): like Ming China's Confucianism, contemporary America's political and economic principles are embedded in the political authority structures of its allied client states. In the American system, democratic governance and respect for private property rights are prerequisites for admission to the society of civilized states (though not necessarily in that order). In an echo of the external application of China's Great Ming Code to the entire Ming *tianxia*, the United States today projects outward to the dependent zones of its world-polity a human rights regime that is overwhelmingly tilted toward the protection of the rights of identity groups that are politically mobilized in the United States. The extraterritorial application of statutory American law is widespread, and frequently demanded by elites in subordinate states. (Cabranes, 2015). Recent high-profile financial and sports corruption cases have even seen the extraterritorial application of American law in Western Europe.

Writing about the potential for a renewed Chinese tributary system in the twenty-first century, Yan (2011, 204) claims that "the idea of sovereign equality among nations has become a universal norm of the contemporary world and it cannot be replaced with the hierarchical degrees of the tribute system." Yet Khong (2013) shows that this is exactly what has happened, albeit with the United States rather than China as the tribute-receiving and legitimacy-dispensing central state. And unlike Ming China, which demonstrated (or bought) its primacy by giving gifts to its tributaries that were of much greater value than the tribute received from them, the United States collects the ongoing tribute of dollar seigniorage while offering nothing of definite value in return. The emerging American *tianxia* is still taking shape, but already it reaches deep into the psyches of most of the world's educated elites through its preeminence in the universities, in entertainment, in business practice, and on the internet. As in Ming China, where non-Chinese elites "participated in a culture that transcended, and knew no specific reference to, particular boundaries or geopolitical institutions" (Mancall,1984, 66), the emerging American *tianxia* is fast becoming "the common ideological heritage of mankind" (Fukuyama, 1989, 9). Liberal democracy married to commodity fetishism is no longer the American culture but the world culture. If not the end of history, this does at least constitute the end of an era—and the beginning of new, millennial world-system.

A post-modern world-system

The military, economic, and cultural power of Ming China was unmatched in East Asia, but in general the successive Ming governments did not seek to expand the territorial extent of the Chinese state itself. Instead they sought to solidify tradi-

tional state and quasi-state boundaries. When disputes arose between subordinate states and quasi-states in the East Asian system, the normal practice was for the aggrieved party to seek a dispensation from the Chinese imperial center. The conceit of *tianxia* was that judgments from the center should in principle be obeyed at the periphery. When the rulers of subordinate states refused to obey the directions of the emperor, the general practice was to attempt to force a change in the ruler of the offending state rather than to use force against the offending state itself. Such a change could sometimes be accomplished through the withholding or redirecting official patents of office—in essence, through the use of tools of diplomatic recognition (Mancall, 1984, 39). Such spiritual tools were always backed up by temporal power, but the final resort to temporal power was viewed as a failure of the proper management of subordinates. Ming China sought to accomplish via internal interference what other world-polities (notably the Roman world-empire) accomplished via external coercion. Ming China acted as (forgive the anachronism) the central state of a post-Westphalian world-polity. The result was a period of extraordinary order and stability (Kang, 2010).

Similarly, the military, economic, and cultural power of the United States is unmatched in the world today, but for more than a century successive American governments have not sought to expand the territorial extent of the American state itself. Instead they have sought to solidify traditional state boundaries. When disputes arise between subordinate states in the American system, aggrieved parties often seek a dispensation from the American imperial center. When the rulers of subordinate states refuse to obey the directions of the president of the United States, the general practice is to attempt to force a change in the ruler of the offending state rather than to use force against the offending state itself. Such a change could often be accomplished through economic sanctions, bombing campaigns, or (in the final instance) military occupation. The spiritual tools of human rights reports, election certifications, and public pronouncements are always backed up by temporal power, which is perhaps used more frequently than it should . . . but the system is still young and not yet mature. The United States is able to achieve via soft power—"attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye, 2004, 256)—the acquiescence that Ming China had to purchase via subsidies and Imperial Rome had to enforce via conquest. The United States is now the central state of a post-Westphalian world-polity. The result is likely to be a period of extraordinary order and stability.

The stability of the American *tianxia* rests on the post-Westphalian intertwining of internal and external affairs. This has aligned the interests (and worldviews) of decision-makers toward cooperation and self-restraint (Chan, 2012). The Westphalian use of force in sub-imperial interstate relations is rarely considered by state leaders to be a realistic policy option. The legitimate use of force is reserved instead to the United States (Babones, 2015). Though the present and increasing dominance of the United States in global affairs may not be apparent in conventional quantitative indicators like time series data on national proportions of global

GDP, it should be remembered that economic preponderance is merely an enabler of power (Nye, 2015). It does not itself constitute authority, *imperium*, or *tianming*. This is made clear by the fact that even though the preponderance of the United States in global GDP was much larger in 1955 than in 1995, the preponderance of American hegemony over the world as a whole was clearly much greater in the 1990s. In any case much of the economic activity that contributes to the dominance of the United States occurs outside the territorial borders of the United States. For example, the global internet, finance, and energy sectors have been to varying degrees endogenized under American control. (Babones, forthcoming)

China's Ming dynasty did ultimately collapse in 1644, to be replaced by the Qing dynasty. While the Chinese concept of *tianxia* was appropriated by the Manchurian Qing dynasty, the East Asian world-polity that was the Ming *tianxia* did not survive as an independent world-system. Beginning in the (long) sixteenth century and with the Ming-Qing transition of 1644 as a symbolic inflection point, the East Asian world-polity was absorbed into the expanding modern world-system. This transition is reflected in the fact that whereas the high Ming emperors self-confidently embraced interactions with the wider world (including the presence of Jesuit missionaries at the Ming court) the Qing emperors threw up a *cordon sanitaire* to exclude, isolate, or neutralize external influences. Contacts with the non-Asian world were strictly limited and delimited. Though Qing dynasty sought to exclude Western influences, the long-distance trade by land and sea that integrated East Asia into the modern world-system created new patterns of interstate relations throughout the region. The Qing dynasty itself retained full independence until 1840, did not fall until 1911, and often prospered over the 267 years of its reign. But it was never the unchallenged central state of a distinct world-system. Its erstwhile client states had important interactions with external powers over which the Qing emperors held no authority. Whatever their rhetorical pretensions, the Qing emperors knew full well that their *tianming* did not encompass all under heaven.

The American *tianxia* is likely to last much longer, if only for the simple reason that there are no other world-systems for it to encounter. Barring science fiction scenarios, the American *tianxia* will play out strictly according to its own internal logic. Understanding that logic should be a major goal of the social science of the twenty-first century. Fukuyama (1989) should be read as prescient first attempt to achieve just such an understanding. It might be said that the American *tianxia* is the universal homogeneous state that Fukuyama was looking for but did not quite find at the end of history in 1989. Its civil religion of liberal democracy is more expansive, more universal, and (one might say) more attractive than the Ming civil religion of state Confucianism. Whereas Ming China exported governing ideas, the United States exports governing ideals. As a result,

> . . . [the] American *tianxia* . . . has a missionary drive that is backed by unmatched military power and political influence. Compared to the Chinese concept, it is not passive

> and defensive; rather, unlike other universal ideals, it is supported by a greater capacity to expand. (Wang, 2013, 135)

The anarchic modern world-system of constant interstate conflict lasted five hundred years. The hierarchical millennial world-system of regime management may last a thousand.

Pronouncements of thousand year reichs are always ripe for ridicule, perhaps rightfully so. But (as Wallerstein recognized) world-polities are highly stable systems. The Roman polity persisted over a continuous history of 2206 years (753 BC – AD 1453). It was a world-polity spanning the entire Mediterranean basin for more than 800 years, from the defeat of Carthage to the rise of the Caliphate. The Yuan-Ming-Qing polity lasted 640 years (AD 1271–1911), including perhaps 250 years as the central state of a much larger world-polity that spanned all of East Asia. In the absence of contact with the larger world-economy the Ming world-polity would certainly have continued in existence, or have transferred over into the next dynasty. As history actually did unfold the only factor compromising the Qing dynasty's preponderance over East Asia was the intrusion of the European maritime powers. Other, less paradigmatic cases of world-empire were similarly long-lasting—despite the lack of modern transportation and information technology. By comparison a world-polity that has the capacity to monitor substantially all global communications has awesome powers of stabilization indeed. Increasing computing power and the advance of machine learning will only reinforce the concentration of political power at the center. Whether or not genuine political authority will follow is to be seen.

The Westphalian system of state sovereignty arose in the context of the 1640s consolidation of the modern world-system. Using conventional symbolic dates, the period from its emergence (1492) to its consolidation (1648) lasted 156 years. The entire reign of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) might be considered the period of consolidation of the Ming world-polity, giving 97 years from emergence to consolidation. The American *tianxia* may be said to have emerged in 1945 and consolidated after 2001: the Westphalian principles that were effectively discarded at Yalta were finally disavowed after the September 11 attacks. Thus in comparative and world historical terms, the new millennial world-system is still quite young. The states—and people—of the world are still learning how to inhabit it. The United States, long a magnet for the energetic and ambitious, has in the twenty-first century become the destination of choice for the world's elites, particularly for the Chinese elite. Just as Josephus and Peter made their way to Rome, in the post-modern American *tianxia* the elite citizen of the world is inexorably drawn to the United States. Wherever they live, and whatever their opinions of the United States, elites recognize the value of being American. Fukuyama's liberal, universal, homogeneous world-polity may not be the United States per se. It is instead the American *tianxia* writ large to cover the entire world.

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4

Pre-emptive Decline: The Weakening of Great Powers and Geopolitical Volatility

Robert A. Denemark

Fear of national decline generates a potent psychological response that leads to the framing of, and support for, policies that are counterproductive in characteristic ways. I trace the resulting process, labeled "pre-emptive decline," as it emerged in debates over educational policy and reform in the United Kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth century, and in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. Decisions were to be made, significant support existed for forward-looking change, but the policies adopted in the United Kingdom, and the social forces that were mobilized in the United States, were oriented toward social myths and archaic policy options. This is exactly the response that pre-emptive decline predicts. Fear of decline appears to be self-fulfilling in both cases.

Introduction: Pre-emptive decline

The most dangerous time in the life-cycle of any geopolitical system is when its great powers are facing decline. Rising powers will prefer a different set of global rules, established powers will seek to maintain the status quo, and the result is increased tension, arms build-ups, tightened alliance structures, and a greater tendency for violence. Some geopolitical perspectives recognize the incentives to engage in violence as inherent in the "position" of states. But geopolitics is not simply about fixed coordinates, it is also about their effective meanings. We know that technology changes the meaning of distance and "natural" boundaries like oceans. Likewise, great powers evidence life cycles that impact their perceptions of their rightful "place" in the system. In the decline phase, great powers evidence a variety of sensitivities that make their geopolitical "positions" especially relevant. Whether perceptions are accurate or not, fear of decline gives rise to a dangerous heightening of self-doubt and an increase in frustratingly self-defeating behavior. This is a process I label "pre-emptive decline."

I suggest that when popular opinion within a great power adopts the issue of decline, resources are squandered on maladaptive policy shifts and ill-conceived uses of force. This process is well understood in the study of corporations, military units, and bureaucracies. Typical responses to fear of decline include (1) the tendency of leaders with high levels of self-esteem to overcompensate in the face of risk

to their organizations, overestimate their capacity, adopt risky behavior even when they are unprepared to prevail, and mindlessly persist in such behaviors; and (2) the tendency of those facing status threats is to revert to the most traditional, apocryphal, even mythological beliefs regarding what made them great in the first place. An attempt to reproduce the conditions evident in these founding myths generates harmful policy tendencies that waste resources and further erode their positions.

This work undertakes three tasks. First, I will review the literature that outlines the processes that lead to both overcompensation and reversion to tradition. This material is reviewed more fully in Denemark (2013). Second, I will concentrate on the cultural elements of this process and begin with a review of evidence of pre-emptive decline in Britain during the period from about 1860 to about 1890. Prominent debates in this period concerned changes in educational curricula. Classical education was unhelpful, and a move toward more modern subjects, especially and particularly the study of science and technology, was considered most important for continued success in the areas of national security and economic prosperity. This material is reviewed more fully in Denemark (2015).

Finally, I will consider a similar debate regarding science curricula, and concern for science overall, that took place in the United States in the period from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, and again in the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. In the British and United States cases there were decisions to be made, and instead of adopting forward-looking reforms (as had been done in the past and as were being proposed at the time), the actions taken reflected an expressly backward-looking search for solutions in the context of the foundation myths of the society in question. The resulting policies were (and are) wasteful and counterproductive. This is pre-emptive decline.

The psychology of pre-emptive decline

High self-esteem is a fundamental element in the personalities of individuals who are successful, in great part because they make sound decisions about appropriate goals and necessary levels of effort (Sanderlands et al., 1988). Such individuals are also vulnerable to three sets of errors when the status of their organizations is threatened. They are (1) overly optimistic; (2) tend to respond with increases persistence (but no change in strategy); and (3) tend to engage in self-defeating patterns of behavior as a result. Threats to the status of the group are interpreted as individual threats, in contradistinction to those in low-status groups (Simon et al., 2001, 311).

Individuals have a natural and healthy tendency to over-emphasize their positive traits (Taylor et al., 1989). This is helpful so long as the exaggeration is not too far out of alignment with actual abilities. But those who represent significantly powerful organizations tend to move self-perception out of the realm of acceptable exaggeration. Baumeister (1989, 186) traces several historical instances where the exaggeration of abilities led to economic, political, or military disaster and concludes:

> . . . one important mechanism for the self-destructive consequences of power is the expansion of illusions beyond the optimal margin. Initially, gains in power overcome depressing assessments of the status quo, and the expansion of the margin of illusion may generate excitement and attract additional supporters. But as the margin of illusion continues to expand, it renders the individual or group increasingly prone to make nonoptimal decisions . . . and these may contain the danger of self-destructive consequences.

Poor policies, overcompensation, and violence

Poor decision-making follows personal overestimation, and emerges in response to three tendencies. First, there is a tendency to over-commit to initial strategies. Attempts by individuals with high self-esteem to deal with a given challenge in the same (unsuccessful) manner persist surprisingly well beyond the point of their becoming counterproductive, and regardless of contrary advice (McFarlin et al., 1984). Self-defeating strategies like reducing preparatory efforts emerge (Tice, 1991). Baumeister and Scher (1988) record a tendency to engage in poor bargaining strategies that enhance the risk of failure. In general, judgment declines and there is an increasing willingness to undertake badly calculated risks (Baumeister et al. 1993). Theories of identity predict that the receipt of negative social feedback, which is inconsistent with a given "standard of identity," will generate not only a response aimed at bringing identity and feedback into alignment (Burke, 1991), but "more extreme versions of behavior associated with that identity" (Willer et al., 2013). In this way evidence of failure can reinforce failure.

It is a relatively short jump from threats to high-status groups that are populated by individuals with high levels of self-esteem, to the choice of more violent means for addressing that perceived threat. Several mechanisms help generate resentment, increase misunderstanding, and justify violence. We may begin with the tendency of threats to group status to generate defensiveness, even when the threats are hypothetical. For example, conflict between State A and State B may be viewed as a threat by State C if it fears any change in the status of members of the system, even if neither States A nor B have any interest in challenging State C.

Another source of tension emerges because dominant groups create hierarchy-enhancing myths that are deployed when they are threatened. There is a strong tendency to affix blame for the "threat" to members who are acting contrary to these myths (Cohrs, 2012). Delegitimization of critics is a first critical step in releasing moral and normative restraints against the use of violence (Bar-Tal and Hammack, 2012).

Prospect theory

The findings of prospect theory (eg. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Taliaferro, 2010) also lend support to the increased tendency toward risk-taking behavior and violence. Applications of prospect theory to international relations stress the greater tendency of risky behavior in the context of potential losses. Increasing use of coercive diplomacy or military intervention are likely outcomes (Taliaferro, 2010). The logic of the link between identity, status threat, and violence, is especially well understood in the study of ethnic group conflict. Horowitz (1985) traces the literature that ties social change, to increased desire to protect group status, to the increase in prejudice and the legitimation of violence. The use of traditional symbols to generate "new" hatreds is traced in a particularly insightful volume by Kaufman (2001). These myths and symbols are well-suited for such manipulation given the psychological dynamics of identity, bias, and related perceptions of threat (Kaufman, 2015).

Taken together, threats to high status groups are internalized, lead to enhanced levels of in-group cohesion, to discrimination against others, to delegitimation, and this facilitates a range of over-compensation, risk-taking, and violence.

Maladaptive responses to crisis: Restricted information, control, and tradition

The tendency toward overcompensation, maladaptive policies, and violence is reinforced by another problematic outcome of status threats to organizations populated by leaders with high self-esteem. Janis (1972) traces the organizational pathologies of governments under crisis conditions. The two most problematic responses are 1) self-imposed restrictions on incoming information, especially the censoring of unwelcome facts or criticisms; and 2) a constriction in control, where a small group of powerful individuals centralize decision-making. Taking this analysis one logical step further, Staw, Sandelands and Dutton (1981) suggest that these two processes will generate a tendency to respond to threats with well-learned or traditional behaviors. Dozens of studies in the 1950s and early 1960s tie stress to restricted attention, increased anxiety, and arousal, all of which tend to narrow perception, reduce flexibility, and increase the use of "well-learned or habituated" responses (Staw et al., 1981, 505). Staw and his colleagues argue that at the group level we may expect increased cohesiveness, constriction of leadership and control, and increased expectations of in-group uniformity, such that:

> . . . a threat to the vital interests of an entity, be it an individual, group, or organization, will lead to forms of rigidity . . . Thus, maladaptive cycles are predicted to follow from threats which encompass major environmental changes since prior, well-learned responses are inappropriate under new conditions. (Staw et al., 1981, 502)

Several studies have confirmed the relationship between stress, group threat, and reversion to tradition. Both Shaham, Singer, and Schaeffer (1992), and Klein (1996), note that individuals tend to use existing heuristics when subjected to stress, even during relatively simple tasks. Schwabe and Wolf (2009) outline the long history of research on the relationship between stress and "reversion to tradition" that has evolved in the study of neuroscience and brain chemistry. The neuro-chemical foundations of the tendency are made clear by Hermans et al. (2011) in a study that maps the relevant neural network. The condition is so well understood that drugs have been developed to intervene in the process. These are most often prescribed for musicians who suffer from stage freight.

George et al. (2006) suggest that the reason that group threats generate traditional responses is that there is a desire to reestablish a degree of control. Control is often perceived to exist if the group under threat exhibits behaviors generally expected under such circumstances. Such behaviors offer comfort and solace "through conforming to normative expectations" as does simply "mimicking the organizing templates . . . that are viewed as legitimate" (George et al., 2006, 355). And Ocasio (1993, 33) suggests that:

> Economic adversity increases reliance on core cultural assumptions, values, and beliefs, as interpreted by participants in organizational decision-making, increases the rate of adoption of solutions that are consistent with the core cultural assumptions and decreases the rate of assumptions of other forms of organizational change.

The link between status threats and a reliance on the most traditional and rigid responses is well-supported.

The British example

In an earlier paper (Denemark, 2015) I argued that the British exhibited this exact pathology as questions about their ability to overcome challenges to their declining global status began to emerge. This took place in the period from roughly 1860 to 1890, shortly after which the power of the British was not simply questioned but had quite clearly diminished. Rapid social change had set the stage for this process.

Social upheaval

The English nation rested on a set of cultural pillars that included the Church; a belief in the liberal economic order and the industrialization it brought; and views of traditional family life. These institutions were in decline long before Britain's global position actually began to erode. Only half the population identified with the official doctrines of the Church of England by the time of the Census of 1851. Urban workers were particularly dismissive. The Church itself was divided in its response, and

the state was altering exclusionary laws so that Catholics (from 1829) and even Jews (from 1858) attained full civil rights.

Liberalism and the industry it brought with it had also come to be questioned. The repeal of the Corn Laws of 1846, which signaled the rise of the free market and the decline of traditional land owners, undercut conditions for nearly one million agricultural laborers and sent them to urban areas (Hobsbawm, 1968, 93). In 1860 the textile industry went into decline, leaving workers with neither jobs nor places to return. Liberal orthodoxy was blamed, as widespread poverty and social instability saw socialist and protectionist platforms emerge even in mainstream parties (Bédarida, 1990, 107).

Traditional family life declined with the mass urbanization of this period. Science and technology (hygiene, nutrition, birth control) brought a new sense of control to what had largely been considered traditional and unchanging patterns of life (Briggs, 1987, 287).

In this same period, public exhibitions (and contests among industries of various nations for technical prizes) focused attention on the link between science and industry (Saffin, 1973,194–195). The weak performance of British entries in the Great Exhibition of 1862 showed that others were getting ahead (Pollard, 1989, 116–117). By 1867, and again in 1870, British industrial dominance appeared to be in retreat, and concern with the education of the general population in science and technology emerged (Sanderson, 1995, 62). In this context, new challenges came to be seen less as hurdles to be overcome and more as none-too-subtle messages that something had gone fundamentally wrong.

The educational system

One of the few consistencies in the voluminous literature on British decline is the frequency with which blame is laid at the schoolhouse door. Schools were criticized as lacking in any science and technology (hereafter "S&T") offerings that would help Britain cope with its difficulties. Part of the reason for this was inertia. Education was private or church-sponsored, designed to cultivate good aristocrats, good Christians, and foster effective social control. Classics dominated the curriculum. Schools ignored all elements of modern society including the English language itself, geography, mathematics, and science.

Debates of various sorts emerged over whether, and if so, how, the lack of science education harmed the economy (McCloskey, 1970; Payne, 1990; Robbins, 1990; Rubinstein, 1990; and especially Pollard, 1989). While traditional economic measures did not suggest a need for more science training (eg. wages were not rising in this area), Pollard (1989, 142) concludes that British business needed science to remain competitive, did not realize, ignored or even opposed the extension of relevant educational systems, and suffered as a result.

Classical education was also said to be responsible for the gentrification of the business class. The purchase of country estates, and the cultivation of a dislike for the "dirty" job of industry, were part and parcel of the educational messages of the day (Wiener, 1981; Daunton, 1989; Taylor, 1996, 163). Education was also thought to be politically and culturally dangerous. It would make it more difficult to keep people in their "proper place" both in the social order and on the shop floor (Safin, 1973, 139; Pollard, 1989, 207; Sanderson, 1995, 12). It would necessitate the raising of taxes, and increase pressure on the franchise (Sanderson, 1999, 209).

The final criticism was that the educational system was disorganized. There were overlapping constituencies even among the rather minor educational duties undertaken by the state (Pollard, 1989, 119, 145). Educational innovators were especially interested in touring German facilities until the war scare of 1859, after which all things German lost their cachet (Newsome, 1961, 237).

Unexpected maladaptive reform

What followed were a series of highly visible, highly popular, and prestigious Parliamentary Commissions on education at every level. Scientists created lobbies of both the general and the highly elite sort. All three of the major Parliamentary Commissions on secondary education that convened between 1858 and 1864 found S&T studies lacking and urged, sometimes demanded, their adoption. The lack of S&T was identified as "a great practical evil," "wrong," and there was popular support for the conclusion that "the neglect of the natural sciences is the most lamentable feature of the public school syllabus at this time" (Saffin, 1973, 239, 68). Later commissions reiterated calls for including science, lamented the slow pace of change, and urged that additional funds be spent (Pollard, 1989, 118–119, 245). Social commentators expected a "revolution" in the educational system, but were surprised by the outcome (Mack, 1941, 103–104). Fears of British decline raised questions about the fundamental character of the nation. Newsome (1961, 3) argues that:

> The cry had gone up for educational reform. Those who were in a position to carry out reform responded by looking to the past for their ideal. They strove to return to first principles, to original intentions; to fulfil what the founders had hoped for . . . .

Instead of adopting an educational system suitable for the modern competitive economy, they decided that "the past was to revivify the present" and noted that England's strength rested in the timeless values of the countryside, even though that countryside no longer existed (Briggs, 1965, 381). These ideals included patriotism; Christianity; social hierarchy; defense of the empire; and character (Saffin, 1973, 272; Bédarida, 1990, 80). The Bible and the Roman Empire were to be the models for the regeneration of the British spirit (Bédarida, 1990, 93).

Fearing economic and political decline, looking to a mythological rural past, and seeking refuge behind the empire, the new educational paradigm was labeled "Muscular Christianity" and was built around service (Newsome, 1961, 235–237). Put less grandly, one prominent headmaster noted that such changes were explicitly designed to make students into "handy rifle skirmishers," while another talked about his school as "a splendid institution for . . . turning out Army officer material" (Newsome, 1961, 198, 201–202). Another bragged that the changes meant the end of some of the few existing science programs (Newsome, 1961, 201–202). This is what emerged in the context of a debate about national character that was driven by perceptions of decline. These perceptions drove calls for resurgence, leading to a focus on the past and various myths retarding national character and the foundations of national strength (Sanderson, 1995, 62).

The British are not alone in this backward looking mechanism for approaching tomorrow's problems with today's policies embodying yesterday's myths. Taylor (1996, 170) finds this same process, and this same outcome, in the decline of the Dutch. Thomson (1998, 80–96, 117–118, 187) uncovers much the same process in the cases of Byzantium, Venice, and Spain. The question for us is whether we might also find this in the United States?

The U.S. example

The British example establishes a strong link between fear of decline and over-compensation that leads to self-defeating behavior. The U.S. example, while not yet fully reviewed, offers some enticing evidence. Unlike Britain in the 19th century, with its relatively small size and unitary political structure, the United States diffuses power over educational standards quite broadly. Local, state, and national policies could be contradictory. As a result, fear of decline could express itself unequally across populations and regions. This more variegated response to socio-political and economic challenges is well illustrated in the United States of the early 1960s and again from the mid-1970s into the 1980s.

Religious faith is the most unique pillar of U.S. political culture. The earliest settlers to the United States were fired by a sense of mission. From this perspective the United States is literally a "chosen nation" and was required to retain rigorous national standards to remain worthy of the role for which it was created (Murphy, 2009, 10–12). According to a study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2002), the United States was the only developed nation in which a majority reported that religion still played a "very important" role in their lives.

Religion is unique explicitly because it is so closely associated with the perceived global mission of the United States. Murphy (2009, 13) argues that:

> At the grandest level, we find interpretations of American history that root themselves in myths of the nation's origin and view its rise to world power as part of a divine bless-

> ing bestowed on the earliest settlers and national founders. This inheritance . . . shapes, or ought to shape the political decisions of subsequent generations.

Individual piety was aggregated and became social morality, which justified the great role the United States was to play. Loss of that moral stature would signal not just the rise of decadence but the loss of God's favor, and therefore the end of the rationale and special mission of the United States. The term "God and Country" was no empty phrase, nor was the order arbitrary.

In his prophetic treatment of anti-intellectualism, Hofstadter (1963) notes the critical role that "mission" played in the vision of the population regarding the project they were engaged in. In the religious communities that founded this country and animated its institutions and policies for three centuries, the argument was about which group would lay legitimate claim to the special God-given mission of the United States, not whether there was such a mission or whether we could afford to take actions that threatened this special relationship. This conflict has animated several serious upheavals, as when the established (17th and 18th century Puritan) church was challenged by primitive preachers who lacked education but experienced a "calling." These "native" preachers were dismissive of the sterile narrative of religious life that was offered by traditional clergy. Education in general was attacked, and there were even revivalist book burnings (Hofstadter, 1963, 70). Though charismaticism declined at the end of the 19th century, it would return when individuals became concerned with the state of the nation. Reinhold Niebuhr (1927, 2–3) argued that:

> Extreme orthodoxy betrays by its very frenzy that the poison of skepticism has entered the soul of the church, for men insist most vehemently upon their certainties when their hold upon them has been shaken. Frantic orthodoxy is a method for obscuring doubt.

The moral purpose of the nation gave it the power to prevail. Lacking that purpose, or in the absence of that sense of mission, there was no point in even attempting to prevail.

The relationship between religion and perceptions of the strength, mission, and vitality, creates a fascinating dynamic. When actions contrary to God's will appear to dominate the populace, there is concern that the decline in the moral fabric of the people will cascade and threaten not just the health of the country, but of the world as well. Alternatively, when people fear that the country is declining they search the community for evidence of "immoral" actions and fret for the future of both our country and the world. Murphy (2009, 101, 10) argues that "In the Christian Right jeremiad . . . the American experience is part of God's unfolding plan for human history" and is designed to remind us that since the United States is a "chosen nation," having "strayed from the path of rightly ordered politics and society" has

implications that "are not merely social and political but world-historical, even transcendent, in nature."

Sputnik and decline

One way to understand this process is to look at the challenge offered by the launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, by the USSR in 1957. This caused a double-edged crisis in the United States that had significant religions implications. First, the apparent superiority of the USSR caused a greater concern than earlier challenges posed by events like the partition of Berlin, Soviet acquisition of an atomic bomb, or the victory of the Communist Chinese. These setbacks were surrounded by questions about internal subversives. Our leaders were blamed for not being sufficiently vigilant. The perception was that these failures could have been successfully faced with strength and determination. But Sputnik was not something the USSR stole from the United States. Instead, it was an advance that the Soviet "system" had facilitated and that the U.S. "system" had failed to foresee, halt, or preempt. This generated the serious concern that we were declining in our ability to compete.

Sputnik initiated a whole-sale turn-around in perceptions of the need for science in official circles (Hofstadter, 1963, 5). But popular perceptions focused instead on the more fundamental question of what had "gone wrong" with the United States, and how it must have strayed from the righteous path (Eve and Harrold, 1992). President Eisenhower did not consider Sputnik a serious threat, but he did believe that an increase in support for U.S. science and technology education was called for. His low-keyed public response included a series of educational reforms. The federal government, in the guise of the National Science Foundation (NSF), designed new curricula and sponsored new textbooks that emerged in the early 1960s. Chemistry and physics were unproblematic, but biology proved a mine-field. While the official response to Sputnik was to enhance education, the popular response was to reconsider the fundamental roots of the U.S. character. The most important of these roots was religious faith, and the new biology curriculum was antithetical to the pious prescription for halting decline.

The push to modernize science in the wake of Sputnik was generally viewed by the government as a matter of national defense. Such initiatives were usually well supported, especially by conservatives. The textbooks that the NSF sponsored may have offended those with traditional religious proclivities, but their reception among the broad range of conservatives, who had criticized the science curriculum for most of the 1950s for its lack of rigor, was far more hostile than could have been predicted (Nelkin, 1982, 58). Religion emerged as not simply a pillar of political culture, it was now viewed as *the solution* to the threat of decline that Sputnik illustrated. In a 1958 survey of school principals, the majority believed that science should receive additional coverage, but a stunning 80% believed that religion was the real solution (Larson, 2003, 91). Science was blamed for declining religious be-

lief as well as for a bevy of social ills that generated decadence and national decay, while religion was identified as the way to address that threat by re-introducing a sense of moral purpose to our study of nature (Nelkin, 1982, 21, 58–59).

We also see church demography change during this period. The growth of evangelical churches and strong religion was a palliative to increased social dislocation and helped fuel the arguments against the teaching of evolution (Denemark, 2010). "Textbook watchers," who had been active since the 1920s, suddenly found ready audiences. In 1961 the first major "modern" anti-evolutionary "science" book, *The Genesis Flood*, was published to significant accolades and sales. By 1963 the drive to control the spread of evolutionary ideas for the sake of maintaining godliness and morality, the drive against the new NSF-generated science curriculum, and a renewed electoral focus on school boards, was well advanced. Anti-evolution legislation, dormant since the 1920s, was again being introduced (Larson, 2003, 47). The issue was supercharged in 1962 when the United States was rocked by Supreme Court rulings that restricted school prayer. The issues were conflated, and drove a largely successful movement to capture school board seats and positions on committees charged with text-book selection. Publishers knew they had a better chance to acquire lucrative contracts if evolution was watered down or missing altogether from their texts (Scoog, 2005).

The dislocations of the 1970s

Between 1963 and about 1968, when a new series of anti-evolution laws adopted by states were struck down by the courts, the furor over evolution declined (Larson, 2003, 148). Evolution was still connected to broader concerns regarding issues like school prayer, but had clearly taken a back seat. It is important to note that the period during which efforts to remove evolutionary teaching from the schools was rich with new movements and ideas. The mid-1960s saw the rise of believers in extraterrestrial visits, a fascination with extrasensory perception, eastern philosophy, free love, and the drug culture. But renewed concern for evolutionary teaching did not emerge until these movements were well past their primes, and it would arise in the absence of the introduction of new books or new rulings that directly threatened religious institutions. Once again, I contend, fear of decline was the central driver of concerns over the finding of viable educational system.

The decade of the 1970s began with the publication of Alvin Toffler's best-selling *Future Shock*. The pace of change had increased to the point that it would be difficult for people to cope. This was true in every facet of life, and Toffler argued that it would generate a fundamental fear of the future. A set of difficult-to-understand changes appeared, as if on cue, in the wake of that publication. The end of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971 was not generally understood by the public, but the economic upheaval (inflationary pressures, import taxes, price controls) were a certain sign of disquiet. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OAPEC) was founded by the most radical oil producing states, and U.S. involvement in the 1973 Yom Kippur War saw the first cartel-generated fuel shortages. But nothing added more to the national sense of decline than the loss of the war against Vietnam. The United States negotiated a cease-fire after a decade of hostilities and began to withdraw in 1973. Religious leaders touted the defeat in Vietnam as a warning from God (Murphy, 2009, 102).

Religious organizations of all sorts began to proliferate in response. Evangelical churches blossomed in the 1970s in fast-growing communities populated by the relatively well educated and well off, like Orange County, California (Hinch, 2014, 4). Angry and newly assertive fundamentalists actually engaged in riots to force their religious concerns on unwelcoming agencies (Nelkin, 1982, 95). The United States elected its first expressly evangelical president, Jimmy Carter, though he proved a major disappointment in that his personal life was governed by religious doctrine, but his policies remained centrist in nature. In response, the more conservative Christian sects began to mobilize for political purposes in contradiction to much of their earlier teachings. Emblematic among them was the work of Richard Falwell, who sponsored a series of "I Love America" rallies in 1976 which evolved into "The Moral Majority." Small religious schools saw their enrollments increase. Falwell's Lynchburg Baptist College grow from meager enrollments at its founding in 1971 to new heights, and changed its name to Liberty Baptist College in 1976.

The anti-evolution movement adopted new strategies. "Creationism," which was the term used to contrast the Biblical understanding of cosmology from the scientific version, changed its name to "creation science" and altered its strategy to argue for "equal time" (Larson, 2003, 124). This tapped a large and popular vein among Americans, with half admitting to believe in the Biblical account of creation, and over 80% supporting the teaching of "both" perspectives (Larson, 2003, 130). A new series of political maneuvers threatened the autonomy of the NSF in an attempt to dissuade the organization from additional action on science curricula.

"Creation science" eventually proved unsuccessful. Courts generally accepted definitions of science that disenfranchised "special creation" as a relevant topic, so another shift took place in 1978 when "intelligent design" was adopted as the new term for creationism. This perspective criticized the "theory" that specialized organs, like eyes, or special forms of life, like humans, could arise from an arbitrary process, and the alternative was the idea that some intelligence (unnamed so as to avoid obvious legal pitfalls) must be implicated in the process. New institutions and think-tanks gathered the faithful, sponsored the writing of books that reconsidered the idea of creation, charted legal strategies, reviewed textbooks, organized lobby efforts, and sponsored events to mobilize relevant voters.

Further dislocations followed. In 1979 the U.S.-supported Shah of Iran was toppled and a radical Islamic republic took the U.S. diplomatic legation hostage. Stagflation gave way to inflation in the range of 20%. Fueled by fear and supported by a large and newly politicized religious right, Ronald Reagan defeated the incum-

bent Carter and brought religious policies into the Administration. Fear of political and economic decline was now very expressly and popularly defined in terms of moral decay. The government was identified as unsalvageable and was to be hobbled. In 1985 Grover Norquist founded an anti-tax group, apparently at the behest of President Reagan, from which he launched his efforts to "cut government in half in twenty-five years, to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub." States returned to court to support anti-evolution laws. Equal time bills were adopted, for example, in Louisiana, for the first time with support from voters and legislators in both rural and urban areas (Larson, 2003, 130–145). NSF curriculum programs were definitively shuttered (Nelkin, 1982, 124). Creationism was supported by new federal justices appointed by the president (Larsen, 2003, 174).

In court testimony over the Arkansas case, Professor George Marsden (1982, 69), a religious historian who has been on the faculty at Calvin College, Duke Divinity School, and the University of Notre Dame, suggested that:

> . . . after World War I there was a period much like the period today [1982] where there was a sense of general unease for the progress of American Civilization. There was a sense that something had gone wrong; a rather indefinite sense, not a real disaster, much like the 1980s, it seems to me. And in that context, that saying evolution is a problem was something that became convincing to a wide variety of people. So out of that World War I concern for the progress of civilization, evolution began to emerge as a symbol of the Fundamentalist fight against secularism.

This round of panic would dissipate at the end of the 1980s. Popular perceptions of decline began to subside. The scientific community mobilized, anti-evolutionary legal challenges were struck down, and the G.H.W. Bush administration was far less concerned with this issue. Most critically, the USSR self-destructed. Nonetheless, it would take years for arguments about the teaching of "intelligent design" to work their way through the courts. The most important case was not settled until 2005. In the interim, millions of dollars in legal costs would be wasted by school districts and states, and fear of attention and controversy had kept evolution out of textbooks and classrooms (Skoog, 2005). Anti-science sentiments, policies, and budgets, have returned with a vengeance in the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The winning campaign slogan reflected a desire for the resurrection of America.

Does it matter?

The question we must ask is whether it makes any difference that the anti-evolution movement has worked to keep scientific concepts, methods, and arguments out of the schools during specific periods? First, there is no small irony surrounding the fact that the first major post-World War II "fear of decline" was generated by a scientific breakthrough by the USSR, and efforts to redress the gap were undercut by the

conservative evangelical and fundamentalist religious groups that most feared and hated the Soviet Union. Writing in 1959, Admiral Hyman Rickover, credited with the creation of a nuclear powered navy, argued that "Our technical supremacy has been called into question" and urged parents to force schools to enhance the science curriculum. This was to no avail. Nelkin (1982, 39 for Rickover quote, 154) argues that the economic challenges of the early 1980s would also have benefitted from an enhanced science curriculum, and concludes that:

> Ironically, the educational programs initially developed to promote scientific and technical competence have been eliminated just at a time when our national competence in the face of economic competition is once again in question.

In the British case there was a debate as to whether a lack of science education really had an impact on the British state and economy. The conclusion was that it did. This is all the more likely in the United States. Post World War II lead economic sectors were all founded upon scientific breakthroughs in areas like electronics and aerospace (Modelski and Thompson, 1996, 25). The science curriculum has long been a sore point in the history of U.S. education, in great part because the link between science and economic growth is clear. By the early 1990s more than 300 reports were published in support of reforming science education (Bybee, 1995). While reports by the NSF or the American Association for the Advancement of Science might be criticized as self-interested, support for science, technology, and innovation were also found in the publications of the Brookings Institution (West, 2011), the National Bureau of Economic Research (Basu et al., 2001), and the World Bank (Qiang, 2009). All conclude that real growth and real increases in productivity are generated primarily, if not solely, by science and technology.

Jelen and Lockett (2014, 2) argue that:

> . . . the ongoing nature of the controversy [over the teaching of evolution] has occasioned intense political conflict. . . and has had an important effect on the delivery of science education at the middle school and secondary levels . . . .

They are speaking for a majority of scholars who consider this question. Anti-evolutionary movements do more than retard the study of biology. First, they strip the populace of information necessary to understand public issues and make a range of decisions about their lives. The medical field has grown in size and sophistication, and questions about personal health choices, much less moral and ethical concerns, emerge that can only be dealt with by a scientifically literate population (Nisbet, 2005). This is also true in the environmental area, where the regulation of certain substances is based on scientific understandings of human and reproductive health (Brewer and Ley, 2013; 2014). Second, and more fundamentally, attacks of this sort work to delegitimize the entire corpus of science as a field that is inherently con-

trary to the appropriate authority of God. This conflict becomes less an argument over content, or even the implications of content, and more an argument about the epistemological tension that arises when science and faith seek authority over knowledge and cosmology (Gauchat, 2014, 338). The result tends to be a reduction not just in knowledge about, but in perceptions of the relevance of, legitimacy of, or support for, science in society as a whole.

Scholars are finding that support for science is eroding among select populations due to faith-based attacks. Those who self-identify as "conservatives" had the highest levels of trust in science (relative to "moderates" or "liberals") in 1974 and now have the lowest levels of trust. Areas where religion and faith overlap are more and more subject to a popular environment in which lack of understanding of science makes it easy to degrade support. Public understanding of science has always been and remains quite low (Miller, 2004), leaving science vulnerable to attacks that substitute easy-to-understand polemics for difficult-to-understand technical arguments. As the range of issues that evangelicals care about extends, the range of issues over which scientific evidence will be trusted will tend to shrink. Finally, neo-liberal attacks on science have taken a new direction in arguments that government funding should avoid universities and research institutions and go directly to corporations who will "put the knowledge to use" in a more immediate manner (Gauchat, 2012, 183). The narrowing of science that would inevitably occur under such a situation is a serious threat. Pre-emptive decline has implications for the way in which we consider geopolitical struggle, and for understanding the types of policies and pathologies we should expect from great powers during certain portions of their life-cycles.

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5

Political Economy of Secession: Global Waves of State-Seeking Nationalism, 1492 to Present

Sahan S. Karatasli

Through an empirical analysis of nationalist movements of the world from 1492 to 2013, this chapter argues that state-seeking nationalism has been characterized by a cyclical pattern in core and semi-peripheral regions of the capitalist world economy. Due to uneven development of capitalism, this pattern is very different from the patterning of peripheral decolonization. In core and semi-peripheral regions of the world-economy, state-seeking nationalist movements tend to rise during "contentious conjunctures" periods of historical capitalism—which are characterized by simultaneous and prolonged crises in social, economic and geopolitical spheres—and decline during material expansion and world-hegemony periods. Empirical analysis presented in the chapter shows that financial expansion processes produce contentious conjunctures and hence contribute to the emergence of global waves of nationalism. After presenting the empirical pattern in the light of statistical and comparative-historical evidence, the chapter examines different phases of contentious conjunctures and discusses three major mechanisms that produce global waves of state-seeking nationalism.

Introduction

On October 1, 2017, more than two million Catalans demanded an independent republic in a referendum which had been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of Spain. Independence side won receiving 92 percent of the votes. Consequently, on October 27, the Parliament of Catalonia declared unilateral independence from Spain. As a response, the Spanish government took unprecedented measures to avoid Catalan independence and assumed direct control over some of Catalonia's autonomous powers.

Catalan referendum was not the only bid for independence that recently took place. It occurred almost simultaneously with the non-binding independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, where 93 percent of the voters demanded independence. The Catalan and the Kurdish efforts for independence also took place during heightened debates regarding a second independence referendum for Scotland. In the previous 2014 referendum, Scottish pro-independence vote had increased to a historic 45 percent but failed to achieve the necessary majority. At the time, the main dilemma many Scottish voters faced was that if they gained their indepen-

dence, they would be unable to stay in the European Union. Now, the tables have turned. During the 2016 "Brexit" vote, 62 percent of the Scots—as well as 56 percent of the Northern Irish population— voted to stay in the European Union while England and Wales decided to leave. Within hours of the closing of the polls, many pro-independence parties and groups in Scotland and Northern Ireland—first and foremost the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Sinn Fein—raised the possibility of independence referenda under these radically new conditions.

Far from being isolated incidents, these events are all interlinked parts of radical changes we have been observing in the geopolitical landscape of the world since the turn of the 21st century. In recent years, we have been witnessing a global resurgence of nationalism by communities belonging to existing states (i.e. state-led nationalism) as well as nationalist tendencies by stateless communities aiming to produce new independent states (i.e. state-seeking nationalism). Although these two tendencies are closely linked to each other, the primary focus of this chapter is the latter tendency: the curious and unexpected resurgence of state-seeking nationalist movements around the world.

In contrast to perspectives claiming that the importance of nation-states would decline and secessionist nationalism and other kinds of state-formation attempts would gradually move to the dustbin of history due to forces of globalization, a wide spectrum of state-seeking movements are rapidly resurfacing around the world in synchrony with rising economic, geopolitical and social crises. A brief look at some of the major political events in recent years will suffice to illustrate that movements aiming to establish new states are far from being over. In Ukraine, for instance, the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and the following Russian military intervention led to a series of state-seeking movements in Crimea and the Donbass region. Crimea's declaration of independence and its immediate request to become a part of Russia was interpreted as an act of annexation by Russia, the first in Europe since the end of the World War II. In the aftermath of this crisis, pro-Russian secessionist forces in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine also followed the Crimean model, proclaimed their republics and held referenda seeking legitimacy in May 2014.

Likewise, during the chaos of the Syrian internationalized civil war, the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" in the Middle East declared the restoration of the caliphate in 2014, which had been abolished since 1924. After the declaration, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) affirmed its territorial claims in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen and continued to dismantle the geopolitical architecture of the Middle East created by the Sykes-Picot agreement. In the course of the Syrian civil war, Kurdish militia forces in Syria also gained the control of the Rojava region, proclaimed their self-rule, gained the *de facto* autonomy of the Afrin, Jazira and Kobané cantons, and declared an interim constitution in January 2014. It was partly these actions by ISIL on the one hand and Kurds in Rojava on the other hand that pushed Masoud Barzani to organize the 2017 independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. Rival Kurdish political groups in the Middle East believe that the

Middle East region has entered a new phase, which produce various opportunities for Kurds to determine their future status.

Western and Southern Europe is not immune from the rising tide of secessionist nationalism either. In addition to the Catalans in Spain, centrifugal secessionist tendencies can also be found in Flemish and Walloon movements in Belgium, Basques in Spain, Corsicans in France, Venetians (and Lega Nord) in Italy, the Northern Irish and even the Welsh—despite their "Brexit" vote—in the United Kingdom.

If we turn our gaze to rest of the world, we can also count the Quebecois in Canada, the Uyghur and the Tibetan nationalist movements in China, the Palestinians in the Middle East, the South Yemeni movement in Yemen, the Pashtun and the Baluch movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Tuaregs in Mali, the Saharawi movement in Western Sahara, the Somaliland and the Puntland movements in Somalia, the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians in Georgia, the Aceh and West Papuans in Indonesia and various other secessionist movements in Congo and Nigeria. Needless to say, this is a highly heterogeneous and still a partial list of existing state-seeking movements in the 21st century. While it is difficult to estimate with certain precision how many active state-seeking movements are there in the world in the 21st century, even according to conservative measures, there are more than a hundred movements as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1 illustrates that there are still considerable number of movements around the world struggling for independence. Yet, it does not help us assess whether intensity of these movements have been increasing or decreasing. If there is an increase in the frequency of state-seeking movements, we also need to answer, why we see such resurgence. To answer these questions, this chapter examines the temporal patterning of state-seeking movements in the world from late 16th century to present, and introduces a world-historical explanation to the resurgence of state-seeking movements in the early 21st century. I put forward three related arguments.

First, I argue that we have been experiencing a major resurgence in the frequency of state-seeking movements in the world. Unlike widely assumed, however, these movements are neither reactions against globalization nor products of enduring primordial ethnic or national identities. They are consequences of the deepening of a multiplicity of interlinked crises in economic, geopolitical and social spheres, which reduce states' capacity to maintain their hegemony over their subjects/citizens and to keep existing secessionist tensions under control and provide various structural opportunities for state-seeking nationalist mobilization.

Second, the resurgence of state-seeking movements around the world in the 21st century is a continuation of a rising tide of secessionism that started in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the U.S.-centered capitalist world-economy and the inter-state system entered into a period of instability and crisis (Arrighi, 1994; Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Wallerstein, 2000). This vicious cycle produced the surprising revival of nationalist movements in the advanced, industrialized, developed regions of the "West" in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and came to a peak with

Figure 1: Active secessionist movements of the 21st century



Source: Author's calculation from *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations* (Minahan, 2002), *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements* (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000) and digitized news reports provided by LexisNexis and Proquest newspaper archives (also see Karatasli et al., 2012)..

Notes: Each of the encyclopedias includes around 350 active state-seeking nationalist movements in the world. Figure 1 shows state-seeking nationalist movements that are common in both of these encyclopedias as well as the international press. The figure eliminates movements if their claim or activities for independence are not visible in the international press since 2000. Size of circles reflects relative size of populations of these stateless nations (as of 2002). White circles show movements which already gained their independence after 2000.

the dissolution of the USSR in the 1988–1992 period. It may be difficult to establish the immediate links between the revival of nationalism in the "West" in the 1960s and the 1970s and the contemporary rise of state-seeking nationalism in the 21st century because this period was interrupted (and intermediated) by the U.S.-led financial expansion and globalization process. Instead of solving the multiplicity of crisis in economic, geopolitical and social spheres, however, the U.S.-led financial expansion and globalization process started to produce much deeper crises in these spheres in the early 21st century. This ongoing vicious cycle has been manifesting itself as an intensification of an interlinked chain of economic crises, geopolitical conflicts and social revolts and revolutions on a global scale. The escalation of these

contentious processes has not only been reducing states' capacity to contain secessionist conflicts through effective use of coercion and consent but has also been producing various unusual structural opportunities for state-seeking mobilization on a world scale.

Third, I maintain that this is not the first time that we see such a multiplicity of interlinked crises in economic, geopolitical and social spheres—intermediated by financial expansion processes—producing a global wave of secessionism. On the contrary, from the mid-15th century to present, emergence of prolonged periods of interlinked crises in these spheres—which I call as "contentious conjunctures"—has been an integral part of the evolution of historical capitalism and the inter-state system. Every financial expansion period of historical capitalism (Arrighi, 1994) has produced "contentious conjunctures" and led to the emergence of a global wave of state-seeking movements within the boundaries of the capitalist world-economy, especially in core and semi-peripheral regions. Pendulum-like movement of global political economy, swinging back and forth between material expansion (of trade and production) and financial expansion periods has produced successive cycles of state-seeking movements in the *longue durée*, especially in core and semiperipheral regions.

The method: A *longue durée* analysis of state-seeking movements

In order to understand the present and near future of state-seeking nationalism in the 21st century, we need to overcome two major biases prevalent in the literature. The first bias is related to the use of relatively short time horizon for analyzing the historical trajectory of movements and making generalizations about the near future (Silver and Karatasli, 2015). From 1945 to late the 1990s, for instance, the widely shared expectation regarding the demise of state-seeking nationalist movements around the world was partly based on extrapolations from short-term trends. Of course, when compared with level of state-seeking movements in and around World War I—which was the greatest wave of state-seeking nationalism the world has seen until that time—nationalism seemed to come to an end in the post-World War II era, especially in advanced, industrialized Western regions. This expectation was repeatedly declared by scholars of international relations (Carr, 1945), political scientists (Deutsch, 1953) or historians of nationalism (Shafer, 1955; Kohn, 1956). Hence revival of nationalism in Western regions (advanced, industrialized) of the world (e.g. the Northern Irish and the Scottish movements in the United Kingdom, the Quebecois movement in Canada or the Basque movement in Spain) in the late 1960s and early 1970s came as a major surprise and was perceived as an anomalous trend.

Indeed, the massive wave of decolonization of the 1945–1970 era was also among such surprises. The elimination of imperial administrations in the colonial

world by movements of national liberation was an inconceivable situation in the early 1940s (Hobsbawm, 1992, 169). Later on, however, it became commonplace for social and political scientists to describe it as an inevitable trend. Likewise, even in the mid-1980s, no one expected the dissolution of the USSR. On the contrary, most social scientists and scholars of nationalism perceived the disintegration of the USSR almost as an "impossible" event (Beissinger, 2002). Many overoptimistic expectations regarding the decline of nationalism in the West and the stability of existing modern state structures were often reinforced by empirical analysis with a relatively short-term temporal frame.

Longer historical perspectives help overcome this myopic bias by revealing macro-structural processes that link social and political movements in space and time. A good example is Bergesen and Schoenberg's (1980) classic study of long waves of colonization and decolonization. Using a dataset they compiled from Henige's catalog of colonial governments from 1415 to 1969, Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) analyzed colonization and decolonization processes in the entire history of the world-system. This long historical study not only helped social scientists observe successive waves of colonization and decolonization but also started a major discussion about structural dynamics that produced these patterns (see Bergesen, 1985). The emerging debate made a major contribution to structural dynamics of colonization and decolonization. From this scholarship, we learned that during world hegemonic crisis, inter-great power rivalry increases, economic competition turns into political competition, inter-state system becomes very unstable and interactions between these processes produce a race for colonization. During periods of world hegemonies, however, inter-great power rivalry pacifies, need for direct colonial rule decreases and these processes help produce a major wave of decolonization (see Figure 2). These long historical studies also revealed very interesting similarities between waves of decolonization of Latin America in the early 19th century during the British world hegemony and decolonization of Asia and Africa in the mid-20th century during the U.S. world hegemony, despite the obvious differences between these two distinct forms of decolonization movements.

This brings us to the second bias: making generalizations from a limited number of cases, from selected economic or geographic regions, or from specific forms of movements. Of course, compared to the 1970s and 1980s, today, more scholars recognize that to be able to make generalizations about temporal-spatial patterns of movements, you need to examine all relevant cases as an interlinked totality. What is still less widely understood, however, is that different movements—interlinked to each other in space-time through structural processes—might be affected by the same macro-processes in very different ways. The temporal patterning of nationalist movements in peripheral regions of the world economy for instance does not have to be in synchrony with nationalist movements in core regions. In a major study on waves of nationalism and nation-state formation in the world from 1815 to 2001, for instance, Wimmer (2013) tests Strang's theory of decolonization, which builds

Figure 2: Number of colonies in the world



Notes: Five year aggregates for successful decolonization activities are shown. Post-1970 instances of decolonization are updated at http://www.irows.ucr.edu/cd/appendices/socchange/data/colanddecol.xls, last retrieved August 31, 2015.
Source: Data from Henige (1970). See Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) for the original study on long waves of colonialism and decolonization using Henige's (1970) data.

upon the original Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) study and links waves of decolonization to Wallerstein's (1974) world hegemonic cycles. Wimmer (2013) finds no robust quantitative evidence supporting the theory. Does this mean that world-hegemonic cycles or macro-structural economic and geopolitical processes do not have an effect on the temporal patterning of state-seeking movements as a whole? Before we reach this conclusion, however, we need to take into consideration an alternative explanation: same world-hegemonic cycles might affect state-seeking movements in core and peripheral regions in different ways.

Because of uneven development of capitalism and the inter-state system, not all regions of the world are affected from these world-hegemonic cycles in the same way. In each phase of the cycle, there is a major unevenness in states' capacity to contain state-seeking movements through coercion and consent based on their geo-economic locations. This ability to coercion and consent to contain nationalism is closely linked to what Deborah Yashar (2005, 6) calls as the "reach of the state," understood in terms of the "state's actual penetration throughout the country and its capacity to govern society." While this capacity is never absolute in any state, its

degree is not independent from states' position in the world-economy and interstate system hierarchy. While this capacity is much higher in states that politically and economically benefit from material expansion of trade and production during world hegemonies (such as "developed," "core" states of capitalist world-economy), it is much lower in the "underdeveloped" peripheral regions, including many dependent territories, colonies and post-colonial states. Because political-economic development of core regions is organically linked to the underdevelopment of these "peripheral" regions, during world hegemonies, while people residing in core regions might benefit from economic growth and prosperity, people residing in peripheral regions do not. This has different effects on states' capacity to contain nationalism during world hegemonies. This capacity is stronger in core regions but much weaker in peripheral regions.

Similar relational processes can be observed in the uneven patterning of war and peace relationships. As I will elaborate in following sections, periods of wars and prolonged conflicts also reduce states' capacity to effective govern their subjects and to contain state-seeking movements, while periods of peace and stability increase this capacity. Yet international peace has never been distributed evenly across the world. To give one example, when social scientists use generalizations like "Hundred Years' Peace" (of the 1815–1914 era), which Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944], 5) sees as a "phenomenon unheard of in the annals of Western civilization," they often ignore the fact that this "peace" was not global. Every time that peace was established among great powers in the global North (after the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, the Peace of Vienna in 1815 and the establishment of the United Nations in 1945), the global South turned into an arena of warfare and conquest. These sorts of different, yet relational, processes inevitably had a major impact on the uneven geographical patterning of social revolts and revolutions as well as state-seeking mobilization on a global scale.

This tendency towards uneven geographical patterning of state-seeking nationalism is further amplified by geopolitical interests of emerging world hegemonic powers. Establishment of world hegemonies—such as the Dutch world hegemony, the British world hegemony and the U.S. world hegemony—play a key role in the demise of vicious cycles of interlinked crises in economic, geopolitical and social spheres by stabilizing international order. Hence during world hegemonies, state-seeking nationalism in core and semiperipheral regions start to decrease. In the course of their escalation to global political and economic preeminence, however, new world-hegemons have also been interested in liquidating the colonial and territorial possessions of former world-hegemons and/or rival great powers (Karatasli and Kumral, 2017). In this pursuit, they have used two strategies: direct military conquests and supporting the subject polities of these rival great powers in independence. From one world hegemony to another, however, the role played by direct military conquests tended to decrease and the role played by supporting independence movements tended to increase. For instance, the British support for Latin

American independence movements in the 19th century was much higher than the Dutch in the 16th century; and the U.S. support for decolonization (in rivalry with the USSR) in the mid-20th century was much higher than the British. That's why from one world hegemony to another, decolonization movements tended to increase in synchrony with the establishment of new world hegemonies, as identified by Bergesen and Schoenberg's (1980) study (see Figure 2).

The pattern: Global waves of state-seeking movements, 1492 to present

To be able to assess the trajectory of state-seeking nationalism in the 21st century, then, we need to expand the geographical and temporal scope of the analysis more than conventionally done; and pay attention to differential consequences of macro-structural processes. In order to analyze state-seeking nationalism in the *longue durée* without being anachronistic, we also need to introduce a more general and broader conceptualization of state-seeking nationalism. For this purpose, in my research, I compiled a new major database—State-Seeking Nationalist Movements (SSNM) database—which helps observe a wide spectrum of state-seeking movements from 1492 to 2013 (Karatasli, 2013). In the construction of the SSNM database, I defined state-seeking movements as socio-political movements of stateless communities that seek to establish an independent state and to become a member of an inter-state system. This definition has its roots in Charles Tilly's definition of state-seeking nationalism, which occurs when "some population that currently did not have collective control of a state claim . . . an autonomous political status, or even a separate state" (Tilly, 1994, 133). This definition also builds upon Weber's (1946, 172) definition of nation as "a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, [as] a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own." According to this definition, what characterizes a nation is not a set of objective criteria such as language, ethnicity, religion, or common myths of origins but the collective demand for an independent state. State-seeking nationalism aims to make the "political (governance) unit" and "national unit" congruent (Gellner, 1983; Hechter, 2001) by acts of secession, irrespective of competing foci of affiliation such as language, ethnicity, race, religion or common myths of origins.

Building upon this definition, for the 1815–2013 period, the SSNM dataset uses news reports about state-seeking movements from digitized newspaper archives of the *Guardian / Observer* and *New York Times* (Karatasli, 2013). In contrast to datasets which only focus only on successive nation-state formation attempts or only on nationalist armed conflicts, the SSNM dataset includes a wide spectrum of action repertoires—which includes peaceful rallies and demonstrations for independence, independence referenda, violent uprisings, armed conflicts, unrecognized declarations of independence—by any geographically concentrated community which

demands an independent state for their own. For earlier periods, I compiled another dataset which includes a list of revolutionary situations and conflicts involving state-seeking movements from 1492 to 1830 in regions of the world that have been incorporated into the capitalist world-economy.[1]

Using the SSNM database, Figure 3 and 4 documents historical trajectory of state-seeking movements within the boundaries of the capitalist world Economy. Figure 3 focuses on the 1492–1830 period and shows the frequency of state-seeking movements in regions where historical capitalism expanded until that point: Western Europe, North America, Latin America and Eastern Europe. As Figure 3 shows, there are major cycles of state-seeking movements within the boundaries of the capitalist world-economy which broadly overlap with contentious conjunctures of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle (1560–1648) and the Dutch systemic cycle (1760–1815).

First of these contentious conjunctures—mediated by Genoese-led financialization—coincided with the escalation of state-seeking movements concentrated in Europe including the Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648), the revolt of Moriscos (1568), the Aragon rebellion (1591), the Catalan uprising (1640–1659), rebellions in Wallachia and Moldovia (1594–1598), the Portuguese War for independence (1640–1668), the secessionist plot in Andalusia (1641), revolutions in Naples (1647) and Sicily (1647), and various Protestant revolts in Western Europe and Central Europe (e.g. in Hungary in 1605–1606) which aimed create new "national" states.[2] In this cycle, Dutch and Portuguese revolts became successful in establishing new states, and the Old Swiss Confederacy (*Republica Helvetiorum*) gained recognition, hence *de jure* independence. Although Catalonia proclaimed Catalan Republic in 1641 and revolt in Naples led to the establishment of Neapolitan Republic in 1647, these republics were soon suppressed. All other movements failed.

The second contentious conjuncture period was the 1760–1815 era—mediated by Dutch-led financial expansion—which overlapped with a major wave of secessionist movements on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the successful revolt of the Thirteen Colonies against the British Empire (aka the American War of Independence 1775–1783) is the most well-known anti-colonial struggle of the period, it was not the only one. There was a larger wave of state-seeking revolts by

1 It was Charles Tilly who first used a dataset of "revolutionary situations" to analyze historical development of nationalism in Europe from 1492 to 1992 (Tilly, 1994). The revolutionary situations dataset of the SSNM database expands Tilly's data in space—by including involve all non-European locations that have been incorporated into the capitalist world-economy between 1492 and 1815—and in time by going back to 1492. In identifying regions already incorporated into the capitalist world-economy, I relied on the findings of Incorporation Research Working Group of Fernand Braudel Center at State University of New York, Binghamton (Hopkins et al., 1987; also see Karatasli, 2017).

2 There are also religious movements (e.g. French Wars of Religion in 1585–1598) and conflicts in the British Isles (such as the Irish Revolt of 1641) with weak/unclear secessionist demands.

Figure 3: Intensity of state-seeking movements (nine year m.a.), 1492–1829



Notes: Left scale: number of revolutionary situations involving state-seeking movements.
Source: SSNM Database (Karatasli, 2013).

indigenous and creole populations against Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the South. In Central and South America, the Mayan Indian's revolt in Yucatan in 1761 (which proclaimed the independence of Yucatan from Spain) under Jacinto Canek, the Quito insurrection of Guatemala against Spain of 1765, the Guanajuanto revolt in 1767, the new Granada revolt in 1774, the Tupac Amaru II Rebellion (1780–1781), and the independence movement of the captaincy of Minas Gerais from the Kingdom of Portugal (1788–1789) were among the other movements which demanded an independent state of their own in the American colonies in this wave.

It must also be noted that movements that led to the first great wave of decolonization in the first half of the 19th century also originated during this contentious conjuncture. Furthermore, the independence movement of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) against the French Republic—which achieved its victory in 1801 and became the first successful slave revolt to create a state for its own—also belongs to this period. The Haitian revolution became a model and a major source of inspiration for various state-seeking slave revolts in the Americas. Europe was not immune to these developments either. The Corsica rebellion of 1768–1769 against French invasion was among the first upheavals. The United Irishmen revolted repeatedly against the British rule in 1798, 1800 and 1803 but they failed to establish an independent state of their own. The Brabantian Revolution—temporarily creating the short-lived United Belgian states in 1790—and emerging revolts in Hungary and northern Italy started to challenge the rule of Joseph II of Austria. Furthermore in Eastern Europe

Figure 4: Intensity of state-seeking movements (nine year m.a), 1820–2013



Notes: Left scale: frequency of news reports on state-seeking movements, *The Guardian/Observer*, inversely weighted by average number of pages newspapers have each year.
Source: SSNM Database (Karatasli, 2013).

first centrifugal tendencies against the Ottoman Empire in its European territories (e.g. Greek, Cretan, Serbian and Bulgarian revolts) and the 1794–1795 Polish rebellion against Russia took place in this period.

Figure 4 turns our gaze to the last two centuries and illustrates the increasing complexity of spatial-temporal patterning of state-seeking movements from 1815 to 2013. The trajectory of state-seeking movements in this period has recurrent aspects of the earlier era as well as some novel features. One of the recurrent features is that two contentious conjunctures of this era also coincide with two major cycles of state-seeking mobilization. One of the novel features is that the intensity of state-seeking movements during material expansion periods (and world-hegemonies) is much higher than former periods. As Figure 4 shows, in addition to the sporadic revolts in concentrating in Western regions, Eastern Europe and Latin America in 1830, 1848 and 1860s during the British material expansion and world-hegemony, there is a major cycle of state-seeking movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East during the U.S. material expansion concentrating on the peripheral colonies in the 1960s. An important feature of the global wave of state-seeking movements of the 1960s is the extremely low level of mobilization in Western and Eastern European territories, which constitute the major portion of the global waves of the 1890–1933 period as well as 1973–present. We

explained why we must expect peripheral-colonial regions of the capitalist world-economy to have a different temporal patterning than non-colonial core and semi-peripheral regions above. If we leave this massive wave of decolonization that took place primarily in peripheral colonies temporarily aside, we can see that the two other major cycles of state-seeking movements coincide with two financial expansion periods.

The first contentious conjuncture period of this era is the 1873–1929/45 period, mediated by British-led financialization—which coincided with the strongest wave of state-seeking nationalism in world history until that point. This major wave of nationalism, interlinked with wars, social revolutions and imperialist conquests, dissolved almost all existing formal empires including the Ottoman Empire, the Austrian-Hungarian empire, and—albeit temporarily—the Russian Empire and even large territories in China under the Qing dynasty. From 1876 to 1915, alone, as Lieven puts it, one quarter of the world's surface changed hands. Eruption of the two world-wars brought this transformation to a much higher level. From the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second World War, 33 new states joined the modern inter-state system and 45 other nations declared their independence and proclaimed states for themselves but were not recognized (Minahan, 2002, 2121–2125). In Europe and the Middle East, for instance, the Republic of Flanders (1917), the Republic of Abkhazia (1918 and 1920), the Rhineland Republic (1919 and 1923), the Democratic and Socialist Republic of Bavaria (1918), the Euzkadi Republic (1931), the Catalan Republic (1931 and 1934), the Alawite Republic of Latakia (1939) and the Kingdom of Montenegro (1941) declared their independence but they were not recognized.[3] There was a longer list of nationalist movements—such as the Kurds in the Middle East—who struggled for their independence in this contentious conjuncture but failed to gain it.

The second contentious conjuncture of this period is the one we are still living in today. The vicious cycle started with the signal crisis of the U.S. world hegemony in the 1968/73 period, led to the financialization of world economy in the late 1980s and the 1990s, and has started to link political-economic crisis with geopolitical crisis since the turn of the 21st century. This most recent contentious conjuncture also coincided with a series of state-seeking mobilization on a world scale. This emergent wave of state-seeking movements started in the late 1960s and the 1970s in Western Europe (e.g. the Scottish and Welsh movements in the United Kingdom,

3 We can also count the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic (1918), the Slovak Soviet Republic (1919), and the Serbian-Hungarian Baranya-Baja Republic (1921) which were set up by the communist revolutions but were suppressed; the Idel-Ural State (1917–1918), the Belarusian People's Republic (1918), the Hutsul Republic (1919) and the Ukrainian People's Republic (1917–1920) which were set up by anti-Bolshevik forces and eventually suppressed by Red Army and the Bolsheviks during the Civil War; the Komancza Republic (1918–1919), the Banat Republic (1918) and the Republic of Prekmurje (1919) among these unrecognized declarations of independence.

the Catalan and Basque movements in Spain, the Flemish and Walloon movements in Belgium, Brittany and Occitanie in France, and the Quebecois movement in Canada); it came to a peak in the 1990s with the dissolution of the USSR and the Eastern bloc countries and rising secessionist movements around the world. After a short-term decline during the U.S.-led financial globalization era, state-seeking movements started to rise again, especially in Western regions since the turn of the century. This period is still unfolding in front of our eyes and producing the rapid intensification of state-seeking movements around the world, from Scotland to Eastern Ukraine, from Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria, to Catalonia.

Empirical evidence: Systemic cycles of accumulation and state-seeking nationalism in the West

When we conpare the patterns of decolonization and patterns of state-seeking nationalism as a whole, we will that the dynamics of state-seeking nationalism in colonial and peripheral regions of the world-economy are different from those of the non-colonial core and semiperipheral countries. In contrast to colonial peripheral regions, frequency of state-seeking movements seem to increase not during material expansion and world hegemony periods but during financial expansion and world hegemonic crisis periods.

In order to more directly examine whether or not levels of state-seeking movements were significantly greater in number during periods of financial expansion/world-hegemonic transition than periods of material expansion/world-hegemonic consolidation, Figure 5 and Table 1 compare levels of state-seeking movements in core and semiperipheral regions during each phase of Genoese-Iberian, Dutch, British and U.S. systemic cycles.

Figure 5 illustrates boxplots showing the distribution of state-seeking movements in each period using the same data. In the boxplots, I also located the positions of both mean and median, to illustate changes in the distribution across historical phases of capitalism. Comparison of these boxplots reveals that state-seeking movements during financial expansion/world-hegemonic crisis periods have higher dispersion, higher means and higher medians than material expansion/world-hegemonic consolidation periods. As evident in Figure 5, the only exception is state-seeking movements in Western Europe during the Dutch systemic cycle. This "anomaly" is partly related to the fact that state-seeking movements during the crisis of Dutch world-hegemony mostly concentrated in the Americas (e.g. American War of Independence, Latin American decolonization movements and other nationalist creole uprisings, Haitian war of independence), whereas on the European side of the Atlantic, social-political unrest mostly took the form of social revolts and revolutions (e.g. French revolution).

Table 1 extends this analysis and presents the results of one-way ANOVA, followed by Bonferroni post-hoc test of difference, and their non-parametric alter-

Table 1: Comparison of frequency of state-seeking movements by phases of historical capitalism

	All four regions combined (core and semiperiphery)			Western Europe (core only)		
	Genoese M-C-M'	Genoese M-M'	Dutch M-C-M'	Genoese M-C-M'	Genoese M-M'	Dutch M-C-M'
Genoese M-M'	(a) 1.803***			(a) 1.594***		
	(b) 9.233***			(b) 9.319***		
Dutch M-C-M'	(a) 0.666**	(a) −1.136***		(a) 0.637***	(a) −0.957***	
	(b) 4.838***	(b) −6.830***		(b) 5.149***	(b) −6.566***	
Dutch M-M'	(a) 1.504***	(a) −0.298	(a) 0.837***	(a) 0.442**	(a) −1.152***	(a) −0.19
	(b) 7.022***	(b) −1.070	(b) 4.397***	(b) 2.824**	(b) −6.446***	(b) −1.815
	Oneway ANOVA: F(3, 319)=36.49, p<0.001			Oneway ANOVA: F(3, 319)=46.36, p<0.001		
	Kruskal-Wallis: $X^2(3)$=101.081, p<0.001			Kruskal-Wallis: $X^2(3)$=107.483, p<0.001		
	All four regions combined (core and semiperiphery)			**Western Europe and North America (core only)**		
	British M-C-M'	British M-M'	US M-C-M'	British M-C-M'	British M-M'	US M-C-M'
British M-M'	(a_u) 25.240***			(a_u) 14.261***		
	(a_w) 27.015***			(a_w) 15.271***		
	(b_u) 5.808***			(b_u) 5.208***		
	(b_w) 21.221***			(b_w) 19.328***		
U.S. M-C-M'	(a_u) 5.977	(a_u) −19.263**		(a_u) 5.35	(a_u) −8.91*	
	(a_w) 7.44	(a_w) −19.57**		(a_w) 6.20	(a_w) −9.07**	
	(b_u) 3.970***	(b_u) −3.678***		(b_u) 4.130***	(b_u) −2.348*	
	(b_w) 15.340***	(b_w) −11.097***		(b_w) 15.712***	(b_w) −7.219***	
U.S. M-M'	(a_u) 59.421***	(a_u) 34.181***	(a_u) 53.443***	(a_u) 22.22***	(a_u) 7.95	(a_u) 16.87***
	(a_w) 58.881***	(a_w) 31.865***	(a_w) 51.432***	(a_w) 23.84***	(a_w) 8.57*	(a_w) 17.65***
	(b_u) 7.230***	(b_u) 4.219***	(b_u) 6.808***	(b_u) 6.984***	(b_u) 2.921**	(b_u) 5.485***
	(b_w) 21.366***	(b_w) 10.842***	(b_w) 18.266***	(b_w) 21.166***	(b_w) 8.150***	(b_w) 15.196***
	Oneway ANOVA(u): F(3, 194)=35.77, p<0.001			Oneway ANOVA(u): F(3, 194)=20.66, p<0.001		
	Oneway ANOVA(w): F(3, 194)=37.60, p<0.001			Oneway ANOVA(w): F(3, 194)=24.90, p<0.001		
	Kruskal-Wallis (u): $X^2(3)$=85.376, p<0.001			Kruskal-Wallis (u): $X^2(3)$=66.163, p<0.001		
	Kruskal-Wallis (w): $X^2(3)$=865.368, p<0.001			Kruskal-Wallis (w): $X^2(3)$=737.671, p<0.001		

Notes: (a) Numbers reflect the difference between frequencies of row categories and column categories, calculated through Bonferroni post-hoc test of difference; (b) Numbers are z values of the (nonparametric) two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test; (u) Results using the unweighted data from the SSNM database; (w) Results using the weighted data from the SSNM database; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Source: SSNM database (Karatasli, 2013).

Figure 5: Boxplots for state-seeking movements by periods, means and median



Notes: Left scale: number of revolutionary situations involving state-seeking movements. Diamonds indicate the mean and triangles indicate the median of each distribution. M-C-M' stands for periods of material expansion and world-hegemonic consolidation; M-M' stands for periods of financial expansion and world-hegemonic transition.
Source: SSNM database (Karatasli, 2013).

Figure 5 (continued)



Notes: Left scale: frequency of news reports on state-seeking movements, *The Guardian*/*Observer*, inversely weighted by average number of pages newspapers have each year. Diamonds indicate the mean and triangles indicate the median of each distribution. M-C-M' stands for periods of material expansion and world-hegemonic consolidation; M-M' stands for periods of financial expansion and world-hegemonic transition.
Source: SSNM database (Karatasli, 2013).

natives—Kruskal-Wallis test, followed by Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests—which are more situable for data which are not normally distributed. Both one-way ANOVA and its nonparametric alternative—Kruskal-Wallis test—show that there is a statistically significant difference in at least one of these historical phases. Bonferroni post-hoc tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show us where these differences come from: All financial expansion periods had significantly greater number of state-seeking movements than material expansion periods that preceded them; and all material expansion periods had significantly lower number of state-seeking movements than financial expansion periods that preceded them. Again, the only exception is state-seeking movements during the Dutch systemic cycle in Western Europe that we discussed above, where there is no significant difference between material expansion and financial expansion periods. All of these results are robust to cut-off points chosen for the beginning and end of financial and material expansion periods.

Explanation: Three broad mechanisms

How can we explain these patterns? Why do frequency of state-seeking movements in Western, non-colonial locations decrease during material expansion and world-hegemony periods and increase during financial expansion and world-hegemonic crisis periods? I argue that pendulum-like movement of global political-economy and the interstate system swinging back and forth between material expansion and financial expansion—and between world hegemonies and hegemonic crisis—affect rulers' capacity to contain rebellion through effective use of coercion and consent. Below I will briefly summarize three broad mechanisms: (1) prolonged periods of crises in the macro-economic sphere which dissolves social and political compacts made by rulers and subject nations/communities, (2) prolonged periods of crisis in the geopolitical sphere intensifying inter-state rivalry and warfare, and (3) prolonged periods of crisis in the social sphere producing social revolts, rebellions and revolutions. Table 2 gives examples of these crises in each systemic cycle of accumulation in capitalist world-economy from mid-15th century to present. In all contentious conjunctures of historical capitalism, these mechanisms have interacted with each other, reduced states' capacity to keep conflict under control and produced many structural opportunities for state-seeking nationalist mobilization.

To explain how these crises affect state-seeking movements, below I will briefly summarize some of the key causal mechanisms that link these crises to state-seeking mobilization.

Economic crisis and dissolution of social and political compacts

In the macro-economic sphere, stable macro-economic growth or prolonged periods of crisis have major consequences for both state-led and state-seeking national-

Table 2: Three phases of contentious conjunctures

Systemic cycles	Spheres of crisis	Examples of signal crisis	Financial expansion/ globalization	Examples of terminal crisis
The Genoese-Iberian SCA	Macro-economic sphere Social sphere Geopolitical sphere	Price inflation Protestant revolts Eighty Years' War	Genoese-led financialization and expansion linking Caribbean to Indian Ocean	General depression of the 17th century Protestant revolutions Thirty Years' War
The Dutch SCA	Macro-economic sphere Social sphere Geopolitical sphere	Stagnation of the transatlantic trade after 1750s Revolt of thirteen colonies Seven Years' War	Dutch-led financialization and incorporation of Western Africa, Ottoman Empire, Russia and Indian subcontinent into capitalist world-economy	General crisis of the early 19th century French Revolution and Haiti Revolution Napoleonic wars
The British SCA	Macro-economic sphere Social sphere Geopolitical sphere	1873/96 recession Paris Commune 1871 Franco-Prussian War	British-led financialization; third wave of globalization and colonial expansion into sub-Saharan Africa (1870–1913)	1929 Great Depression Bolshevik Revolution and bourgeois-democratic revolutions First and Second World War
The U.S. SCA	Macro-economic sphere Social sphere Geopolitical sphere	1973 crisis 1968 social revolutions Vietnam War	U.S.-led financialization and most recent wave of globalization of the 1980s–1990s	2007/8 crisis 2011 wave of revolts and revolutions U.S. war in Afghanistan, war in Iraq, Syrian "internationalized" civil war

ism through their effects on the hegemony-building capacity of rulers and states. Under conditions of stable economic growth during periods of material expansion and world hegemonies, states which benefit from the economic upswing will have more resources to establish "social compacts" through provision of public good or introduction of socio-economic privileges to contain rebellion. Hence during periods of economic growth, states can contain state-seeking movements more easily because they will have more to offer to their subjects in terms of public goods (Wimmer, 2013, 37–72), redistribution, welfare and development (Mishra, 1999; Keating, 2001; Moreno and McEwen, 2005; Derluguian, 2013). States which benefit from a stable economic growth (i.e. core and semiperipheral countries) can also

establish "political compacts" relatively more easily. This is because when there are plenty of resources to redistribute due to a stable economic boom, states can more easily tolerate the economic costs of providing autonomy or indirect rule (e.g. reduction of taxes or loss of control over local resources) if they need to.

During the material expansion phase of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle (from mid-15th century to mid-16th century), for instance, Catholic Kings and ruler of Spanish-Habsburg Empire benefited from such economic boom from Transatlantic trade and managed to offer various social, economic and political privileges to subject kingdoms or "nations" residing in their territories. During the material expansion phase of the Dutch systemic cycle, all major colonial powers managed to keep secessionist conflicts in settler colonies by offering them economic, social and political privileges thanks to superprofits provided by the Transatlantic trade. During the material expansion phase of the British systemic cycle, even the rulers of the sick man of Europe—the Ottoman Empire—managed to preserve its territorial unity by offering its non-Muslim communities many economic and political privileges (e.g. Tanzimat and Islahat reforms). Likewise, during the material expansion phase of the U.S. systemic cycle, implementation of developmentalist policies by many core and semiperipheral states helped reduce state-seeking movements especially in Europe and North America. In all of these periods, frequency of state-seeking movements in the core and semiperipheral regions has rapidly declined.

It would be erroneous, however, to assume that once these social and political compacts have been made, state-seeking nationalist problems are solved for good. On the contrary, these kinds of social and political compacts can very well be unmade when existing resources available to rulers start to shrink. Among other things, macro-economic downturns—which are recurrent features of all financial expansion periods of historical capitalism—play a key role in this process. Economic crisis and stagnation conditions in the macro-economic climate (often through its interaction with other forms of geopolitical and social conflicts) tend to pressure states and leaders to "unmake" existing social or political compacts. When states start to take away previously granted social or political rights or privileges, however, they not only lose their consent-making capacities but also provide with major grievances and structural opportunities for state-seeking nationalist mobilization. During the crisis of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle (spanning from mid-16th century to mid-17th century), centralization policies by rulers of Europe (such as the policies of Philip II, which was a response to both the Price Inflation and the intensification of inter-state and intra-state conflicts) ended up unmaking social and political compacts (e.g. tax privileges enjoyed by subject kingdoms, regions and communities) which had maintained unity of the centralizing states. During the crisis of the Dutch systemic cycle, which came to a peak after 1760s, all colonial powers were forced to take away social and political privileges given to settler colonies. Imposition of high taxes during both Genoese-Iberian and Dutch systemic cycles has been a major source of grievance by subject kingdoms, nations or settler colo-

nies. A similar pattern was observed during the crisis of the British systemic cycle (spanning from 1870s to 1930s). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, Ottoman rulers after 1870 could no longer pursue the Tanzimat and Islahat reforms. To pay their debt to the British Empire, they were pushed to impose further taxes to the non-Muslim regions of the empire (such as the Balkans), which produced grievances and opportunities for nationalist mobilization against the Empire.

From this perspective, gradual dissolution of developmentalist policies (their capitalist and socialist variants) starting with the crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle in the late 1960s had a major role in the rise of secessionist activities in core and semiperipheral countries (Derluguian, 2013). In their propaganda for secession, for instance, the Scottish National Party (SNP) today mainly emphasizes the social and economic benefits Scottish people will receive if they get rid of neoliberal British policies and if they are provided with the exclusive rights over the revenues from the sale of North Sea oil. Oil ownership and developmentalist policies, SNP argues, will boost incomes of Scottish people by 30 percent, provide them jobs and reduce unemployment. Although SNP's emphasis on the link between independence and development issues is not new (Nairn 1977; Breuilly, 1982), the 2007/8 crisis created a wide platform on which SNP's message was favorably received by more people than before.

Geopolitical crisis and escalation of inter-state rivalry and warfare

A similar dynamic can be observed in the geopolitical sphere. Periods of geopolitical stability and crisis also affect state capacity to contain state-seeking movements through the use of force and consent. When inter-state rivalry and wars are absent or low in the region, states can more easily turn their attention to internal conflicts and contain state-seeking movements through coercion. Intensification of wars, geopolitical crisis and escalation of inter-state rivalries, however, reduce state's capacity to keep social and political conflict under control through effective use of coercion and consent. In doing so, geopolitical crisis and wars also produce a fertile climate for state-seeking movements to challenge existing states using emerging instabilities (Skocpol, 1979; Wimmer, 2013). Competition and rivalry among states in an interstate system also help state-seeking movements mobilize by providing them with external aid from rival states as well (Gurr, 1993; Mayall, 1994). Financial expansion—and world-hegemonic crisis—periods intensify these geopolitical rivalries and produce various structural opportunities for state-seeking mobilization (Arrighi 1994; Karatasli and Kumral 2013). The Eighty Years' War and the Thirty Years' War during the crisis of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle, the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic wars during the crisis of the Dutch systemic cycle, the two World Wars during the crisis of the British systemic cycle and the return of geopolitical conflicts and warfare during the crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle (e.g. War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq or the "internationalized" Syrian civil war) all produced a

fertile environment for state-seeking mobilization. The Kurds in northern Iraq, for instance, managed to mobilize and to gain their de facto autonomy using the destabilization of the state apparatus during the First Gulf War, and gained their federal government mostly due to the collapse of the Iraqi state apparatus in the course of the War in Iraq (Lachmann, 2010, 184). Kurds in Syria managed to assert their self-rule in Rojava using opportunities produced by the Syrian civil war. Interstate wars also help state-seeking movements mobilize by providing them with external aid from rival states (Gurr, 1993; Mayall, 1994). Rise of secessionist movements in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, for instance, cannot be considered independent from the Russian military intervention in Ukraine from 2014 to present. Since the beginning of the military intervention, Russia's military and logistic aid to secessionist minority nationalism in this region has been one of the key factors that helped secessionist movements mobilize (Beissinger, 2015).

It must be noted that this conceptualization is different from conventional approaches which maintain that wars (or inter-state rivalry) would strengthen state-led nationalism by uniting citizens around a political cause and producing a sense of solidarity through sacrifice, danger and differentiation from "others" (Tilly, 1990; Mann, 1993; Centeno and Enriquez, 2016). While it is true that external wars strengthen state-led nationalism, they do not necessarily weaken state-seeking movements and provide unity. In states where state-seeking movements exist, external wars might end up producing further polarization. State-seeking movements can oppose wars of their states especially if these wars harm these communities politically, economically or culturally. In the 16th and 17th century, the Dutch and the Catalan rebels in Spanish-Habsburg Empire were extremely critical of wars fought by the Castilian crown. These grievances, in return, played an important part in state-seeking mobilization against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire. Likewise, despite expectations of Tsar Nicholas II, the Russo-Japanese of 1904–1905 did not produce unity among Russian subjects. On the contrary, it produced a social revolution against the Russian Empire and strengthened various state-seeking movements (e.g. Polish movement) in the Russian Empire. It is not a coincident that Bolsheviks who mobilized a wide spectrum of national liberation movements against the Russian Empire in the course of the 1917 Revolution considered war as the greatest gift imperialism gave to revolution. By the same logic, today if Turkey decides to declare war to Syria, this process will more likely to further polarize the Kurdish and Turkish nationalists residing in Turkey, rather than creating further unity.

Social crisis: Escalation of social revolts, rebellions and revolutions

Escalation of social rebellions, revolts and revolutions in the world is a third major mechanism that effects state-seeking mobilization on a wider scale. Similar to the effects of inter-state wars and geopolitical conflicts on state-seeking movements, emerging instabilities due to the rise of strong social and political revolts, revolu-

tions or rebellions in a region also provide a more fertile environment for state-seeking nationalist organizations to mobilize and challenge their states. This is mostly because, like wars and military conflicts, strong revolts, rebellions and revolutions also destabilize existing states. Likewise, many state-seeking nationalist movements can also ride the tide generated by other social and political revolutions. Instabilities created by Protestant revolutions in Europe in the 16th century, indigenous rebellions of the late 18th century in Latin America, French Revolution of 1789–1799, French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 etc. all created opportunity structures for many state-seeking movements in the regions affected by these great upheavals in extremely complex set of ways. For instance, the Dutch independence movement of 1555–1648 was riding the tiger of Protestant revolts. *Creole* nationalism in Latin America in late 18th century and the Haitian Revolution were influenced by rising tide of revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic; and they further triggered other national revolutions. National liberation movements in Tsarist Russia in the early 20th century cannot be thought independent from the Bolshevik revolution. Likewise, today, the Syrian civil war, which provided structural opportunities for mobilization to Kurds in Rojava, must be seen as a part of the Arab Spring revolutions. Together with Kurds, Berberis in Algeria or South Yemenis in Yemen also started to use structural opportunities provided by the Arab Spring movements to mobilize masses for greater autonomy and independence. We must also note that in the course of these upheavals, some state-seeking movements also emerged as a reaction to these major revolutions. In the 17th century, for instance, Catholic regions of the British Isles reacted against the spread of the Protestant revolutions by attempting to declare their self rule. Secessionist movements in contemporary Ukraine, as another example, are apparent reactions to the Euro-Maidan revolts and the Ukrainian revolution. If opposition becomes successful in Syria and the Asad regime is ousted, this would probably trigger an Alewite secessionism in the region.

These tidal influences, however, are not the only ways through which escalation of social movements might contribute to the strengthening of state-seeking movements. Some social revolutions in world history—such as the Protestant Revolutions, the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, and the Bolshevik Revolution—have produced new forms of state structures, new state-society relationships, and new ideologies justifying state-formation. These political, social and ideological innovations, in return, contributed to the development and mobilization of various state-seeking movements in the world through emulation of tactics, strategies and ideologies and through the external aid coming from these newly established revolutionary governments.[4]

4 For the effects of French Revolution see Tilly (1990, 107–108).

End of globalization discourse and return of the geopolitics in the 21st century

From the perspective presented in this chapter, prolonged periods of crises in economic, geopolitical and social spheres become extremely fertile for state-seeking mobilizations. What makes these "contentious conjunctures" extremely fertile for state-seeking mobilization is that these crises in economic, social and geopolitical spheres occur in synchrony with each other, interact with each other and they produce a much deeper crisis on a global scale. From a world-historical perspective then, the combination of crises in these three spheres is more than the sum of their individual effects. In the People's Spring of 1848, for instance, while one could observe the effects of economic and social crisis on nationalism, the third component—the crisis in the geopolitical sphere—was missing. Hence, we saw a major wave of nationalist movements in Europe, but these movements were smashed by a reactionary coalition of rulers (i.e. Holy Alliance) without spreading further. Hence the frequency of 1848 wave of nationalism was dwarfed compared to what we have observed in and around 1914, where all crises affected each other and produced the greatest wave of state-seeking nationalism that the world has seen until that point.

I argue that a major force that interlinks these crises in these different spheres in core and semiperipheral locations is the financialization process (Karatasli, 2013). Financialization processes emerge as a partial solution to the emerging signal crisis of systemic cycles of accumulation. In the short term, all financial expansion processes led by leading business and government complexes of the capitalist world-economy temporarily created super-profits and temporarily provided growth and stability. The growth and stability in financial expansion periods, however, were illusionary. In the medium term, all financial expansion processes ended up planting the seeds of a deeper crisis in these three spheres. Hence, in each contentious conjuncture of the capitalist world-economy, we actually saw not one but two major waves of state-seeking seeking movements: one during the signal crisis of the systemic cycles of accumulation that preceded financialization processes and one during the terminal crisis of systemic cycles of accumulation that followed the financialization processes. It is easy to see these two waves in recent decades. The revival of nationalism in the West in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was linked to the signal crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle, and the one we have been observing today is linked to its terminal crisis.

This is precisely why the resurgence of expectations about the final demise of nationalism during the financial globalization led by the United States during both Reagan and Clinton eras has been extremely misleading. Like all previous historical periods of financial expansions, the emerging stability was provided at the cost of producing deeper crises in economic, social and geopolitical spheres. At the turn of the 21st century, we started to see that crises in all spheres are coming back. The 2007/8 financial crisis and its global repercussions in the global economic sphere,

post-2007 waves of social revolts and revolutions around the world (i.e. the 2011 wave of revolutions, Arab Spring, Occupy-type movements, Ukrainian revolution) and return of geopolitical conflicts (i.e. War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq, Syrian "Internationalized" Civil war) all signal that we are entering into the second and more chaotic phase of the contentious conjunctures. As in previous historical phases, these instabilities have been pushing rulers to take away previously offered social, economic and political privileges (such as unmaking of developmentalist regimes), to rely more on coercive tools to secure their territorial unity and borders. All of these processes produce not only grievances but also major structural opportunities for state-seeking mobilization in the early 21st century. That's why from Scotland to Eastern Ukraine, from Catalonia to Kurdistan we see a resurgence of state-seeking nationalism all around the world. Whether or not this resurgence will produce a great wave of secessionism that will surpass what we have observed in the early 20th century, however, depends on how this crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle and the world hegemony will unfold in the near future.

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6

"Fortress-Russia": Geopolitical Destiny, Unintended Consequences, or Policy Choices?[1]

Andrei Melville

This chapter examines the recent phenomenon of "the return of geopolitics" within the current Russian political and ideological context. Russian geopolitical narrative with its roots in the so-called "Neo-Eurasianism" should be understood as one of the crucially important components of the new conservative wave in Russian politics and ideology presenting a new version of the long-awaited after the fall of Soviet Communism Russian national idea. Along with the simplified "black and white" geopolitics, among its other components one should mention the concept of Russia as a unique civilization-state with a special mission in the world, a belief in the irreconcilable clash of values and ideologies, social conservatism based on traditional values and religious fundamentalism, and political conservatism as the defense of the status quo. This new conservative consensus seems to be rather durable as it reflects the status quo priorities of the central authorities and powerful elite groupings seeking guaranteed access to rents; conservative attitudes of the specific "middle class" dependent on the state and without democratic request; as well as dominant public attitudes. However, there may be various sources of potential vulnerability of the current neo-conservative "consensus," which are analyzed in the conclusion of this chapter.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

Probably the most dominant theme in today's discourse on world politics and international relations is "the return of geopolitics" (as Walter Mead 2014 puts it in his seminal article). Searching on "the return of geopolitics" in Google, for example, retrieves 585,000 titles in 0.35 seconds, such as: "The Return of Geopolitics to Europe," "The Return of Geopolitical Risk," "The Return of Realpolitik," "The Emerging China-Russia Axis: The Return of Geopolitics," "History Isn't Dead Yet: Asia and the Return of Geopolitics," "Ukraine and the Return of Geopolitics," "The Return of Geopolitics: The Ascension of BRICS," "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics," "Russia,

1 This chapter advances some topics outlined in Melville (2018). Some titles and quotes in this chapter were translated from Russian. This work is supported by the Russian Science Foundation under grant №17-18-01651 National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," "The Russian Mind Today: A Geopolitical Guide," and "Russia and the Return of Geopolitics."

Indeed, traditional geopolitical narratives seems to resurrect it as the slogan of the day, as if Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Houshofer, Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, and Nicolas Spykman are all back today. It also seems as if the dire realities of today's world politics reconfirm once again pronouncements about the inevitability of Realpolitik, the war of all against all and geopolitically predetermined confrontation over traditional spheres of influence, disputed borders, zero-sum game and the primacy of military power. Indeed, geopolitical rivalry reemerges as a destiny one cannot avoid.

The reality of global confrontation (or, rather, even in the plural—confrontations) is back; new tensions and conflicts over control of territory, spheres of influence, shifting balances of power are escalating before our eyes in different areas from Central and Eastern Europe, to Middle East, Central, South and East Asia, and even the Arctic. International law and many international institutions are in jeopardy if not in decline as their universal norms and values are contested. Perceptive observers warn about dangers of the return to a Neo-Westphalian world or even to the realities of the Thirty Years' War in Central Europe (1618–1648). Worries about the Cold War 2.0 are also popping up all over. Regardless of the specific analogy, we are witnessing the end of a three decades period after the dramatic international and domestic changes since Gorbachev's "perestroika," "velvet revolutions," Soviet disintegration and subsequent hopes and illusions about the advent of global cooperation and integration. And it seems that these changes are irreversible and they largely predetermine our future.

Today Russia, along with other supposedly "discontented" or "revisionist" powers (China, Iran and some others), stands in the center of heated debates on geopolitical revival in current academic and political discourse. According to this argument, Russia denies the post-Cold War world order as unjust because of its discriminating unipolarity imposed by force and arrogance and reclaims its great power status and role in the international system. The gist of this argument is largely shared by those in the West who see Russia as "revisionist" and "authoritarian" and also by those in Russia who believe it is "rising from the knees" and "ascending." For the first group, Russia simply returns to its historical pattern—authoritarian state dominated society inside and in pursuit of its traditional geopolitical goal of "strategic depth for security" on the outside. For the second group, Russia, after being the major contributor to the end of Communism and collapse of the Soviet Union, rises against the discriminating status of the "looser" doomed to remain in the humiliating "pupil" position in world affairs—an unjust position which was awarded to her by the West.

For both parties of these heated geopolitical debates Russia willy-nilly occupies the *de facto* position of "fortress-Russia"[2] *vis-à-vis* the West, surrounded by monumental adversaries who challenge its sovereignty, status, national interests and even survival. There are fundamental political and ideological differences in these approaches, conclusions and suggested recipes; but their common geopolitical denominator is without doubt. However, here is the big question: is it all about geopolitics?

This brings us to a larger issue related to the real meaning of "the return of geopolitics" thesis. In at least one sense geopolitical reality of international relations, strictly speaking, never "went away"—so it does not need to "return." Territory and geography, definitely were, and remain, a perennial factor in world politics as well as in rivalry and competition for advantage. These go together, though, with the ages-old, and necessarily coming to the front in today's global world efforts, joint responses to new threats and challenges. But in another sense, "geopolitics" (especially in its simplified versions) is "geographically deterministic" and offers black-and-white answers to very complex and multidimensional questions related to global dynamics of today's world order and its future and relationships between varieties of international players and prospects of mutual efforts to respond to new challenges. In such a simplified picture of the world, there exist only conflict and confrontation as primordial features of international politics; states are doomed to struggle with each other constantly repeating historical cycles of animosity, hostility, and the "war of all against all."

This simplified version of "geopolitics"[3] offers a static (no dynamics) picture of the reproduction of international interactions based on assumptions of the geographical predetermination of an inevitable confrontation between "world centers." Factors such as globalization, information revolution, economic, financial, technological, cultural, interdependence, global threats and the need for cooperation are simply marginal in this discourse.

One needs to add that these arguments usually go together with either laments or ecstasy (depending on own values and perceptions) about "the end of globalization" as the final *coups de grâce* for the supposedly universal liberal world order. And this same logic can be seen in the reasoning of the opposite political and ideological

2 "Fortress-Russia" was one of four alternative scenarios of the Russian future in a 2020 project I was involved in with colleagues almost ten years ago. The gist of it is an image of a lonely strategic and spiritual "backbone" of stability in the ocean of chaos and confrontation (see Melville and Timofeev, 2008). The "fortress-Russia" scenario describes a very adversarial and menacing world surrounding Russia, and Russia, in order to withstand the siege, and all the enormous enemies from the outside and a "fifth column" inside, needs to get united and mobilize, even if this limits economic and political competition, along with political rights and freedoms. Ten years ago, during the focus groups which we conducted from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, this scenario was considered to be the most improbable. Today however, it seems to have turned into reality.

3 Simplified "Geopolitics for Dummies"—as coined by Kortunov (2015).

camps found in the current debate on geopolitical revival. This is worth of special attention as it contradicts those alternative and well-grounded logical arguments in favor of the invariability of really existing world order based on not so much liberal ideology, but on liberal institutional basis *per se* (see Ikenberry, 2014; Kortunov, 2016).

What we are left with, then, is a question about other factors causing and/or affecting today's global geopolitical rivalry and confrontation. Without downgrading geopolitics as such, may we examine and try to take into account other possible factors as well, such as domestic interest groups, elite policy decisions, public attitudes, psychology, frustrations, fears, and illusions. In particular, and in order to explain the emergence of a "different world" and "different Russia" in a new geopolitical context we may want to draw attention to factors beyond geopolitics. This may help us to contribute to a more nuanced and multidimensional picture of current dramatic shifts in Russia and in world politics in general.

Russian geopolitics narratives

There are peculiar similarities and specific features in the narratives about the geopolitics of Russia and geopolitics in Russia.

One geopolitical narrative in Russia has specific roots in so-called "Eurasianism," which was a brand of historiosophy before, and especially after 1917, that was represented by different, mostly émigré authors, such as Nikolay Trubetskoy, Petr Savitsky and others. It has ideas that, in some respects, resonate with the classical geopolitics of Ratzel, Houshofer, and Mackinder, that emphasize oppositions between "continental" and "maritime" paradigms of international behavior. A major emphasis of "Eurasianism" was on the "non-European" origins of the unique Russian civilization as a spiritual antithesis to the "West."

During most of the Soviet period "Eurasianism" was practically ostracized. However, since the 1980s there emerged isolated attempts of its revival represented, in particular, by numerous works of a noted historian, Lev Gumilev. Another important, though quite esoteric "Eurasianist" thinker, was Vadim Cymbursky (1993) with his tractatus *The Island Russia*. But the real "Eurasianist" boom in post-Soviet Russia is associated with the writings of the notorious Alexander Dugin (2014; 2015), a dedicated ideologist of "Neo-Eurasianism" as a mix of geopolitics, Russian nationalism and orthodox fundamentalism. He is also an activist pretending to exert influence on current Russian politics. The actual extent of such influence is not clear, though, as Dugin and his followers represent a very radical branch of geopolitical discourse in today's Russia. The core of Dugin's geopolitical narrative is a conception of the world as four geopolitical "meridian zones," with Russia as a "World-Island" a unique civilization of "land" called to withstand the "West" as the "kingdom of the Antichrist" and predestined to imperial "Greatness."

It is noteworthy that many perceptive Western observers of Russian geopolitics largely reproduce a similar logic and argumentation about Russia's geopolitical "destiny," although with different assessments and appraisals. Their focus is on perennial "indefensibility" of the Russian territory with "no natural borders," eternal predestination of the "despotic state" to "territorial expansion to withstand invasions," a search for enemies "outside" and "inside," along with the creation of "buffer zones" and a pursuit of the goal of "strategic depth for security" together with a belief in a special "mission."[4] One of the implications of such logic is the mantra of "Weimar Russia"—a warning about the dangers of a humiliated and frustrated geopolitical "looser" ready for revenge.

The idea of geographic predetermination of international and domestic political patterns is reproduced when it is applied to current developments in Russia, such as the return to perceptions and attitudes toward the outside world as hostile and menacing along with domestic mobilization to withstand external threats. In short, it is as if the scenario of "Fortress-Russia" has been turned into reality. In this logic the "return of geopolitics" reflects the realities of a *de facto* "deglobalization" in world politics as well as the end of Russia's illusions of the 1990s to find an appropriate place in the so called "global world" (Guriev, 2015; Gould-Davis, 2016).

This narrative emphasizes the absolute value of national sovereignty (*à la* imperatives of the Neo-Westphalian world order) *vis-à-vis* globalization, total primacy of national interests (however, poorly defined), Realpolitik and a longing for great power status with all of this legitimized by geopolitical predetermination as prescribed by "Neo-Eurasianism." Thus, the geopolitical contours of Russia's revived "grand strategy" are understood—by proponents and critics as well—as control of as much territory as possible, including in the first place the "Near Abroad," along with shifting economic, political and even cultural priorities towards the "East" and domestic mobilization supporting Russia's great power's status.

One may reasonably argue that there are different factors affecting the current geopolitical "revival" in Russia, including political and psychological effects of the tremendous territorial contraction after the collapse of the Soviet Union reducing Russia to the borders even before the expansion during the reign of Catherine the Great, as well as related frustrations and feelings of resentment by the general public and elites. This current geopolitical "revival" may be easily legitimized with the help of "Neo-Eurasian" rhetoric. However, it may be premature to directly link the current explosion of a geopolitical narrative in Russia to philosophical and intellectual impacts of a radical ideological "Neo-Eurasianism" in the spirit of Dugin and his followers. The mainstream of the current geopolitical "tsunami" in Russia's politics, media and academia, relies on "Neo-Eurasianism" as a political and intellectual le-

4 See recent examples in Kotkin (2016) and Graham (2016).

gitimization, but it's social, political, ideological and even psychological foundations may, nonetheless, have different sources.

Indeed, in Russia the period since 2013–2014 witnesses a real geopolitical "explosion" in general political discourse, international relations studies and mass media. Almost everybody in Russia today talks geopolitics. Geopolitics becomes an accepted set of beliefs *sine qua non*. However, the paradox is that the leading intellectual gurus of the new creed are—surprisingly or not—in very many cases former advocates of liberal internationalism, globalization and new global agendas for cooperation and partnership. Thus, there seems to be at least some inconsistency in theoretical approaches of the newly converted geopolitical neophytes in Russia beginning with their attitude towards geopolitics as an instrument of political legitimization rather than a long-nourished philosophical belief.

Former "liberal internationalists" today become advocates of the "war of all against all" (arguing in favor of the "Hobbesian moment" as return to international "normalcy" [Lukyanov and Krastev, 2015]). Globalization and interdependence are treated now as "factors of vulnerability" for Russia and a smokescreen covering the dire reality of the unipolar and unjust world of the United States and NATO monopoly (Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 2016). According to this logic Russia is predetermined to withstand the geopolitical "West" and to reorient from the former goal of "Greater Europe" to that of a "Greater Eurasia."

No doubt, one may rationalize such theoretical permutations as a reaction to changing political circumstances, but this should require a special and in itself intellectually exciting discussion of social and political factors affecting evolving methodological patterns of politically motivated research and analysis. At the moment this remains still a prospect. What we have at this moment is a mainstream of a new geopolitical narrative focusing on ideological and political anti-Westernism and a prescribed "pivot to the East," a Realpolitik approach to world politics, the "image of the enemy" rhetoric, proclamations about "de-globalization," "Russian special way" and an irreconcilable clash of values and civilizations.

In turn, this geopolitical mainstream in Russia's political discourse today should be adequately understood not so much as phenomenon in itself but as one of the crucially important components of a larger political and ideological context of contemporary Russia—namely, the advent of the New Conservatism.

Geopolitics and the new Russian conservatism

Neo-conservatism emerges in today's Russia as a dominant phenomenon; almost as a new national consensus and a long-awaited new national idea, which adds new specific ideological overtones to a traditional geopolitical narrative. Of course, some marginal ideological and political "fringes" may still remain, but geopolitics

and new conservatism have become the real spirit of the time.[5] No doubt, this newly emerged consensus is not entirely monolithic, as there are various flanks and coalitions among its proponents, from respectable pro-Kremlin think tanks (like the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research[6] and even the quite famous Valdai Club[7]—all with close links to the presidential administration) to much more radical extremes (like the Izborsky Club,[8] for example).

However, there is an apparent core of shared ideological beliefs which along with revived geopolitics consists of several components: (a) "messianic vision," i.e. the concept of Russia as a unique civilization-state with a special mission in an adversarial world; (b) "new ideological warfare," i.e. the belief in an irreconcilable clash of ideologies and values; (c) "social conservatism," i.e. the belief in traditional conservative values which are assaulted by the decadent forces of Western moral decay and decadence; and (d) "political conservatism," i.e. the defense of the status quo as the ultimate political priority.

This new conservative version of the Russian national idea resurrects the century-long concept of Russia as a specific "civilization-state" very distinct from "regular" nation-states and with a special "mission" in the world.[9] Russia is claimed to be a "floating empire" (as the Izborsky Club puts it; Averyanov, 2015) or a "continental empire, and not a nation-state" (as argued in the indicative *Manifesto of Enlightened Conservatism* [Mikhalkov, 2010]). This messianic pathos manifests itself primarily in ideological declarations: "At the limit, the Russian ideal is 'sacredness'"; "Sacred Rus is a universal ideal—not limited geographically, ideologically or metaphysically" (from one of the reports of the Izborsky Club [Averyanov, 2015, 47]). In practice, however, Russia's ambitions in this respect are more modest today and, in principle, include ongoing support for integration processes in the Eurasian Economic Union and calls to gather the "Russian world" as a union of "the most dispersed people in

5 Foreign policy alternatives in today's Russia are not in the focus of domestic public and expert debates. Quite indicative was the 2016 campaign leading to the State Duma elections. It was as if the spoiler parties "Fair Russia," "Liberal Democrats" and the "CPRF" (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) were competing for being "more catholic than the Pope" in calling for new attention to geopolitics, opposing Russia and the West ("Fair Russia" warning against "imperialist globalization" and the "redivision of the world"), stressing the primary role of traditional geopolitical interests and formidable external threats (Communists), sounding alarms about the "war against Russia without rules," calling for "Slavic reintegration" and a necessary pivot not only to the "East," but to the "South" as well ("Liberal Democrats").

6 See: http://www.isepr.ru/en/. Among its quite notable regular publications – the almanac "Notebooks on Conservatism."

7 See: http://valdaiclub.com/.

8 See: http://izborsk-club.ru/.

9 Tsyganov (2016) points that the current discourse of "distinct civilization" is the product of international pressures and domestic vulnerabilities.

history." The "reestablishment of empire" is, as a serious imperative, not considered by the neoconservative mainstream for there are simply no resources for this goal.

For Russian neocons today's world restores the basic foundation of geopolitical confrontation based in civilizational incompatibility between the "West" and the "non-West." Values are irreconcilable: "freedom" ("the West" as a core of today's world-system) versus "justice" and "fairness" (Russia and the rising "non-West" as its contenders). As such, Russia must constantly counteract Western values. This leads to another radical conclusion related to the reinterpretation of Russian national identity, where Russia is said to oppose "Europe" (the "West") not only geopolitically but also ideologically, as Russia's future is no longer within the lines of the "Western perspective." Hence, calls for "detachment" and even "divorce" between Russia and Europe and also declarations about Russia's "self-sufficiency," not only strategic and geopolitical, but civilizational and cultural as well (Miller and Lukyanov, 2016).

Like in old Soviet times the impossibility of any universal or common values is reaffirmed. The almost forgotten "ideological struggle" is back,[10] as if Perestroika and Gorbachev's "new thinking" never existed. This "struggle" is supposed to have both international and domestic dimensions. The argument about "reideologization of international relations" bears familiar Soviet overtones: we are on the "right side" and our ideological opponents are on the defensive. However, this time "our" ideology is not Marxism-Leninism but the new conservatism. Remarkably, the West is to be blamed for this "reideologization" as it remains the center of "new international ideocracy" (see Lukin, 2016). Hence, the global opposition: "defensive democratic messianism" (with its origins in the "West") vs. "emerging ideology of new conservatism" (emanating from the "non-West") (Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 2016). The only logic is "war to death" (Nagorny, 2015) between not only two major geopolitical rivals, but two diametrically opposite and irreconcilable systems of values.

Social conservatism presents another focal point of this new creed with the stress on traditionalism and religious fundamentalism and the opposition between collectivist values and the spirit of solidarity vs. individualism and social atomization. Traditional ("pre-postmodern") values need to be protected from the current "European decay and decadence." The gist of these values consists of religious fundamentalism (resisting decadent permissiveness), collectivism (as opposed to disruptive "individualism"), a specific version of patriotism based on the mythology of "spiritual bonds" and the primacy of the State ("statism"). Some of these ideological

10 "The growing importance of alternative projects entails a revival of the role of ideologies and ideological struggle. For a quarter of a century after the Cold War ideological messages were a monopoly of the West, while others either accepted them or locked themselves away in a combination of fortress mentality and 'Realpolitik.' Now, though, attempts to formulate an ideological response to the West are apparent. . . . The coming decade may well see an ideological renaissance" (Barabanov et al., 2016, 5).

components evoke memories of the past Soviet rhetoric. However, the truly universal appeal of Marxism-Leninism is missing in the neoconservative version of new identity and national idea for Russia.[11]

Finally, a political and social status quo comes forward in Russian neocons' pronouncements as it is prescribed by conservatism *per se* in all places and in all times. However, in this particular case attempts to legitimize current conditions are derived not so much from appeals to conserve the present, but quite often to restore the past—including its symbols, identities and myths. Order and stability are interpreted by neoconservatives themselves as of higher priority than individual rights and rule of law: "For a conservative, tradition and morality are above the law" (Makarenko, 2015, 275).

However, Russia's neo-conservative ideology is missing some very crucial elements, such as, in the first place, a vision of the future and a program of long-term practical goals as well as a positive agenda of how to attain them. Despite widespread claims of being a "conservatism for development"[12] with reliance on Russia's indigenous resources and capabilities and a pivot towards the "East," there is little to offer as a viable program of Russia's "sovereign modernization" (see Bluhm, 2016) without reliance on Western technologies and investments. Besides, today's new conservatism is self-sufficient; it does not need a dialogue with opponents other than for self-legitimation.

And yet, the newly emerged neo-conservative ideology (with its major components of geopolitics, the "Russian way," ideological warfare, fundamentalism and the status quo) seems to be quite solid and durable. What then are the sources of its domestic support?

On the durability of the new conservative consensus

In the first place, the major conservative impetus comes from central authorities and powerful elite groupings whose number one priority is precisely the preservation of the status quo (and reduction of the threats from other elite groups and the dangers of popular dissatisfaction). The immutability of power holder's and elite's dominant positions with guaranteed access to rents is the key factor and the principal cause of the current demand for conservative ideology in Russia. Strategic decisions ending previous reformist experiments were made under the exaggerated fear of "colored" scenarios after mass protests in 2011–2012, that is, regime status quo by any means necessary (in a hostile environment and with no exit strategy). Elite's

11 "In effect, Russia is resurrecting a Soviet version of its identity. This new identity is missing the socialist/collectivist component, but, nevertheless, retains the equally important patriotic element. The next stage in this search is finding a universal idea" (Timofeev, 2016, 10).

12 Frequent appeals to "conservative modernization" ("sovereign modernization") evoke analogies with "building socialism in one country"—Stalin's and Bukharin's concept of mid 1920s.

cohesion and regime support becomes a condition sine qua non for survival (*vis-à-vis* possible contenders).

The preservation of the status quo has been inculcated into the elite and mass consciousness via the muscular propagandistic influence of mass media[13]—especially television. It is noteworthy to mention that, according to surveys of public opinion, the success of the propaganda efforts in some respects also follows the paradoxical rise of conservative moods in large segments of Russia's younger population as well, contrary to some conventional sociological wisdom, which assumes that the older people are more conservative in their outlooks.

Another important component of the social base supporting new conservatism is Russia's constantly growing bureaucratic estate. Bureaucracy (at all levels—federal and regional—and everywhere) is the natural bearer of conservative attitude and stance. In Russia today bureaucracy's natural conservative inclination is reinforced by very substantial benefits from status and ever growing salaries. This ideological inclination is also widespread among other social groups whose existence and wellbeing depends on the government, such as employees of government-financed organizations, military, pensioners, and so forth and so on.

Conservative attitudes and values are also typical among large groups of the rather specific middle class which emerged as a product of redistribution of rents during the oil boom in the first decade of 2000s. Contrary to the famous "Lipset hypothesis," according to which economic growth and welfare of the middle class produce democratic and liberal expectations and demands, large segments of Russia's middle class seem to support today conservative values and the status quo. A probable explanation of this "paradox" is dependence on the state, and, in fact, in very many respects. Economically and administratively this is largely a "service" and "servile" middle class, whose very existence depends not on independent economic and other activities but on bureaucratic decisions of authorities of different levels (Gontmakher and Ross, 2015), like in some other non-Western countries (China may be another specific example refuting causality between economic growth and the wellbeing of the emerging middle class, on the one hand, and support of democratic values—on the other).

The ideological demand of the authorities and elites turns on a surprisingly harmonious brew of mass moods, reflecting mobilized propagandistic influence, but it is also a specific, largely emotional manifestation of mass complexes, authoritarian syndrome, nostalgia, and imagined or phantom pains. The simplified, neoconservative picture of the world offers fast and simple prescriptions for addressing the real problems and pressures of today. By analogy with the "Moral Majority" in the United

13 The shift from pure coercion to propaganda and indoctrination is the core element of the "informational theory of the new authoritarianism" (Guriev and Treisman, 2015).

States on the eve of the advent to power of Ronald Reagan, such public moods simultaneously serve as support and a breeding-ground for new conservatism.

The dominant motives of public sentiments in today's Russia consist of a mélange, including the glory for a return to the "great power" status, belief in a "special Russian way," a focus on the "image of the enemy," and a priority of "order and stability." These attitudes also strongly resonate with the major premises of new conservatism.

Data from the Levada Center[14] show that: respondents believe today that Russia is a "great power" and what makes Russia a great power is military might, while less support is given to Russia's economic potential. An overwhelming percent of Russians are proud to live in Russia (and this figure did not change during the last ten years), however, only 68 percent are proud of today's Russia. Forty-four percent are proud of Russian history and 21 percent are proud of Russian territory. This patriotic élan is reinforced by the "image of the enemy" imposed by massive propaganda. A large majority of the population feels the presence of the enemies from the outside. In 2015 Levada Center data show three quarters of respondents say it's the West and 70 percent say the United States is an adversary and 48 percent say that about Ukraine as well in 2016. Public opinion polls reveal that neoconservative assumptions about Russia's "special way" are deeply rooted in popular attitudes. "Russia's own way" is unique and fundamentally different from all other nations say roughly half the respondents. However, when it comes to specifics the majority can't clearly articulate Russia's "special way's" nature and peculiarities. Many respondents believe that that there is democracy in today's Russia, and it is very noteworthy that the percentage of them dramatically increased after the Crimea events. This trend, by the way, may be a remarkable manifestation of both the impact of propagandistic mobilization "around the flag" and profound confusion in popular mentality. To the question what kind of "democracy" does Russia need?, 46 percent answered "A completely special kind of democracy that is appropriate to Russia's national traditions and unique characteristics" and only 19 percent answered "that which existed in the Soviet Union," and only 16 percent answered "that of developed European countries and the United States." Powerful urges toward stability and status quo is evident as well, where 61 percent of respondents to a survey prefer "order," even at expense of individual rights and freedoms. A growing isolation from the West does not bother 62 percent of respondents and only 15 percent feel definitely the need to improve relations with the West. This data suggest that people seem to get accustomed to confrontation, isolation, sanctions, and so forth and they do not care much about this new international reality.

The picture that seems to take shape is public moods in Russia today are confused but definitely in line with major postulates of neoconservative ideology, which

14 All data in this section comes from Levada Center (http://www.levada.ru/en/).

leads to a traditional "chicken and egg" issue: do new conservative ideologists build their version of the Russian national idea reflecting current popular preferences deriving from widespread frustrations and syndromes, or do they through the means of powerful propaganda form these preferences? Most probably both arguments are true and reflect important bits of complex social reality. But an even more important question has to do with the durability of the above mentioned stance in public opinion and, hence, popular support of new conservatism.

One needs to acknowledge the actual (however sometimes embryonic) complexity of the current state of popular moods in Russia today. On the one hand, massive support of a neoconservative status quo is pretty obvious, although due to different causes. But on the other hand, there are signs of doubts about the durability of a new social contract ("TV instead of the refrigerator" as a replacement of the "Refrigerator instead of political involvement"). One needs only to watch and closely monitor signs of potentially important changing trends in public opinion which eventually may put into question the popular neoconservative consensus. In particular, there are signs of potential fatigue with the massive propagandistic brainwashing and emergence of new concerns about the real problems affecting daily lives of rank-and-file Russians. As an example, in the situation of current economic and financial troubles respondents start to range their anxieties in a different way: instead of "enemies outside" we see support for ideas about "growth of prices" and "impoverishment of population"; economic crisis; Russia being drawn into conflicts outside its borders; unemployment and increases of tensions with Western countries. It remains to be seen whether the extant ideological consensus can compensate for the continuing deterioration of the economic situation of the country, as well as the growing fatigue of the population *vis-à-vis* massive propaganda and the quite possible lessening of its effectiveness.

In other words, popular foundations of the new ideological consensus in Russia may become vulnerable in the future. Obviously, it is hard to clearly predict the directions and the outcomes of these fluctuations; however, in the future they may significantly dispute the solidity and the durability of the seemingly strong neoconservative ideological consensus in today's Russia.

Besides the obvious volatility of public attitudes, there may be many other factors at work which could eventually undermine the seemingly lasting and invariable status quo situation and the neoconservative ideological consensus in Russia today. To continue with the previous argument it is hard to predict how long the social base and the ideological appeal of new conservatism can endure. Today this seems to be the case. However, as was shown above, there may be various exogenous and endogenous disruptions affecting and undermining today's popular support of the status quo. Another long term possibility is the emergence of a new generation of elites with no connections with the ancient regime and searching for Russia's post-industrial modernization. Generational elite change may become, as in other developing countries, a powerful instrument for political and social transformation.

Modest agenda

Whatever the remote prospects may be, the situation today looks rather blunt. Both parties of the current geopolitical confrontation are preoccupied with mutual disillusionments and disappointments, blames and accusations. And both parties, although most probably to different extents, share at least some parts of responsibility for missed opportunities which seemed to emerge after the end of the Cold war. On the one hand there are various attitudes towards Russia: a "collapsed empire" and a "looser," not a "new democracy," the position of the West as a "teacher," and not a "therapist," Yugoslavia and Kosovo, NATO's expansion with vague assurances to Georgia and Ukraine, sensitive issue of anti-missile defense close to Russian borders, and so forth and so on. On the other hand there are post-Soviet frustrations and "phantom pains," resentment, and paranoid fears of "color revolutions."

Be it as it may, this grievous situation originates not so much from predetermined geopolitical destiny, but from the unintended consequences of a chain of political choices. All this does not mean underestimation of dangers of possible escalation of confrontation, but quite the opposite; it calls for a modest, pressing, realistic, although with a rather minimalist agenda for Russia-Western relations, for the foreseeable future. Here are some important priorities of this agenda:

- *Stop blaming* each other for who is responsible. Take it as a *fait accompli* and accept differences—in values, perceptions, and interests. Open a new page in bilateral and multilateral relations.
- *Keep restraint*—in order to manage confrontation, self-restraint and mutual restraint are needed. Some "red lines" have been drawn: there should be no more moves towards NATO's membership of Ukraine, and Georgia and no experiments around Donbas.
- *Exercise caution*—in order to prevent possible dangerous incidents.
- *Continue communication*—to develop and maintain all possible channels for dialogue: experts exchanges, confidential discussions, "Track – II" diplomacy, etc.
- *Exercise endurance*—to look for all possible positive elements and openings in the relationships. This may mean opportunism in the best sense of the word, i.e. looking for opportunities to improve the situation in a sense similar to the spirit of the 1980s.

This modest agenda may help us from sliding into an even more dangerous confrontation legitimized by arguments of its geopolitical predetermination and prepare better options for generations to come.

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7

Democracy, Crisis and Geopolitics: Emergence and Transformation of Anti-Kurdish Riots in Turkey

Şefika Kumral

This chapter discusses Turkey's recent authoritarian turn and the escalation of political violence by turning attention to two under-examined processes: democratization process and the rise of anti-Kurdish communal violence. It argues that communal violence targeting the Kurdish civilians and the authoritarian turn is the result of simultaneous crises at two levels: (1) the crisis of the AKP's efforts to establish its hegemony over the Kurdish population through the "democratic opening" process in the first decade of the 21st century; and (2) the effects of the escalation of a rising geopolitical crisis in the Middle East especially in the aftermath of the Syrian War, which is linked to the crisis of the U.S. world hegemony. These two crises—operating at two different levels—are ultimately interlinked, and they play a crucial role in the emergence, institutionalization, and radicalization of communal violence in Turkey in recent years.

Rising tide of violence and authoritarianism

Once hailed as a model of democracy for the rest of the Middle East, Turkey has recently taken an authoritarian turn leading to heightened conflict both within Turkey and in the region. As part of Erdoğan's struggle to remain in power and increase his political grip through various means, including the repression of the opposition and the censorship of media, Turkey has witnessed the most violent period in its entire history. It is not a secret that modern Turkey's political history was never free from various forms of political conflict and violence. History of modern Turkey is full of state-led massacres of ethnic/religious minorities (e.g. 1938 Dersim Massacre), anti-minority riots (e.g. anti-non-Muslim riots of 1955; anti-Alawite riots in ş in 1978 and in Sivas 1993); military coups (i.e. in 1960, 1971, 1980, and the post-modern coup of 1997), prolonged socialist-fascist clashes in the late 1970s, and the ethnic armed rebellion by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that came to a peak in the mid-1990s. What makes the current period different from these former episodes of political conflict and violence is that, in recent years, Turkey has been witnessing the simultaneous increase in different forms of political violence all at once, including deadly suicide bombings in major cities, occasional rockets targeting towns bordering Syria, heightened armed conflict, and state-led massacres against civilians in

the Kurdish region, military operations in Syria and Iraq, anti-Kurdish communal violence in western cities of Turkey, as well as civilian violence targeting political opponents, as exemplified in the latest coup attempt in July 2016. This chapter explains the relationship between Erdoğan's authoritarian turn and this unusual rise of political violence in Turkey by turning attention to two under-examined processes: democratization process and the rise of anti-Kurdish communal violence.

There are two interrelated features of this rising tide of violence that are not well understood. First, in this tumultuous period, ordinary civilians are not only used to the routinized political violence, but also have become its main perpetrators. Civilians' role in the production of violence is particularly visible in increasing communal violence targeting Kurdish civilians. Second, unlike widely assumed, this rising tide of civic violence did not start with Erdoğan's authoritarianism. It is true that anti-Kurdish societal violence reached a peak in the tumultuous political environment corresponding to the Justice and Development Party's (AKP)—and Erdoğan's, for that matter—hegemonic crisis and rising authoritarianism. Yet, what is less widely known is that popular anti-Kurdish riots emerged and became widespread in mid-2000s, when the AKP was still perceived as the *champion* of democratic resolution of Turkey's long lasting Kurdish conflict. In the course of the AKP's "democratic opening," Kurdish civilians, political parties, shops and civil society organizations in western cities and towns in Turkey increasingly became targets of nationalist mobs (see Figure 1). This new form of societal ethnic violence was introduced to the "repertoire of violence in Turkey" (Gambetti, 2014) in the 2000s, when the armed conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK came to an end, and when a "democratic/Kurdish opening" process was started. This new form of ethnic violence—targeting Kurds—has taken place in various cities and towns of western, northern, southern and central Turkey; that is, away from the geographical center of Kurdish armed rebellion in the East.[1] Rather, it is taking place in the metropolitan and industrial cities of western Anatolia where internally displaced Kurds migrated, in late 1980s and 1990s at the peak of the armed conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK (Ayata and Yükseker, 2005).

This chapter discusses the emergence, institutionalization, and transformation of anti-Kurdish communal violence in Turkey in the last two decades in relation to contradictions of the AKP's *democratic decade* and the recent geopolitical crises in the region. Based on intensive fieldwork in districts with high levels of communal violence, archival research, and original data on ethnic and nationalist violence in Turkey (collected by the author), this chapter puts forward three main arguments. First, the AKP's democratic opening process in the 2000s was based on a contradictory double movement: (1) an attempt to co-opt the Kurdish masses through

1 See Bora (2008), Gambetti (2007), and Ergin (2014) for this new form of anti-Kurdish violence in Turkey.

Figure 1: Incidents of anti-communal violence and number of military deaths in due to armed conflict



Source: Frequency of communal ethnic violence and extreme right nationalist violence is calculated from Ethnic and Nationalist Violence in Turkey (ENViT) database created by the author; Data on military deaths due to armed conflict is from Şener (2010).

partial extension of democratic rights and liberties, and (2) a full-fledged suppression of the other main contenders for this hegemony-building project: the Kurdish democratic movement. This double movement of democratization, in return, had two major consequences for the development of anti-Kurdish communal violence. On the one hand, it further polarized ethnic divisions by providing a space for both Kurdish social movements and ultranationalists to mobilize. On the other hand, it made it easier for the government to turn a blind eye to the emerging popular anti-Kurdish riots, which helped discipline "bad Kurds." This policy, however, gradually led to the *normalization* and *institutionalization* of riots.

Secondly, I argue that anti-Kurdish communal violence further escalated and radically transformed since 2014 in the face of escalating geopolitical crisis in the Middle East and rising authoritarianism. As Figure 1 illustrates, while the 1990s had been characterized by a high level of armed conflict (between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK in southeastern Kurdish cities of Turkey) but a low level of communal violence, the 2000s were characterized by a low level of armed conflict but a high level of communal violence against Kurds in western cities. Since 2015,

Figure 2: Trajectory of forms of anti-Kurdish violence, 1990–2016



however, we have been observing a third era characterized by high levels of armed conflict and communal violence, which takes place both in Kurdish cities as well as in the western cities of Turkey (Figure 2).

Thirdly, I argue that these radical transformations since 2015 are results of simultaneous crises at two levels: at the national level, we see a crisis of the AKP's efforts to establish its hegemony over the Kurdish population through the "democratic opening" process; at the international level, we see the effects of the escalation of a rising geopolitical crisis in the Middle East especially in the aftermath of the Syrian War, which is linked to the crisis of the United States' world hegemony. This chapter will show that these two crises—operating at two different levels—are ultimately interlinked, and that they play a crucial role in the emergence of the recent simultaneous increase in different forms of political violence in Turkey in recent years.

The AKP's double movement of democratization

When the AKP first came to power in 2002, it promised a change in official policy toward the long-lasting Kurdish conflict and a move away from a security-military focus. Erdoğan became the first political leader to refer to the "Kurdish problem" since Turgut Özal. This heralded the beginning of a decade marked by democratic opening, which was by no means a straightforward process. Instead of simply ex-

tending rights and liberties to the Kurds, the AKP's strategy for democratic resolution of the conflict was characterized by a double movement: From the very start, it simultaneously pursued partial democratization and increasing repression.

Shortly after the November 2002 elections that brought the AKP to power, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül showed the new government's commitment to a democratic resolution of the Kurdish conflict by declaring that they would "take steps that will shock the E.U." (The Association Press, 2002). In his famous *Diyarbakir Speech* in 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan (2005) admitted the past mistakes of the state, declared the existence of a "Kurdish problem" in Turkey, and promised to solve this problem through extending democracy and welfare. This change in political attitude was formalized when the National Security Council declared in June 2007 that the "fight against terrorism would be carried out 'on the basis of democracy and rule of law'" (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011). The *democratic initiative* was confirmed in a public declaration by the Minister of Interior in 2009, widely known as the *Kurdish Opening,* and started a process that included the extension of the "rights and freedoms of the Kurds" in the spheres of education, culture and media. The Kurdish problem began to be discussed publicly in "the media, civil society, and universities" and the state "started to negotiate with the PKK and its captured leader, Abdullah Ocalan, to disarm the question" (Keyman, 2012, 474–475).

Those that attribute these changes to the AKP's *initial* commitment to democracy, however, ignore that the democratic turn in the state's attitude towards the Kurdish conflict was above all a pragmatic attempt of the government to establish its hegemony over the Kurdish population. This policy was also supported by the United States, which needed to contain the Kurdish rebellion in the Middle East as part of its neo-imperialist ambitions. In order not to further lose its repressive "state capacity" and escape the fate of being a "weakly Weberian state" (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998) by prolonging the armed rebellion, the Turkish state chose to increase its consent-making capacity upon the recommendations of United States' policy makers.

Many forget the "Kurdish Opening" process is not an invention of the AKP government. Efforts at democratization-from-above actually predated the AKP era. In early 1990s, during the height of the Gulf War, President Turgut Özal—in collaboration with George Bush—made a similar overture, which did not have any actual political outcomes (Karatasli, 2015). Furthermore, as part of the European Union's accession negotiations, the coalition government before the AKP had also initiated various reforms such as lifting the ban on broadcasting in Kurdish and imposing a ban on the death penalty in 2002. When the AKP came to power in 2002, it promised the continuation and extension of this policy, as indicated by Abdullah Gul's aforementioned remarks.

What was distinctive about the AKP was its desire, will and potential to become a counter-hegemonic force which could replace the secular Kemalist republican tradition, ideology and institutions, whose hegemony was rapidly declining

in the face of rising Kurdish and Islamic movements. Through various discursive, legal, and executive moves towards democratic resolution of the Kurdish conflict described above, the AKP hoped to establish its hegemony over the Kurdish population. The success of this strategy also meant enormous electoral benefits for the AKP, which were realized in the first half of AKP's rule. Erdoğan's Kurdish opening especially paid off in the 2007 elections, when the AKP received 53.2% of the vote in the Kurdish region. The AKP also received significant electoral support from the Kurdish population in western metropoles such as Istanbul. With this substantial electoral support from Kurds, Erdoğan even declared the AKP as the main political "representative" of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Despite this seemingly overconfident declaration, Erdoğan was aware that the AKP had a major contender to this hegemony-building project: the pro-Kurdish political parties and social movement mobilization led by a broader left-wing coalition. Hence, the AKP's quest for hegemony over the Kurdish masses through partial extension of their rights and liberties also was accompanied by attempts to delegitimize any competitor for democratic representation of the Kurds.

The rise of AKP's democratic contenders

The AKP's plan to assert its hegemony over the Kurdish population did not go as smoothly as planned because the Kurdish movement did not fade away from the political scene. While pro-Kurdish political parties of the 1990s were largely seen as only "secondary" to the PKK, pro-Kurdish political parties in the 2000s (e.g. Democratic Society Party—DTP; Peace and Democracy Party—BDP; Peoples' Democratic Party—HDP) became central actors in Turkish politics. On the one hand, pro-Kurdish political parties engaged in a massive social movement mobilization especially among the Kurdish forced migrant population in various western cities of Turkey. They substantially grew in strength both organizationally and politically. They established bureaus in various western cities and towns, and Kurdish civil society organizations mushroomed throughout the country. They also established a major alliance with a wide spectrum of socialist organizations for electoral campaigns and for social movement mobilization.

Concomitant with grassroots mobilizations, the electoral power and political visibility of Kurdish parties have increased significantly. Especially starting with 2004, pro-Kurdish parties (or independent candidates) gradually increased their votes among the Kurdish population. In the Kurdish region, the pro-Kurdish parties received 18% in 2007, 26% in 2009, 27% in 2011, 30% in 2014, 34% in 2014 (presidential elections) and 46% in the 2015 elections (Bayhan, 2014). The increase in the political power of the pro-Kurdish political parties is much more significant than what is captured by this gradual increase in votes. In 2007, the pro-Kurdish political party DTP joined elections with independent candidates (rather than as a political party), and in combination secured 22 seats in parliament, thereby by-passing the

10% national threshold. The 2007 election inaugurated a period in which pro-Kurdish parties were no longer extra-parliamentary political actors but instead became a major parliamentary opposition to the AKP; and sparked a debate about "who is the political representative of the Kurds." After this point, the parliamentary seats of pro-Kurdish parties secularly increased as well. In the 2011 elections, 36 independent candidates of the Kurdish-socialist alliance (Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc) were elected to the parliament. This gradual increase of electoral power was the first step towards the HDP overcoming the 10% threshold on its own (as a political party) in the June 2015 elections.

Overall, pro-Kurdish parties established three things at the same time. They increased their electoral support from the Kurdish masses, increased their political visibility and significance by gradually becoming a major opposition party in the parliament, and further strengthened an alliance with the Turkish left. The pro-Kurdish parties increasingly became the strongest left-wing party articulating the problems of the most exploited and oppressed sections of the society including the working classes, the Kurds, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. It not only became a major competitor of the AKP in its quest to establish its hegemony over the Kurdish masses, but also extended its sphere of influence over a larger group of oppressed and excluded populations.

The AKP's efforts to repress and delegitimize the contenders

The active participation of pro-Kurdish parties in national electoral politics marks a fundamental difference between the democratic resolution process in Turkey and how these processes played out in Spain (with the Basque Homeland and Liberty—ETA) and in the United Kingdom (with the Irish Republican Army—IRA). One must note that it was not the AKP, or the Turkish state for that matter, that had been pushing the Kurdish movement to participate in electoral politics. On the contrary, it is the Kurdish movement which has been struggling for electoral participation as a part of its mobilization strategy. Turkish political actors have long been trying to exclude the Kurdish movement from parliament. This difference might help explain why a state-led "democratic opening" process cannot be successful as a hegemonic strategy without also countering pro-Kurdish democracy forces.

Precisely for this reason, a significant aspect of the AKP's democratic opening process was delegitimization and repression of pro-Kurdish democracy forces. This revealed itself in a number of ways.[2] First of all, pro-Kurdish political parties faced constant legal attacks by the state through party bans and detainment of party and

2 While the AKP was able to increase its votes in the Kurdish region in 2007 elections, the 2007 elections were not marked by AKP's success but by BDP's challenge. Shortly after elections, Erdoğan declared that the "AKP was the true representative of the Kurdish people," openly showing his disturbance by BDP's challenge (Radikal, 2007).

movement activists in this period. Shortly after the victory of independent candidates in the 2007 general elections, the pro-Kurdish party DTP faced a closure case, which included provisions to put political bans on eight members of the parliament. Interestingly, most of those members of parliament (MPs) were known to be the moderates of the party ("the doves") rather than the figures closer to the PKK ("the hawks"). The party faced a similar legal attack shortly after its electoral success in March 2009. In December, the DTP was banned by the constitutional court, and its leaders had their positions as MPs revoked. Starting in April 2009, thousands of party members, members of mass democratic organizations and activists were detained as part of operations against the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), also known as the urban wing of the PKK. The anti-KCK operations continued in May as members and representatives of Turkey's largest union of public employees (Confederation of Public Workers' Unions—KESK) were detained. Electoral success of the pro-Kurdish party in the June 2011 elections unleashed two other major operations against the party cadres as well. Between 2009 and the end of 2011, approximately 7748 politicians and activists were arrested, most of them awaiting trial in prison for years (Bia Haber Merkezi, 2011). The number of political prisoners in the AKP decade surpassed those figures during the 1980 military coup.

One objective of the mass detainments was the repression of the Kurdish movement and the undermining of its organizational strength and activities. Another aim of the large-scale KCK operations was to delegitimize the party and its activists, who were increasingly becoming central figures in parliamentary politics. In this quest to delegitimize the mass movement that utilizes democratic means of claim-making, the state extensively exercised its power over the "discourse on public order" (della Porta, 1996).[3] Through various acts that include party bans, arrests of activists of pro-Kurdish party and civil society organizations and obstructing protest actions, the AKP government continuously framed these institutions, actors, and claims as ones that allegedly "disturb the public order." For instance, during the KCK operations, the photos of handcuffed party representatives and elected officials reached millions through the news media. The prime minister—and even the president—were constantly questioning the legitimacy of the pro-Kurdish parties and MPs in the parliament through hostile public declarations. Ironically, while the government was holding secret negotiations with the PKK and its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, they were continuously forcing pro-Kurdish parties to publicly denounce Öcalan and the PKK. State repression had an impact on public opinion at the local level as well. In some districts, representatives of the pro-Kurdish BDP complained about the negative impact of large-scale police presence during their public announcements and protests, arguing that the police presence prevented

3 On the question of "disturbing the public peace," see della Porta (1996).

their messages from being heard by the larger masses and made them appear like criminals to bystanders.[4]

Consequently, the AKP's double movement, combining simultaneously cooptation and repression, has created a contentious space in which the Kurdish movement increasingly utilized democratic means (electoral politics and social movement mobilizations), while the state/government delegitimized this mobilization, casting its goals and leaders as enemies of public order (i.e. criminals, terrorists, etc.). Most important of all, this contention was not confined to the higher echelons of elite politics. It has also taken place in the public space. The "Turkish majority population" became witnesses, and later, active participants in this contention. In the 2000s, this participation was mediated by far right nationalists.

Extreme right nationalists riding the tide of AKP's double movement

The AKP's double movement of "cooptation and repression" of the Kurds throughout the 2000s greatly benefited the far right nationalists—more specifically, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The Nationalist Action Party is the "electoral wing" of the *ülkücü movement*, which is Turkey's historically strongest right-wing nationalist movement with strong links to civil society. Despite being a marginal political party throughout the 1970s—both in terms of its marginal electoral appeal, extremist ideology, and violent practices—and suppressed by the 1980 military coup, the MHP made a significant return in the mid-1990s by receiving a surprisingly high number of votes in both general and local elections.

The MHP emerged as the political actor that put forth the most consistent opposition to the democratic/Kurdish opening process throughout the 2000s. As the Kemalists in the army and various state institutions were gradually liquidated, and as the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) took very ambiguous and inconsistent positions with respect to the "democratic opening" process, the MHP emerged as the only remaining representative of the "security oriented/militarist" approach to the Kurdish problem on the Turkish political scene. This stance enabled the MHP to hold a unique position as the AKP's major contender for representing the conservative-nationalist portion of the electorate that was unsympathetic to any form of negotiations with the Kurdish movement. The rise of the pro-Kurdish political parties has further increased the salience of the MHP's opposition to the democratic opening process. The MHP constantly criticized the AKP for the Kurdish Opening process, for negotiating with the PKK, and for allowing pro-Kurdish parties, which they call PKK's extensions, to be in the parliament. They embarked upon this dual

4 Author's interviews with BDP representatives, 2012.

opposition to the strengthening of pro-Kurdish parties on the one hand, and to the AKP government on the other.[5]

In the 2000s, the AKP's double movement created opportunities for the MHP not only to find popular support for its nationalist political agenda on the electoral scene but also to popularize anti-Kurdish and extreme right violence at the societal level. Legal attacks and continuous attempts by the government to delegitimize Kurdish democratic mobilization, parties, and civil society organizations created a legitimate sphere for *non-state violence* (both actual and symbolic) towards pro-Kurdish parties and Kurdish civilians. The *ülkücü* movement made extensive use of this sphere. Throughout the "decade of democratization," nationalist mobs, often led by the *ülkücü* movement, have attacked Kurdish political parties, activists, and their supporters, which they openly denote as the nation's enemies (Kumral, 2017).

In sum, the extreme right greatly benefited from the contradictions of the democratic opening process. In the 1990s the *ülkücü* movement organized "anti-terror" nationalist demonstrations on the one hand and utilized political violence against socialists on the other; however, they were not able to mobilize the masses for violence. In the 2000s, for the first time in its long history marked by militant and paramilitary violence, the *ülkücü* movement found a space to lead and mobilize *civilian masses* for violence. In turn, the mass character of violence enabled the movement to enjoy a high level of popular legitimacy and to avoid being seen as a marginal or radical political actor.

The AKP's role in the institutionalization of riots

In the course of the 2000s, the AKP government not only created opportunities for the popularization of nationalist violence, but it also helped institutionalize this violence by legitimizing the actions of nationalist mobs during and after riots. Besides facilitating violent acts through inaction, state further legitimized riot behavior by not punishing the perpetrators afterwards (see Wilkinson, 2004; Gambetti, 2007; Bora, 2008). One such case was a lynching attempt in İzmir in 2005. The incident started when five residents from Diyarbakir had a traffic-related discussion with a military officer, which gave way to a false rumor that "Kurds are attacking the soldiers," which in turn sparked mob violence. Eventually, only one of the attackers was put on trial, and he was found not guilty by the court. On the other hand, two of the lynching victims were found guilty of "resistance to a public officer" by the court (Çalışlar, 2009).

Likewise, five leftist university students in Trabzon, who became targets of a lynching mob in 2005 while distributing political pamphlets, were arrested by the

5 Inter-electoral violence targeting Kurds was also an attempt by the AKP to change MHP's monopoly over nationalism.

police after the incident. During an episode of the Zeytinburnu riots in 2011, to give another example, when a nationalist mob was confronted by a Kurdish group, the police were reported to have gently asked the nationalist mob to leave saying "Friends please disperse. We [the police] are more than enough for them [the Kurds]." (İnsan Hakları Derneği, 2011). Another interesting detail in the report shows how state repression was utilized: while the arrested Kurds were taken to the "anti-terror branch," nationalists were taken to "public security branch" of the police.

State inaction and failure to punish the rioters was further reinforced by the supportive post-riot remarks of government officials. In most of these remarks, riots and attacks were generally referred to as "incidents" and rioters were called "angry masses" or "citizens." When thousands of people attempted to lynch five socialist students in Trabzon, who were mistaken for Kurds, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized "the importance of the 'sensitivity' of the public" for the outbreak of the '*events*." He even stated that "when this sensitivity is 'touched,' there would certainly be reactions" (Hürriyet, 2005). His discursive support for the vigilantes increased further in time. After a nationalist attack in 2008, he interpreted the event as a case of "self-defense": "I advise my people to have patience. Yet of course, until when should one have patience? If you break the glasses of their shops, threaten their lives, then citizens would choose the path of self-defense if they have the means and opportunity to do so." (Saymaz, 2010).

Even though riots actually constitute a breach of the state's monopoly over violence, as long as they did not have the aim or potential to debilitate state authority, they were not repressed—as any other non-state collective violence would have been. Hence, the riots become an interesting showcase to see the organic link between the political society and the civil society. Anti-Kurdish riots provided a two-way legitimization: while the state produced and institutionalized the legitimate sphere for civilian violence, mob violence against the Kurds provided a popular legitimacy for the AKP's disciplinary repression of the Kurdish mass movement.

Changing dynamics of anti-Kurdish violence after 2015

Since 2015, however, the government and state institutions are no longer confined to turning a blind eye to riots, legitimizing and normalizing violence against Kurds. The government and state institutions themselves have started full-fledged deadly attacks against the Kurdish population.

It is reasonable to suggest that the qualitative shift occurred after the June 7, 2015 elections. Until the June 2015 elections, the AKP managed to increase its votes in every election: From 34.28% in 2002 to 46.58% in 2007, and to 49.83% in 2011. As Figure 3 shows, from 2007 to 2011, the AKP managed to receive votes from the MHP as well as other center right and Islamic parties. In addition, the AKP did not lose significant votes to the Pro-Kurdish coalition.

Figure 3: Shifts in electoral preferences from July 2007 to June 2011 general elections



Source: Author's calculations using the changes in the percentages of votes at the district level. Width of bars and lines shows the relative size of votes.

After 2011, however, this pattern started to gradually change. The massive anti-government protests in the summer of 2013—the biggest anti-government protest in the history of modern Turkey—were clear evidence that discontent against Erdoğan's regime was rapidly escalating. While Erdoğan was re-elected in the 2014 presidential elections with 51.79% of the votes, his hopes to become a president in a "presidential system" were interrupted with the defeat of the AKP in the June 2015 elections. Election results showed that the AKP lost its parliamentary majority. The AKP's electoral support declined from 49.83% (in the June 2011 general elections) to 40.8% (in the June 2015 elections). As Figure 4 shows, the AKP lost its votes mainly to two groups, both of which were riding the tide of the democratization process, albeit in two opposite ways: (1) the pro-Kurdish party (HDP) and (2) to the ultranationalist MHP. Around 8.49% of the AKP supporters in the 2011 elections supported the Kurdish party in the 2015 elections; and 7.48% of the AKP supporters in the 2011 elections supported the ultranationalist MHP in 2015.

The most important feature of the June 2015 elections was the rise of the HDP. For the first time in Turkish history, a pro-Kurdish party (i.e. the HDP) entered into parliamentary elections *not through an independent candidate strategy but as a party*, and managed to pass the 10% national threshold by receiving 13% of all votes. The

Figure 4: Shifts in electoral preferences from June 2011 to June 2015 general elections



Source: Author's calculations using the changes in the percentages of votes at the district level. Width of bars and lines shows the relative size of votes.

success of the HDP mostly rested in its ability to forge a broad left-wing and social-democratic coalition, to win some of the "loyal" Kurds back from the AKP, to attract a new "young" electorate who were politicized during the 2013 anti-government protests (aka the Gezi uprising), and to mobilize these segments against the AKP and Erdoğan based on a highly effective motto: "we will not make you President [in a presidential system]."

After the June 7, 2015 electoral defeat, President Erdoğan's plan to replace Turkey's parliamentary political system with a presidential system was interrupted by the opposition. In response, Erdoğan blocked any possibility for a coalition government. Since a coalition government between the Kemalists (CHP), ultranationalists (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish parties (HDP) was not possible, the only remaining option was to call for another round of elections in November.

Erdoğan promoted a bloody campaign for the early November elections. The campaign was based on a simple slogan: "Without AKP rule, there is only chaos for Turkey." Curiously, that's exactly what happened. The period after the AKP's electoral defeat in the June 2015 elections became the most violent and tumultuous period in the history of Turkey. In the inter-election period, armed clashes between the PKK and the state re-emerged, and violence and repression resumed in the Kurdish

region. The town of *Cizre* came under fierce state attack and Kurdish civilians were massacred in their homes by the army in what was presented in the mainstream media as a "terrorist hunt." The state resurrected emergency rule in Kurdish cities by establishing various "provisional security zones" weeks before the November 1 elections.

This period also coincided with two suicide bombings targeting Kurds and socialist groups allying with the Kurdish movement. The first blast killed 33 socialists in Suruç that were on their way to help reconstruct *Kobane*. The other took place in the heart of the capital, during a peace rally organized by the pro-Kurdish HDP and leftist parties and unions, killing 102 people. This bombing attack "was the most devastating terrorist assault in the history of the Turkish Republic" (Öniş, 2016, 150). While Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was the perpetrator of these bombings, the AKP, Prime Minister Davutoglu and President Erdoğan utilized the suicide bombings as propaganda against the HDP and the PKK. For instance, in the days following the Suruç operation, around 1300 people were detained. While only 150 of them were related to ISIS, the rest were members of the Kurdish movement and the revolutionary left in Turkey (Zirngast, 2015). Turning ISIS terror into an anti-Kurdish campaign was possible because, "for the average citizen, the originator of terror—whether ISIS or the PKK—seemed irrelevant . . it was easy to paint dissent as a threat to stability and public order" (Öniş, 2016, 150–151).

This violence came to a peak just before the November 2015 elections. In September 2015, the death of sixteen soldiers at the *Dağlıca* military outpost sparked nationalist fervor throughout the country and nationalist demonstrations organized by right wing nationalists turned into violent attacks against Kurdish civilians and offices of the People's Democratic Party (HDP). Within two days, HDP offices were attacked in various cities and some were set on fire by demonstrators; Kurdish workers became targets of lynch mobs; Kurdish civilians were beaten to death by their neighbors; passenger buses traveling to Kurdish cities were attacked by nationalists blocking highways.

Turkey entered into the November 1 elections in this chaotic context. If there was any time when elites tried to use communal violence in order to gain nationalist votes, it was probably in this period. The eventual success of Erdoğan's bloody electoral campaign—where the AKP managed to increase its votes from 40.8% to 49.50% in four months—and popular support for violence shocked both his opponents and observers. The November 1 electoral victory also implied that nearly 50% of the citizens gave their implicit support for this inter-election violence. As disturbing as this civilian support for anti-Kurdish violence might be, it was far from shocking. After all, as we have discussed in previous sections, the popular support for anti-Kurdish violence was already visible before the elections. Civilians were not only supporters of state-led anti-Kurdish violence in southeastern Turkey, but also their main perpetrators in western cities.

The rise of the AKP-led anti-Kurdish violence, however, cannot merely be understood as Erdoğan's response to electoral defeat. Good evidence for this fact is the continuation of repression and violence even after the elections, despite the AKP victory. The AKP's electoral defeat in the June elections was preceded by a hegemonic challenge that the AKP faced from the Kurdish mass movement. While the AKP recovered its votes by attracting the nationalist votes, it was not able to liquidate this hegemonic challenge.

What we have been observing since 2015, then, is not a mere replica of the previous forms of violence. We have been observing a major transformation in the form of anti-Kurdish violence today. Below, I will note four major and inter-related aspects of this new era that is marked by Erdoğan's and the AKP's hegemonic crisis at the national level and geopolitical crisis at the international level.

The end of the "democratic opening process"

First of all, after it became apparent that the Kurdish movement would not support Erdoğan's presidential system, the AKP's "democratic opening" was put on the back burner. In this new era, we have been witnessing a shift towards "domination without hegemony" in the AKP's attitude towards the Kurds, after a decade-long attempt at hegemony-building. Dialogue between the state and the PKK's imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has halted. The ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK that was in effect since 2013 gave way to military clashes. As the "hegemony building" strategy comes to an end, conflict has further escalated—even though the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire in October 2015 (Al Jazeera Turk, 2015).

With the collapse of the democratic opening process, the AKP government has started to emulate the old hardline nationalist approach to the Kurdish problem and to frame all of these movements as part of terrorist activities, including justifying the repression and killing of civilians in Kurdish towns or the imprisonment of Kurdish activists in western cities as part of a "terrorist hunt." Even non-Kurdish activists or intellectuals (e.g. Turkish academics) are not immune from this treatment.[6] As a part of their combat against terrorism, the AKP—with the support of both the ultranationalist MHP and the Kemalist CHP—even proposed a law to lift the immunity of Kurdish MPs in the parliament on May 2016 (Balik, 2016; Hürriyet Daily News, 2016a). As a result, thirteen MPs of the HDP are imprisoned, including the two co-chairs. This wide perception of "terrorism" is not alien to ultranational-

6 A good example of this is the way Erdoğan and the AKP government responded to the "Academics for Peace" petition signed in January 2016 by thousands of academics in Turkey and all over the world. President Erdoğan immediately publicly denounced all petition signers as terrorists and started an investigation—through legal prosecutors or through universities—against all petition signers. Many academics have been dismissed or suspended from their jobs for signing the petition; some were put in pretrial detention and jail.

ist conception of Kurds as "enemies within." As we have shown, it was also already visible in the AKP's selective repression of the dissidents in the previous decade. What we have been observing, however, is the melding of these two conceptions into each other. Now, as the AKP's hopes to coopt the rest of the Kurds are dashed, and since it started to lose even some of the "good Kurds," the AKP emulates the nationalist approach with a nuanced twist. They claim that all rights and liberties of Kurds have already been recognized and whoever tries to push further are terrorists who want to divide and separate the society. As Erdoğan himself put it in January 2016, "There is no Kurdish problem in Turkey any more. We only have a terrorism problem" (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016b).

The AKP's emulation of the fascist strategies

One of the major reasons why Erdoğan and the AKP shifted their position is the failure of their hegemony-building project. Having failed to coopt the Kurds, Erdoğan has been trying to ride the tide of nationalism. Indeed, today the MHP voters are the main group supporting the AKP against the Kurds. To maintain and further increase this support, Erdoğan is using a dual strategy. First, he is playing with fire by provoking the PKK and a resurgence of the armed conflict, to make the "rise of terrorism" argument more plausible. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons—*Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan* (TAK), which is a splinter of the PKK—have started bombing attacks, one of which killed 37 people in the capital (Ankara) on March 13 to avenge the 300 Kurds killed in *Cizre*. President Erdoğan and the AKP government have been using these incidents to further justify a full-fledged attack against terrorism and their supporters.

It is important to note that the resurgence of armed conflict—in a context where riots are institutionalized—would have significant repercussions for ethnic violence, which would quickly go out of control. This process will definitely not be a return back to the 1990s where the armed conflict was confined to fighting between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK. As we have seen in previous sections, even sporadic armed clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Armed forces during the democratic opening period triggered various major riots on the societal sphere. Likewise, the trigger for the recent anti-Kurdish riots in September 2015 was the resurgence of armed conflict in the Kurdish region, i.e. the death of sixteen soldiers in Dağlıca. Hence, unlike the 1990s when armed conflict in the Kurdish region did not lead to riots outside the war zone, the escalation of armed conflict in today's conditions has the potential to further intensify deadly ethnic riots with massive popular support.

Secondly, going beyond legitimizing and institutionalizing riots throughout the 2000s, Erdoğan's AKP has started to emulate the fascist strategy, by directing horizontal violence against mass movements that challenge his authority. This was visible during the 2013 Gezi uprising, when Erdoğan embraced shopkeepers who

attacked the protestors as "the *police*, the *soldier*, the *guardian* of the neighborhood, when necessary" (Cumhuriyet, 2014). Youth branches of the AKP attacked and/or intimidated protestors in various cities. Utilizing the "riot strategy" was particularly visible in recent post-election anti-Kurdish riots in September 2015. In his quest for constituting the "masses" as active nationalist subjects through activating anti-Kurdish [and anti-HDP] hostility before the elections, riot production became another tool in the hands of Erdoğan.

In various cities, the violence was led by a relatively new organization called *Osmanlı Ocakları* (Hearts of the Ottoman) formed in 2009, which has organic links with the AKP and considers its members to be "soldiers of Recep T. Erdoğan." Emulating this fascist strategy of utilizing horizontal violence against the Kurds, which also seems to be a successful electoral strategy in different contexts, like India, Erdoğan hoped to increase nationalist fervor and emerge as the main representative for the nationalist electorate.[7] Furthermore, the increasing salience of this new paramilitary organization, which bears a remarkable resemblance to *ülkü ocakları* (Hearth of Idealists), also indicates how Erdoğan has started to copy fascist organizational forms as well—which worked well for the electoral fortunes of the MHP throughout the 2000s—in a quest to compete with them.

Rise of the geopolitical crisis: The Kobane effect

A third related process was that state and non-state violence against the Kurds have increasingly melded into each other in the face of rising geopolitical crises. Especially the *Battle of Kobane*—where the Kurdish militia in the Rojava region of Syria and ISIS fought—became a critical turning point in that regard. To explain how this dynamic played out we need to introduce some of the relational links between the *Rojava* movement and the Kurdish movement in southeast and western Turkey.

As part of the Syrian conflict, which has turned into an internationalized civil war, Kurds managed to establish their de-facto autonomy in the *Rojava* region on the border of Turkey. Paradoxically, the "democratic opening process" in Turkey played an interesting role in the strengthening of the *Rojava* movement. The Kurdish armed forces who left Turkey as part of the bilateral peace negotiations between the Turkish state and the PKK went to *Rojava* and concentrated their power in western Syria at the Turkish border. Using the opportunities produced by the Syrian Arab Spring protests, the Kurdish militants gained their *de facto* autonomy and declared self-rule in their cantons. The Kurdish movement in *Rojava* has also started to gain

7 Erdoğan's strategy also became obvious to the MHP soon after the eruption of recent riots. After the initial fervor of mobilizing nationalist demonstrations, the *ülkücü movement* made an announcement to praise "peace" to its activists and followers and pointing fingers to AKP as the instigator of the recent riots, saying: "those who follow AKP's lead cannot be an *ülkücü*."

some degree of legitimacy and partial international support due to their successful resistance and fight against ISIS during and after the *Battle of Kobane*.

The AKP government was very keen to gain United States' support for a military operation in Syria, for the purpose of defeating the Kurdish movement in *Rojava*. Yet, the United States—after the disastrous consequences of the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq—was not willing to lead such an operation or to help Turkey in this regard. Having failed to gain United States' support, the AKP government decided to use a dual strategy: On the one hand, they provided implicit support to ISIS militants who were fighting the Kurds in *Rojava*. They also stopped Kurds who wanted to join the fight against ISIS during the *Battle of Kobane* from crossing into Syria from Turkey, while they allowed ISIS militants to pass the border more freely (The Economist, 2015). When the United States and Western Allies pushed Turkey to play an active role in the coalition against ISIS, Erdoğan did his best to use this occasion "to attack the PKK as part of the all-around campaign against terror groups" (Öniş, 2016, 150).

On the other hand, they started to use a military repression strategy in Kurdish regions of southeast Turkey, where the Turkish armed forces have never been successful due to the strong presence of the PKK in the region. In response to increasing state intervention—and also riding the tide of self-confidence generated from *Kobane*—the Kurdish youth self-defense organization (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement—YDG-H) in southeastern Kurdish cities of Turkey—which was set up for "young Kurds who didn't want to join the PKK but who could organize and resist the state from their cities"(Fitzherbert, 2015)—took up arms, started to fight against security forces and proclaimed autonomy in the form of self-defense neighborhoods.

The autonomy of the Syrian Kurds, their ongoing fight with ISIS and escalation of violence in southeast Turkey, in return, had various repercussions for the intensification of anti-Kurdish violence in western cities. For one thing, the Turkish government's implicit support for ISIS at the expense of the Kurdish defense during the battle of *Kobane* in the fall of 2014 gave way to a series of anti-ISIS and anti-government protests by Kurds and leftists in various Kurdish and western cities of Turkey in October 2014. Police responded brutally to the protests. Pro-ISIS groups and extreme-right nationalists also organized counter-demonstrations in various cities, which turned into violent attacks in riot-prone locations such as the *Zeytinburnu* district of Istanbul. In addition, pro-ISIS Islamists attacked Kurdish protestors and party buildings. 46 people were killed in the course of the protests. This episode of violence was critical since the state, paramilitaries and "rioters" joined together in attacking the Kurds; raising fears of the possibility of murderous ethnic cleansing.

Emergence of ISIS as a new actor

As is clear from these examples, a final fundamental novelty of this new chapter of violence is the addition of ISIS as a new actor in this conflict. In the last few years ISIS and pro-ISIS groups have engaged in various forms of violence against the Kurds, including paramilitary violence and suicide bombings. During the massive anti-ISIS protests in October 2014 mentioned above, Islamist groups in both Kurdish and non-Kurdish regions attacked protestors and Kurdish party buildings. Pro-ISIS groups and mobs fired guns at protestors and engaged in lynching attempts in various non-Kurdish cities like Adana and Istanbul, whereas attacks by Islamist groups[8] against Kurdish protestors gave way to deadly clashes in the Kurdish region.[9] ISIS was also responsible for a series of bombings targeting HDP buildings in Mersin and Adana, and targeting the HDP's electoral rally in Diyarbakir before the June 2015 election. In the post-election period, ISIS attacks became much more violent and took the form of fatal suicide bombings targeting Kurdish and socialist rallies/gatherings.

Not surprisingly, the state has largely tolerated Islamist violence targeting Kurds, creating a legitimate sphere of action for ISIS in Turkey. This process is analogous to state inaction—and turning a blind eye—during ultranationalist mobilization of the 2000s. Yet this time, violence escalates conflict to a much higher and radical level. Furthermore, as in the case of violence of the 2000s, there is also a surprising level of mass support behind these violent attacks. This support was particularly visible after the blast in Ankara that killed 102 people. After the bombings, in Konya, thousands of spectators at the Turkey-Iceland football match shouted *Allahu Akbar* during the moment of silence for victims of the Ankara blast. Hence, while the decade of democratization institutionalized fascist violence, the current period of chaos seems to be legitimizing violence by Islamist extremists. We are witnessing the substantive rise of ISIS's legitimacy and sphere of influence in Turkey, facilitated by Erdoğan. Yet fascists—and its Islamo-fascist variants for that matter—are not the "right hand" of the state. They are independent actors with a significant degree of autonomy. It remains an open question whether Erdoğan can manage to control fascism-from-below today as Franco and the Japanese state/military (Paxton, 2005, 198–199) did in interwar Spain and Japan.

8 Including Huda-Par, which is a legal Islamist political party, and the Turkish *Hizbullah*.

9 For more information on the list of state and non-state violence against *Kobane* protests in Turkey, see the special report by Human Rights Association (İnsan Haklari Derneği, 2014).

Conclusion: Prospects for a deadly ethnic violence

Erdoğan's hegemonic crisis is far from over despite the popular support received in the November 2015 elections, the 2016 coup-attempt, and his victory at the 2017 constitutional referendum that substantially increased the executive powers of the president. Democratic resolution of the Kurdish conflict is off the table. After the 2015 elections, Erdoğan stated that the "one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state" policy will continue. Since then, the conflict has escalated. The government has engaged in a full-fledged attack in Kurdish cities whose severity surpassed any other military involvement by the previous governments. Military operations mainly targeted urban centers and destroyed major Kurdish cities, killing hundreds of civilians and forcing thousands to migrate. Furthermore, the crisis in the Middle East has the potential to further escalate internal conflict in Turkey. The conflict in Syria shows few signs of winding down in the near future. The popular support for the September 2017 independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan already sparked the nationalist fervor and was responded with military exercises at the Iraqi border.

Michael Mann (2005, 178–179) shows how factionalization and radicalization in the face of mounting geopolitical crisis led to statism, paving the way for the Armenian Genocide in the early 20th century. In line with this observation, anti-Kurdish riots that emerged and became institutionalized in the period of contentious democratization have the potential to escalate into deadlier forms of ethnic violence in the face of current political and geopolitical instability. Rising authoritarianism, regional conflict, increasing polarization, increasing salience of paramilitary groups and the escalation of armed conflict, in a context where civilians have already become perpetrators and targets of violence, point towards the gloomy possibility of ethnic cleansing in Turkey's future.

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8

African Islamist Terrorism and the Geopolitical Fracturing of Postcolonial Borders

William F.S. Miles

When the Organization of African Union embedded in its founding charter the principle of inviolability of inherited colonial borders, its framers had in mind territorial expansiveness by potentially aggressive neighbors. What we have experienced over the last decade, however, is the fracturing of African borders for reasons unpredictable in the 1960s: the rise of Islamist extremism. Cross-border and borderland exploitation by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Shabab, Ansar Din, Boko Haram and other terror groups are but African examples of a wider challenge within geopolitics. Umma, the ideal of a single, global, Islamic nation has long coexisted in geopolitical tension with the ideal and reality of the post-Westphalian nation-state. From the jihadists' point of view, blurring/fracturing/deconstructing established boundaries is part and parcel of the geopolitical reordering that they view as theologically imperative. Inattention to African borders is a geopolitical oversight with underappreciated dangers to Europe and the United States, not to mention Africa itself. Socioeconomic development within those borders and borderlands is necessary so that there is hope and reason to reject the violent Islamist messages and their messengers.

Africa in comparative geopolitical perspective

In 2011, the National Defense University Press published a collection subtitled *Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization* (Clad et al., 2011). Although that work focused on the borderlands of Southeast Asia, the same paradigm is applicable to those of Africa. As Zachary Abuza (2011) makes clear in his chapter on insurgency, until the end of the Cold War Southeast Asia's greatest security threat—one posing the greatest potential for territorial reconfiguration—emanated from China. The attack by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 rebalanced the Chinese threat in that region; Islamist militant organizations, with a Middle Eastern orientation, increasingly emerged to provide their own challenge to the regional status quo.

In Africa, the present chapter will demonstrate, a similar geopolitical threat to boundaries and borderlands emerged in the wake of 9/11—with one major exception. In the African context, no single nation-state represented a threat to territorial stability and border maintenance in the way that China did in Southeast Asia. In contrast with Southeast Asia, Africa lacks a local hegemon which may take on the

role of regional policeman (or counterterrorist) and confront caliphate re-bordering pretensions. (China reserves its own "right," of course, to re-border for its own purposes.)

When the Organization of African Union (precursor to today's African Union) embedded in its founding charter the principle of inviolability of inherited colonial borders, its framers had in mind territorial expansiveness by potentially aggressive neighbors. The last thing it then envisioned was the grave and chronic violation of sovereignty by terrorist organizations. Preservation of colonial-inherited boundaries was not merely viewed as a mechanism for reducing the likelihood of inter-state disputes; it was seen as a building block for larger federations. These regional units, or confederations, could then act as more viable economic units in the world at large. African regionalism in the 1960s was viewed as a building block in the process that by the 1980s would become known as globalization.

What we have experienced over the last decade, however, is the fracturing of African borders for reasons unpredictable in the 1960s: the rise of Islamist extremism. From Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa to Boko Haram in West Africa to Al Shabab in East Africa, violence associated with Islamism has gravely harmed life, limb, and national sovereignty. International interventions, from French operations in Mali to American interventions from Djibouti, have shed a spotlight on the porous borders that undermine peace, security, and prosperity in many African borderlands, turning them rather into shatterzones.[1] Multiple are the programs of assistance from Western nations designed to aid African governments in their struggle to secure their borders. Such efforts have met with mitigated success.

This chapter argues that inattention to African borders is a geopolitical oversight with underappreciated dangers to Europe and the United States, not to mention Africa itself. This situation is a byproduct of an overall historical neglect of Sub-Saharan Africa by U.S. policymakers and academic programs alike. Governmental and scholarly institutions alike would do well to revalue Africa within their respective planning and budgetary processes.

The rest of this chapter presents the evolution in African geopolitical strategizing from the creation of the Organization of African Unity, to regionalist continental thinking, to the incorporation of Africa into the paradigm of globalization. It then discusses the implications of 9/11 and radical Islamist organizations in West and East Africa. The concluding section summarizes the geopolitical implications of cross-bordering African Islamist and terrorist groups.

1 The term "shatterzones" deliberately echoes the Bartov and Weitz (2013) historical anthology on the violent borderlands of eastern Europe.

From African regionalism to naïve globalism

Founded in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) aimed to erect norms to ensure inter-state peace on the continent. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity were cardinal pillars of this strategy. Noninterference in the internal affairs of members' states was another. The July 1964 Cairo Resolution of the OAU explicitly reaffirmed members' acceptance of "the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence." So, did the Charter of the United Nations.

Founding heads of the African states present at the Addis conference were not unaware of the problematic nature of the boundaries they had inherited from the colonial powers. Partition of indigenous ethnic groups, both arbitrary and deliberate, had been common by colonial continent carvers. Festering grievances on account of colonial partition had already surfaced from West Africa (e.g., Ewe split between Togo and Ghana) to the East (e.g., disenfranchised Somalis outside of Somalia in Kenya and Ethiopia), and would continue to be a source of conflict (Onah, 2015). Reopening such basic issues was nevertheless deemed more dangerous than restoring ethnic integrity and/or indigenous national justice.

Nor did the savvy political leaders at the time of Africa's wave of independence ignore the potential for violence on other scores. Political assassination was condemned outright by the OAU, as were acts of subversion on the part of other African states. As civil and inter-state wars in independent Africa's early years in Congo, Burundi, and Nigeria bloodily proved, such concerns were well founded.

At the same time, economic reasons impelled African states to attempt to create federations of neighboring states to overcome structural handicaps emanating from colonial-era boundaries. Some (e.g., the defunct Mali Federation of Mali and Senegal and the East Africa Community [EAC] of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) were less successful than others (the extant Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] and the Southern African Development Community [SADC]). Over the years, a delicate equilibrium developed between the desire to maintain state sovereignty and the realization that economic progress was best served by combining resources, manpower, infrastructure and geographical advantage to the benefit of neighboring states. As the paradigm of globalization began to take hold in the late 1980s, African intellectuals (notably Ali Mazrui) began to take note of and lend caution to an otherwise upbeat neoliberal assessment of the phenomenon's implications for Africa.

The end of the Cold War brought to Africa the same hopes for a peace dividend that enthralled the former adversarial camps worldwide led by the Soviet Union and the United States. African states allied with the former (e.g., Ethiopia; Angola; Mozambique; Zimbabwe) buried the anti-capitalist hatchet (and, for the most part, communist economics.) While the principle of maintaining national sovereignty was not seriously brought into question, patrolling state borders became less of a

priority for security purposes. Countering of smuggling and other forms of trafficking did, on the other hand, remain a reason for not opening borders in the European Union mold.

Official recognition of the importance of globalization for the developing world writ large came in 1999 with the publication of the United Nation Development Programme's (UNDP) tenth annual *Human Development Report* (HDR). As with all previous and subsequent reports, the HDR was themed: globalization was that year's focus. Acknowledging critical scholars who claimed that globalization was not a new phenomenon at all,[2] the report invoked four factors to buttress the claim of globalizing (if not geopolitical) novelty: new markets (especially service-, financial-, and consumer-oriented ones); new actors (multinational corporations, NGO, regional blocs, the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court); new rules and norms (relating to democracy, human rights, privatization, trade and the environment); and new modes of communication. Although the Report invoked Africa tangentially, one telling example was the unfavorable comparison of Mali with Botswana: the latter lauded for its macroeconomic policies, strong governance and social services making trade liberalization successful, the former singled out—despite its economic liberalization—for its negative growth in per capita income (UNDP, 1999, 85). The message (reinforced by the UNDP's rival sibling, the World Bank [via its own *World Development Reports*] was clear: open borders lead to prosperity.[3]

Globalization overlapped with another innovative paradigm, one that rethought the very meaning of defense. "Security" was redefined from a purely (and, implicitly, antiquated) "national" preoccupation to being rather one of (an implicitly more enlightened) "human security." As the 1994 Human Development Report put it, states should shift their focus on defending sovereignty to "the security of people in their homes, in their jobs, in their communities and in their environment."

In this halcyon post-Berlin Wall crash decade, scholars—including Africanists—tended to tie the globalization-human security nexus to their specific regions of interest. Emblematic was the volume (published in the same year as the UNDP's Globalization report) by Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (1999) on *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience*. While critical voices emerged there and elsewhere (e.g., Kieh, 2008; Carmody, 2010) to warn against neo-liberal excesses of globalization, the dynamic international duo *per se* (human security and globalization) was not challenged on empirical grounds.

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2 Although it does not mention them directly ("Some argue that the globalization is not new, and that the world was more intergrated a century ago" UNDP, 1999, 30), the report is channeling such works as Bordo et al. (1999).

3 See, for example, the 2009-themed *Reshaping Economic Geography* chapter "Winners without Borders" (World Bank, 2009, 260—285).

9/11 and its African aftermath

Two years after the globalization paradigm was reified in the HDR, as with many other prevailing schools of thought it took a hit along with the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Almost overnight, if we take September 11, 2001 as the seminal date, the open-borders/security-as-development momentum was halted if not reversed. Once again, rather than a concept that needed to be transcended, borders were now perceived as "things" that had to be secured and surveilled. International development was now justified not on account of human ethics (or even national interest) but as a tool for counterterrorism (Miles, 2012). Increasing human security in Africa was now linked to its value in providing hard security for America (Carmody, 2005). Even the most hitherto obscure (or at least neglected by the West) regions of the globalizing planet (cf. Miles, 2005) were reappraised in light of the blow struck by Persian Gulf terrorists operating out of the Near East.

A case in point is the Sahara Desert. Long ignored by Western policy-makers and military strategists, this throwback to French Foreign Legion times and cinematic backdrops, was now described by U.S. military strategists in urgent tones. NATO Commander General James Jones referred to the "large ungoverned spaces in Africa"—particularly its mostly empty desert, ringed by Muslim populations—as "tempting" to terrorists.[4] In 2003 the U.S. Department of Defense and the State Department set up a Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) to equip and train security forces of the Saharan-Sahelian nations on the Sahara's edges: Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger. In the decade to follow PSI expanded and underwent several institutional metamorphoses to constitute today's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), whose African partners include Senegal, Burkina Faso and Nigeria.

Whether General Jones was a prophet or the Sahara as terror zone became a self-fulfilling prophecy (as this commentator warned in the *Fletcher Forum* [Miles, 2008a]) is debatable. Suffice it to say that, nearly fifteen years after 9/11, areas of the Sahel and Sahara have indeed become no-go zones for Westerners on account of opportunistic border crossing militant groups.

West Africa

The notion of jihad has a strong historical resonance in West Africa, dating back to the largely Fulani-led uprisings of the eighteenth century in Futa Jalon (in today's Guinea) and Sokoto (embedded currently in Nigeria). West African jihads endured until colonial suppression of Islamic resistance to European overrule. Such suppression more or less coincided with the superimposition of borders that has defined

4 For a challenge to the conventional Sahara-Sahel definitional dichotomy within the context of borders and terrorist networks, see Walther and Retaillé (2010).

the region continent. Contemporary jihadist movements that defy postcolonial boundaries as they wage Islamist war include:

– Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): This group has undergone various nominal transformations since beginning as an anti-government Islamist opposition movement in Algeria in the 1990s (Armed Islamic Group [GIA] until 1998, Salafi Group for Call and Combat [GSPC] until 2005, when it declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda). AQIM has staged numerous attacks in the borderlands between Algeria and Mauritania, Algeria and Mali, and Algeria and Niger; between Mali and Mauritania, Mali and Niger; and Algeria and Tunisia. Attacks on African government forces, kidnappings for ransom of Western tourists and officials, and sabotage of state installations have been its hallmarks. One of the most spectacular AQIM operations was the assault on the Amenas gas plant in Algeria's Sahara in January 2013, in which nearly forty Westerners were murdered. Another outrage with which it has been associated was the November 2015 attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali. In that incident, more than half the nineteen victims were non-Malians. In October 2017 an ambush in Niger (near the border with Mali) that killed four U.S. soldiers on a training mission was also attributed to AQIM.
– El-Mourabitoun: This one-time splinter group reunited with AQIM to lead the Radisson Blu attack in Bamako. It is the product of a merger, in 2013, of two other Saharan extremist groups: The Masked Men Battalion (aka al-Multhamun) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).
– MUJAO (see above): It became a significant player in 2012 when it joined two ethnic-based (Tuareg) secessionist movements: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar al-Din. MNLA represents the more "classical" kind of oppositionist group that early founders of the OAU anticipated in their declared maintenance of colonial boundaries: militant autonomist (if not pro-independence) groups desirous of territory and sovereignty for their particular "tribe." Ansar al-Din departed from this familiar model of secessionism by grafting an Islamist theology upon the traditionally "liberal" Muslims among the Tuaregs. Both groups worked to establish control over northern Mali (including the storied Timbuktu), but in its attempt to impose a harsh form of sharia, Ansar Din turned on its erstwhile ally the MNLA. Tuareg in northern Niger have similarly, periodically, joined forces and then splintered in order to promote an ethnically-defined polity. Uniting the Tuareg of Mali and Niger under a single flag waxes and wanes as an objective.
– Boko Haram ("Western Education is Taboo"): Operating mainly in northeast Nigeria (with periodic bombings of targets in the capital Abuja in the center of the country), this group has also taken hostages and undertaken trans-border attacks in Cameroon and Niger. Internationally, it garnered great attention with its kidnapping (and forced "marriages") of two hundred (Christian) schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria. Many of the girls were subsequently spot-

ted in Cameroon and Chad (whose military forces successfully engaged in Boko Haram, on their own, in Nigerian territory). But the most long-lasting cross-border consequence has been the approximately 200,000 refugees from northeast Nigeria who have sought sanctuary in Niger Republic. "Although Boko Haram has exploited state weakness along Nigeria's northern border . . . to mount attacks and seek sanctuary, as of this writing Boko Haram has not been a *Nigérien* Hausa phenomenon *per se*" (Miles, 2015, 198–199).

East Africa

Although fewer trans-border terrorist groups operate on the eastern edge of the Trans-Sahara, the United States has been preoccupied and engaged there for an even longer time. "Operation Restore Hope" is better remembered in American consciousness as "Black Hawk Down," the ill-fated attempt ordered by outgoing President George H.W. Bush in 1993 to provide humanitarian assistance in Mogadishu despite militia opposition during Somalia's civil war. The ensuing debacle and American withdrawal left a power vacuum that was eventually filled by:

– Al Shabab: Anarchy in Somalia throughout the 1990s spurred the creation of an Islamist militia, the Union of Islamic Courts, which attempted to impose a degree of security and stability. In 2006, the leader of this organization swore allegiance to Al Qaeda and changed its name to "The Youth" (Al Shabab). Responsible for numerous attacks in Somalia's capital Mogadishu and the second city, Kismayo, Al Shabab is most notorious for its cross-border operations. In Uganda's capital Kampala, over seventy people were killed in a suicide bombing in 2010. Almost as many were killed in the Westgate, Nairobi, shopping mall attack in Kenya in 2013. Tanzania, less affected, has nevertheless witnessed since 2015 an uptick in of Al Shabab related violence.[5]
– Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Somalia's location and Al Shabab's ideology extends the influence and operations of this group beyond the African continent proper. Zarif (2011) specifies these links as they emerged at the outset of the current decade, with Al Shabab joining the AQAP "franchise." Within the framework of this chapter, the Gulf of Aden represents a water boundary no less porous than the unmarked desert ones of the Sahara. An even more direct threat to the United States is represented, directly and indirectly, by Al Shabab outreach, plausibly with AQAP participation, to disaffected Somali immigrant youths. Between 2006 and 2010, dozens of them left their homes in the Minneapolis, Minnesota region to join Al Shabab in Somalia (Savage, 2010). There are now reports that that same recruiting network is being utilized by

5 See the United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism *Country Reports on Terrorism* for 2015 and 2016 (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016; 2017).

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Attempts to bring Somali-American youth to Iraq and Syria bring us beyond the scope of this chapter's focus on Africa. They nevertheless illustrate the trans-border terrorist (and counterterrorist) dimension to a facet of globalization that constitutes a major challenge to regional and world security (see Figure 1).

Cross-border threats have accordingly risen to the forefront of African state concerns and Western donors, particularly as relates to the Horn and what the U.S. Government refers to the Trans-Sahara region. TSCTP and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) resources have been used to strengthen Mauritanian security force surveillance of its boundary with Mali and Niger army control of unregulated flows across its borders. United States government assistance to Nigeria in combatting Boko Haram now includes its monitoring of activities along the border with Niger Republic. The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program of the U.S. Department of State also aims to enhance the capacity of Nigerian customs and immigration services to secure their nation's borders. Another State Department program—Counterterrorism Finance (CTF)—provides training to assist Nigeria in restricting Boko Haram's capability to obtain, transfer and secure funds.

Figure 1: Islamist militant groups and their areas of activity in Africa



Notes: Each circle represents location of a violent event.

Source: Map courtesy of Caitriona Dowd.

On the other side of the continent, an equivalent to TSCTP has emerged in the form of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). Founded in 2009 (out of the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative), the PREACT includes "expanding border security" in its mandate. Although only areas within a single country (Somalia), provide havens for terrorists (unlike the plethora of countries spanning the Sahara that are so affected in West Africa), PREACT includes many more member states than does TSCTP: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and, naturally, the official government of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Camp Lemonier in Djibouti has emerged as the epicenter of United States counterterrorism activities in East Africa, under the rubric of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).

Globalization, geopolitics, borders, and Islamism

M.A. Khan's (2007) aptly subtitled book *The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* brings to the fore competing geopolitical visions of Muslim politics in a world otherwise constituted politically by the nation-state. *Umma*, the ideal of a single, global, Islamic nation has long coexisted in geopolitical tension with the ideal and reality of the post-Westphalian nation-state. The contradiction is particularly acute in relation to the postcolonial state with a demographically dominant Muslim population. Why should such states exist independently of one another, particularly when they were the arbitrary creations of European powers? This is one of the few anticolonial theses that have united such otherwise disparate actors as Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party (who went to war to "reunite" Iraq with Kuwait) and ISIS (who murder and terrorize also to "recreate" a single Islamic State).

Islamism may also be understood as "a backlash antiglobalizationist movement" (Charlick, 2007, 20). Thomas Friedman in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (1999) characterizes its promoters as Muslims "brutalized or left behind by this new system." Benjamin Barber (1995) had already made a similar point in *Jihad vs. McWorld.* It is the extension of this line of thinking from the "core" of the Muslim world (usually understood as the Middle East) to the Sub-Saharan periphery that is relatively new from a geopolitical perspective. What is particularly troubling is the religiously-inspired violence—including a return of jihad—that has descended from other climes to disturb the relative quiet of the Sahara and its adjoining Sahel.[6] There and in the Horn of Africa, inherited colonial borders that previously were dismissed by Africanists and globalists alike as "arbitrary "or "artificial" now represent corridors for religious fanatics whose monitoring constitutes a major challenge for governments near and wide. Early postcolonial and globalization hopes in Africa have

6 For a perspective that emphasizes rather the local sources of Islamist violence in Africa, see Dowd (2015). For a focus on the return of jihadism, see Miles (2018).

been replaced, for the foreseeable future, by a "sclerosis, or hardening, of the boundary" (Miles, 2008b) on the one hand, and a slew of "border disorders" on the other (Walther and Miles, 2018).

This tension reflects geopolitical shifts on an even broader scale that are occurring elsewhere in the world, largely on account of the same terrorism-counterterrorism dynamics we have discussed in the African context. Instability in the Middle East, much aggravated by the rise of ISIS and other post-Al Qaeda Islamist militant groups, has led to the greatest refugee crisis since World War II. This crisis has spilled over from refugee haven nations, such as Turkey and Jordan, to Europe. Resulting attempts by the Turkish and Jordanian governments to reinforce their borders with Syria and Iraq mirror the African boundary sclerosis we have referred to above. But Middle Eastern refugees—often joined by would-be African migrants—are also taking to trans-Mediterranean corridors in order to reach and resettle in Europe. Coastal Libya (itself rocked by violence between pro- and anti-ISIS factions) has become a particularly problematic staging point for European states wishing to restrict the unregulated refugee-migrant flow.

The inability of African and Middle Eastern governments, and particularly their boundary control apparatuses, to contain the spontaneous cross-border flow of populations has had great consequences in Europe itself. Gateway European states such as Greece and Italy are in tension with European Union partners who, though better resourced, assume less of the burden associated with being first ports of (illegal) entry onto the continent. Brexit was fueled, in large measure, by fears that the United Kingdom could not control its own in-flow of migrants and refugees from the Continent as long as it remained a part of the European Union and subject to its open border policies.

While several geopolitical steps removed from Europe's refugee crisis, the United States too is affected by border fracturing elsewhere. President Trump's attempted travel ban on two Sub-Saharan countries (Somalia and Sudan) and a North African one (Libya) (in addition to three Middle Eastern nations) reflect fears that Islamist extremists could very well make their way to the United States. Even the much-heralded wall between the United States and Mexico, its advocates have intimated, also will have an anti-Islamist infiltration benefit, notwithstanding its primary function as a barrier to drug smuggling and human trafficking from Central and Latin American nations.

From the jihadists' own point of view, blurring/fracturing/deconstructing established boundaries is part and parcel of the geopolitical reordering that they view as theologically imperative. It is not only in the Fertile Crescent that ISIS has striven to replace state boundaries created by colonialism (in particular, between Iraq and Syria) with a caliphate governed according to sharia. Africa, too, would be subject to a geopolitical restructuring, by which the northern half of the continent would see its dozens of independent states reorganized into but three caliphates: Maghreb, Land of Habasha, Land of Alkinana. Before ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

had already declared its intention to dissolve the artificial borders between the Muslim states of Northwest Africa and the (mostly) Muslim ones of the Sahel. But the wider aim has been global jihad, a kind of New Islamic World Order.

Radical Islamist organizations in Africa, then, constitute branches of a transcontinental movement aimed at replacing a basically secular geopolitical order with a fundamentally faith-based (qua Islamic) one. Although originally rooted in local grievances, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, AQIM in North and West Africa and their various offshoots need to be viewed as part and parcel of a much larger jihadist challenge to the geopolitical framework composed of postcolonial states and boundaries.

The vast majority of African Muslims, and all of the states in which they reside (including the Islamic republics of Mauritania and Sudan), reject such a massive reordering of the continent's boundaries and governing principles. Western assistance to these victims of jihadism will be futile if it is military only. Yes, it is dangerous to the entire geopolitical order if the borders of Africa can be freely crossed by terrorists who exploit them to wreak mayhem. But even more important is development within those borders so that there is hope and reason to reject these violent messages and their messengers.

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9

Geopolitics in the Anthropocene

Simon Dalby

The recent revival of geopolitics often brings with it assumptions of stable geographical contexts, boundaries and inevitable rivalries. This involves a serious failure to understand connections across political boundaries and between human actions and the natural world, not least the scale and speed of current transformations. In contrast contemporary geographic scholarship shows that globalization and the remaking of economic and political matters is key to the material transformations that are now happening on a geological scale. Hence the designation of current events in terms of a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene. This highlights not just climate change issues but the larger transformation of land, water use and mining as well as species extinction. Conventional thinking that either simply denies the significance of climate change or focuses on conflict in the global South as a threat to Northern security ignores the historical responsibility of Northern states for climate change, and is dangerously myopic about the processes that connect across geographical boundaries.

Geopolitics returned?

Alarming headlines in 2016 suggested that violent rivalries are the order of the day. Discussions of migration, boundary walls, fences, military interventions, and the use of nationalist tropes have raised the rhetorical temperature in international politics. Walter Russell Mead (2014) is concerned that antagonistic politics between at least some great powers suggests just such a return of geopolitics after a period in which it was apparently absent. If the term is used to refer to territorial disputes, and the use of military force or the threat thereof, then clearly the conflicts over Crimea, Ukraine, various islands disputed by China and Japan and by various states in the South China Sea, or Russian and Turkish actions in early 2016, suggest its utility given the belligerence in recent events. Opportunistic populist politicians frequently respond with xenophobia and threats of force rather than intelligent policy. Robert Kagan (2015) is worried that the "weight of geopolitics" is now reducing the role of democracy in global governance as authoritarian states flex their political muscles.

In response, and in stark contrast, John Ikenberry (2014) is equally convinced that the liberal order of recent decades remains intact and that regional skirmishes and nationalist rhetoric are not undermining globalization. Geopolitics has not re-

turned apparently, at least not in the sense that force and great power rivalries are the most important matter in international politics. Nonetheless there is fractiousness to international politics recently, and nationalist logics, increased border controls, walls and fences are being used to try to reinforce territorial modes of power. Ominously, geographical verities are being invoked in the language of many nationalist politicians suggesting mobility and migration are a threat to supposedly stable political entities. British voters decided that they wanted to leave Europe, in the "Brexit" referendum in 2016, apparently fearing the influence of immigrants on the British state. What really is alarming is the failure of contemporary modes of governance to deal with many complex interconnected changes in a timely fashion.

These political developments also occur in the context of the persistence of formulations that invoke classical notions of geopolitics, of the world arranged in particular geographical ways that shape if not determine the conduct of foreign policy. While Samuel Huntington (1996) gets pride of place in most such discussions with his infamous mapping of global culture regions, Robert Kaplan (2012) and others also use geographical language to suggest that context determines destiny. The classical writings of Mackinder and Mahan are back in vogue in discussions of Chinese policy in the United States.

> Whether it is because of their simplicity and ease of intelligibility, or the rhetorical power of charismatic and idiosyncratic advocates, or simply their play to an audience receptive to reassurance and stasis in times of rapid change, these geopolitical visions refuse to dissipate. It is through underplaying the role of global trade and finance, a disregard for the multiple versions of sovereignty and power that exist in the world, and a denial of the possibility for alternative perspectives in world politics that have allowed Mackinder, Mahan, and Monroe back onto the centre-stage of the globalist regime. (Richardson, 2015, 236)

In Europe too, classical geopolitics has undergone a revival with political thinkers invoking geographical formulations as the context for policies (Guzzini, 2012).

These intellectual and political developments fly in the face of much recent scholarship and commentary, by political geographers in particular, who emphasize the growing interconnectedness of the global economy and the dynamism, perhaps best called globalization, that repeatedly changes patterns of production and trade (Agnew, 2009). The revival of concerns with geopolitical matters in scholarly investigations over the last few decades, as opposed to just in the recent foreign policy commentaries, involves a more profound engagement both with the forms of geographical representation that structure policy discussion as well as with these rapidly changing geographies of global political economy.

But little of this discussion so far explicitly links up with matters of the rapid transformation of the environment, another pressing and directly related matter in

global politics. Now, this chapter argues that linking geographical representations, and the changing global political economy with discussions of the contemporary transformation of the earth system, focused in the rapidly growing debate about "the Anthropocene" as a new human caused geological epoch (Purdy, 2016), is necessary to grapple with geopolitical change. Geological language, as in the use of the term Anthropocene, may be helpful here not least because conventional forms of environmental governance have fallen so far short in tackling global change (Galaz, 2014). Relying on traditional geopolitical thinking may have some considerable political utility for populist, nationalist and more expressly fascist politicians, but in so far as such notions structure policy by emphasizing separation, competition and conflict, they are making the dangerous global environmental transformations of our times much more difficult to address.

Geopolitics revisited

Geopolitics has often been understood as the contextual matters shaping politics at the planetary scale, about struggles for power and the rivalries of big states and empires, which have played out over the last few centuries as the global economy grew and technologies ushered in new human possibilities (Agnew, 2003). It is also about the related attempts to politically divide the world into various spatial configurations, empires, blocs, and such things as the Grossraum formulations of Carl Schmitt (Minca and Rowan, 2015). Schmitt may have been a more influential thinker in Nazi Germany than Karl Haushofer, who frequently gets the blame for introducing Adolf Hitler to Friedrich Ratzel's thinking, and hence indirectly, the pernicious ideas of *Lebensraum* that informed Nazi ambitions for rearranging the map of Europe by force (Snyder, 2015). Schmitt's (2006) *Nomos of the Earth* suggested various divisions of the world and the superiority of European modes of law and authority, but relied on an anachronistic fixed geography and a remarkably limited view of the transformative effects of the global economy.

Geographical scholarship of the last few decades often under the rubric of "critical geopolitics," has investigated how geographical language has important political consequences (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Even a fairly limited reflection on recent history suggests that geographical entities in global politics are not permanent and immutable but rather temporary, contingent and relational (Dodds et al., 2013). However geographical representations frequently pass without this critical interrogation precisely because they are apparently obvious. This is both in terms of how geographical language frequently structures particular nationalist narratives of the homeland, but also in how such language shapes larger interpretative frameworks of supposed territorial autonomy, grand strategy and justifications of the use of force in international affairs (Dalby, 2010).

Such formulations often link to technological fantasies of geographical control, to territorial sovereignty and to the supposed sanctity of national boundaries

(Brown, 2010). Linked to the invocation of martial vigor these are a heady brew in political rhetoric which links fear to the necessity of strength to provide security in troubled times. Invoking external threats to supposed internal stabilities is a powerful mode of geopolitical discourse that is repeatedly used in American politics (Dalby, 2013) as seen in 2016 with presidential candidate Donald Trump's rhetoric of wall building as a "solution" to the supposed "problem" of migration. At more or less the same time in the "Brexit" referendum British voters decided that they wanted to leave Europe apparently fearing the influence of immigrants on the British state. Once these cartographic entities become the hegemonic assumptions of how the world is organized, frontiers appearing as "natural" and permanent features (Fall, 2010), then these geographical categories become powerful tools for policy makers anxious to emphasize differences and dangers on a variegated planetary surface.

In a similar manner Benjamin Ho's (2014) examination of Chinese exceptionalism points to the risks of assuming permanent fixed identities in geopolitical thinking and making assumptions that geography presents eternal verities. In a world of rapid change and globalization this assumption is likely to be misleading in many ways. The relations between places are crucial, and have been changing rapidly due to the processes of globalization that involve changing geographical patterns of manufacturing and trade linkages. These are much more important than the military rivalries that usually get so much attention in geopolitical thinking related to foreign policy. Yes, military conflicts matter, and Second World War vintage technologies were key to setting the contemporary acceleration of globalization in motion. But military matters have been a minor factor in the overall pattern of the global economy although some regional industrial strategies were clearly involved in the Cold War period on both sides of the iron curtain.

John Agnew's (2015) recent discussion of geopolitics and globalization is analytically helpful in explaining these important but much wider formulations. As with other scholars who have been back over the history of geopolitical thinking of late (Kearns, 2013), Agnew notes that the early twentieth century formulations of geopolitics in terms of naturalized assumptions of spatially autonomous competing geographical entities obscured a larger body of historical thinking that emphasized the interconnections between places, the flows of resources from colonies to imperial centers, as well as larger concerns with geographical settings, trading arrangements and cultural exchanges. Looking back to Montesquieu and Voltaire's reconstruction of Alexander the Great's imperial efforts to enhance cultural interactions and trade among the regions he conquered, Agnew (2015) crucially argues that the narrow territorial sense of competing entities in late nineteenth century thinking obscured this larger sense of geopolitics, and in the process sets up a false dichotomy of geopolitics versus globalization.

This analysis shows that the processes of geopolitics are part and parcel of the growth of globalization over the last half century. United States' efforts to promote trade and investment in at least some parts of the global economy, a "geopolitics of

globalization," interacts with the very different colonial histories of various forms of statehood, a "geopolitics of development," and most recently with the rising new international agencies in what he terms a "geopolitics of regulation." These processes have shaped how world politics operates. In Panitch and Gindin's (2012) terms, American foreign policy has made the world safe for capitalism, and in the process greatly advantaged American based industrial and agricultural interests.

The Anthropocene formulation makes it clear that these globalizing forces of state and economic "development" are also geomorphic and environmental forces rearranging landscapes, damming rivers and moving huge amounts of material to build roads, railways and cities, while connecting them into a "global" economy. This transformation of the biosphere caused by the history of the expansion of European power over the last half millennium has only become clear in recent decades. Humanity has been remaking its planetary home on a more drastic scale than has been understood until very recently (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016).

This transformation is now the new context for geopolitical thinking even if its profound consequences have been slow to challenge contemporary geographical imaginations (Dalby, 2014). Anthropocene geopolitics is now much more a matter of the unfolding consequences of production decisions made by the dominant states and corporations in the planetary system than it is just a matter of territorial rivalries in a supposedly stable geographical configuration. Rapidly changing climate, rising sea levels and the melting of Arctic Ocean ice are only the most obvious symptoms; ones that have yet, despite progress in Paris in late 2015, to be seriously tackled by the processes of global politics. All this has, however, made it abundantly clear that classical geopolitical thinking, which suggested that climates in various parts of the world determined the fate of the resident human communities, is now backwards. Geopolitics is now shaping future climates, not the other way round (Dalby, 2015).

Geopolitics and governance

The most important point about contemporary governance and the geopolitical challenges of the present is so obvious that it frequently goes unsaid. That is, the organization of the world into nearly two hundred supposedly sovereign territorial states (Jackson, 2000), a matter that appears stable and fixed. The United Nations system is premised on this geographical division of the earth's terrestrial, and by extension, parts of its oceanic surface. This arrangement was to a substantial extent an effort to solve one of the key problems of European geopolitics – the long- standing pattern of using military force for territorial aggrandizement. Winners of European wars traditionally got territorial rewards as the spoils of victory, but in the process frequently sowed the seeds of future conflicts. Fixing the frontiers once and for all as the United Nations system did after World War Two, removed this temptation while making aggressive warfare international anathema. The apparent violation of

this norm in the case of the Russian-Ukraine conflict in recent years is one of the reasons that it generates so much international attention.

Globalization is partly about accelerating interconnections, but frequently those interconnections are between the now relatively fixed spaces of territorial states and regional blocs enclosed by various rules, or forms of sovereignty (Agnew, 2009). In the case of non-traditional security threats, such as diseases and environmental problems, states adapt to international arrangements in ways that frequently enhance the power of elites and leading sectors in their economies, a pattern that suggests once again that globalization favors well connected corporations and their local suppliers (Hameiri and Jones, 2015). Simultaneously, numerous complicated matters of international finance slip out of control of national governments but require their collective intervention when matters become too chaotic. Arcane technical specifications govern trading arrangements, and in many cases curtail freedom of action by governments, at least those who wish to remain within the more complicated structures of the international trading system. The territorial state is the dominant mode of administering these larger arrangements of political economy, and seen as such the proliferation of nation states, while apparently suggesting the supremacy of territorial rule and sovereign jurisdictions, in many ways simply operates as the local instantiation of larger globalization processes.

The scale of material transformation involved in the rapidly evolving global economy; the interconnected world that Montesquieu and Voltaire discussed, needs to be updated to include the transformation of the biosphere and the geophysical consequences that are manifested as climate change. Most terrestrial surfaces that are potentially useful for modern agriculture are now being exploited (Ellis, 2011). Rapid deforestation and the rise of plantations for such things as palm oil are emphasizing the point that environmental change is part of the growth of the global economy. Crucially, the consumption of fossil fuels is both powering the industries of the global economy, often through the use of cheap coal, and by using petroleum facilitating the mobility of both commodities and people linking places in the processes of globalization. But it is precisely this consumption of fossil fuels that is a key factor in destabilizing the climate system and rendering the taken for granted geographies of the world increasingly anachronistic.

Trying to assert control over contemporary changes by using territorial strategies, only most obviously in case of the current migration crisis flies in the face of the basic processes of geographical change. In the case of environmental change the key mode of adaptation for most species is to move to more conducive climes. But where animals, four legged as well as two, encounter barriers in the form of fences and walls this most basic mode of adaptation is thwarted. The would-be migrants are rendered ever more vulnerable by their being hemmed in precisely when they need to move. Now as the geological scale of contemporary transformations becomes ever more clear this contradiction between geographical fixity and the need to accommodate rapid change has become acute. The governance arrangements to

hand are increasingly inappropriate, and the situation is aggravated by attempts to use force to try to dominate matters in a badly divided world. Rethinking these contextual questions is now key to dealing with these counterproductive consequences of the "return of geopolitics."

Welcome to the Anthropocene

The rapid proliferation of the use of the term Anthropocene in recent years suggests that it is becoming a synonym for the present, the latest stage of globalization, and one that brings with it threats to numerous aspects of the human condition. Much of the discussion seems, at least so far, to have underplayed the significance of the fact that this is a geological term (Crutzen, 2002). The significance of this lies in the scale and longevity of the phenomenon. The implications of thinking in geological rather than environmental terms suggest much longer term and dramatic transformations are already afoot. Humanity is changing matters profoundly, moving the planetary system out of conditions that have pertained for hundreds of thousands of years and launching the planet into a new and as yet unknown configuration.

Just as the assumption of autonomous spaces is impossible so too is the modern assumption of humanity separate from nature. The Anthropocene makes this clear, but how to think of humanity as making new spaces is not so easy. Related to this are the expanding processes of commodification and enclosure as the global economy incorporates ever more processes and products into its circulations; governance and property relations are increasingly commercialized. In the process, boundaries and borders extend in new ways to privatize and hence price many things, change generates numerous new modes of bordering, incorporating and governing social and ecological processes (Dalby, 2014). Hence the irony of a globalization process that apparently crosses numerous boundaries but simultaneously involves numerous new rules, regulations and enclosures to function. Lengthy commodity chains are the new shape of global economy, ones that require modes of security that transcend territorial boundaries while incorporating their governance practices into commercial arrangements that cross many borders (Cowen, 2014).

The planet is being remade by these contemporary production and commercial activities. Decision makers have been slow to grasp that crucial point. The aspirational statements in the Paris Agreement of December 2015 about limiting climate change to 1.5 degrees Celsius suggest that politicians are finally thinking about how hot it should get. But the implications are not clearly in focus yet in a way that transforms how national economies are powered or terrestrial ecosystems rethought in terms of their abilities to buffer the worst excesses of climate extremes and facilitate species migration. The rich and powerful among us are in effect making decisions about the future configuration of the planet—how many polar ice caps the planet will have for millennia to come, and profound decisions as to which species will survive and which will not. We have entered the sixth major extinction event in the

planet's history, one caused by humanity and its dramatic reworking of both terrestrial and marine ecosystems (Kolbert, 2014).

The crucial insights of the new literature on the Anthropocene, and the earth system science research that drives the discussion, make it clear that the earth's biosphere is interconnected in numerous complicated ways; ones that render ontological formulations of relatively separate geographical regions of the planet redundant. While climate change gets much of the attention it is crucial to note that other phenomena are involved in this novel understanding of interconnectedness (Rockstrom et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). The depletion of stratospheric ozone came to be understood as a global problem in the 1980s when the ozone layer repeatedly disappeared in winter over the polar regions. This came as a nasty shock to policy makers as scientists showed the importance of interconnections when an apparently innocuous industrial product turned out to have very dangerous consequences in a realm where its presence had not been considered.

Species loss as a result of the extraordinary expansion of agriculture, the destruction of forests and other ecosystems, have transformed terrestrial ecosystems so much that the nineteenth century mappings of the world in terms of biomes and "natural regions" now need to be updated. New ecological assemblages of "anthromes" must be added to our understandings of the spatial arrangement of many things (Ellis, 2011). The huge transfer of species around the world by human action, whether for agriculture, pets, or accidentally due to trading activities, means that the planet now has terrestrial species mixed up in ways that may not have happened since the splitting up of Pangaea a couple of hundred million years ago at the beginning of the current cycle of plate tectonics (Kolbert, 2014). The wholesale pollution and fishing of the oceans, simultaneously with the rapid acidification due to the rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, means that ocean ecosystems are also being transformed with as yet unclear consequences.

Above all the matter of rapid anthropogenic climate change looms over international affairs, a key theme in the new geopolitics of our times. In Paris in December 2015, despite high profile terrorist attacks a huge conference lead to an agreement on a number of measures to be taken to begin, belatedly, to tackle climate change. This was not the binding treaty many hoped for, and the aspirational statements about keeping the average global temperature rise to close to 1.5 degrees Celsius, were in stark contrast to the promised commitments to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Nonetheless, the meetings did convey a clear sense that major powers were at last beginning to think about how to craft a global arrangement to deal with the threat of increasingly severe weather events, rising sea levels and much more dramatic future disruptions to the existing planetary climate. The Paris agreement's entry into force in November 2016 is a start in the right direction, albeit one that requires voluntary commitments on the part of state parties to the arrangement.

Climate wars?

In his speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin in 2013, President Obama elevated climate as a top priority for United States' national security, and then set in motion confidential negotiations with China to grapple with the issue. The deal between the United States and China in late 2014 made Paris possible; without such a meeting of minds the Paris Agreement would probably have accomplished even less. By incorporating all the major states into a loose framework, it perpetuated the attempt at universal involvement in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The United States insisted that nothing in the Paris Agreement was to be understood as an admission of responsibility for causing climate change and such language showed up in the final documents. This was one important factor that prevented a binding treaty from being the final outcome. In the process the United States acted as a great power by dictating the terms of its accession to the arrangement. Nonetheless some notion of universal involvement in the process to grant it legitimacy was maintained. In terms of the climate change process the argument that geopolitics has returned appears at least partly inaccurate.

However the growing literature on climate security suggests that some of the more pernicious formulations of geopolitics are reappearing in ways that are dangerous to the formulation of intelligent policy (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015). The climate justice arguments, heard repeatedly in Paris, and key to the justification for the aspirational statements to keep the average temperature rise to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, suggest that given the lengthy residence time of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the developed world with its long history of greenhouse gas emissions has primary responsibility for dealing with climate change. The ill-fated Kyoto accord of the 1990s started on the premise that those who had caused the problem should take the lead in trying to deal with it. This garnered no support in Washington where Congress voted in patterns that prevented the Clinton administration from even trying to get the accord acceded to by the United States. Television advertisements at the time showed the world map being cut into pieces with the implication that all countries ought to be involved in dealing with a global problem. Equating un-equals is not a new rhetorical strategy, but it worked effectively to obscure responsibilities in the 1990s well before the full weight of the climate denial movement was felt in American public discourse (Oreskes and Conway, 2010).

Perhaps more worrisome than this blanket refusal to deal with questions of historical responsibility, beyond repurposing some aid budgets to deal with climate adaptation issues, is the portrayal of vulnerable places in the world in terms of persistent tropes of dangerous zones of violence and degradation in terms of places beyond the remit of civilization (Dalby, 2013). The 1990s rhetoric of bifurcation, of a world of pacified zones and wild zones, only most famously in Robert Kaplan's (1994) dystopic warnings of "a coming anarchy," has persisted through the war on

terror and been updated in such formulations as Thomas Barnett's (2004) "non-integrated gap" in the global polity. Now these ideas of wild zones are linked into Pentagon notions of failed states and forms of political instabilities for which climate change now acts as a "threat multiplier." Climate change is now upgraded to a "catalyst of conflict" in the more recent formulations of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA Military Advisory Board, 2014).

This "threat multiplier" formulation has become widespread in the international security community. Climate change risks were elevated to the top of the list of global risks in the discussions at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2016. The contemporaneous *Munich Security Report* had similar concerns:

> Climate change is a very particular kind of threat. For low-lying countries, it is an existential danger. To most societies, it is a threat multiplier: An increase in extreme meteorological events, droughts, and land degradation as well as the sea-level rise can and do exacerbate political fragility and resource disputes, increase economic hardship and mass migrations, and magnify ethnic tensions and civil strife. (Munich Security Conference, 2016, 44)

The dangers in such formulations are, as with the earlier formulations of environmental security after the Cold War (Dalby, 2002), that these geographical specifications of dangerous places are disconnected from the larger transformations of geopolitics. They facilitate violent actions in the periphery in ways that perpetuate rather than ameliorate the disruptions set in motion by the interaction of changes in rural political economy in the global South with climate change. All of this, may be aggravated by unilateral attempts by some states and corporations to reduce their climate risk and ensure food supplies by purchasing large tracts of land in the South, thereby diversifying their holdings and reducing climate vulnerabilities among those in the North regardless of the consequences in the South (Dabelko et al., 2013).

Even more ominous are the warnings from scholars who link the historical concerns with Nazi geopolitics to the larger reasoning practices used to shore up its genocidal violence. Welzer's (2012) discussion of how the Nazi regime gradually changed laws and assumptions concerning what was considered "normal" and how current geographical formulations of wild zones and inevitable war in the South are shaping policy discourse, is a cautionary tale that needs to be taken seriously. Likewise Timothy Snyder's (2015) careful reconstruction of the political geography of the holocaust in his *Black Earth* points to the related dangers of geopolitical formulations of *Lebensraum*. Nazi interpretations of "living room", linked geopolitical claims on agricultural land in Eastern Europe to logics of consumerist aspiration and entitlement in Germany, at whatever political and economic cost this may have inflicted elsewhere on the continent. Discourses of consumer entitlement and fears of numerous environmental threats from external sources have been a persistent theme in recent American geopolitical discourses, too. Forms of "inverted quaran-

tine" structure the privatized security response in numerous commodified forms in attempts to, in Andy Szasz's (2007) terms, "shop our way to safety."

Such formulations simultaneously rely on fantasies of non-porous borders (Kearns, 2013) and the implicit assumptions that "containment" or "quarantine" are effective security strategies in a world where interconnections are the key to ecological and economic processes. This geographic assumption of separation is powerfully reinforced by claims to territorial jurisdiction, property boundaries, and sovereignty. It is epitomized by the penchant for wall building as a strategy to try to limit migration of various sorts, as well as discourses of invasive species as threats to different forms of farming and economic activity. Territoriality is a key strategy of control in many human affairs—demarcation, communication and enforcement being the key interrelated practices in Sack's (1986) classic discussion of the process—but it is much less efficacious when it comes to either economics or ecology than its advocates often assume.

Nonetheless territorial strategies are being attempted by many states and politicians in an attempt to shore up at least a sense of being in control despite an obviously waning sovereignty (Brown, 2010). Donald Trump made headlines during his campaign early in 2016 promising to build a wall across the American border with Mexico and force Mexicans to pay for it. Many such walls and fences are being constructed in the world, including along parts of the United States-Mexican border, where relatively rich states are situated in close proximity to relatively impoverished areas (Jones, 2012). They reinforce a carceral cartographic imagination; one where political borders often take on cultural significance as though these lines on the map were in some way "natural" frontiers (Fall, 2010).

Geopolitical vision

All this is related to the larger questions of geopolitical vision, how the world is represented as an object to be struggled over, divided and dominated by great powers, or shared by an interconnected humanity inhabiting an increasingly artificial world. While Macdonald, Hughes and Dodds' (2010) series of essays on observant states emphasize the importance of scopic regimes, technologies of seeing, and the constitution of objects to be governed through these practices, the ability to see the globe as a whole through satellite imagery, is now also a key part of the climate discussion. The "zoom in" functions literally contextualize new stories now; mere stationary contextual cartography is now largely passé! In a similar mode, "The Situation Room" on CNN long mimicked military presentations of a central control room, monitoring from afar, distant events that might have geopolitical repercussions. They used the modern scopic regime to imply a visuality that conveyed a superior panoptical surveillance vantage point on the world's evolving political scene. But in doing so, the connections between places are frequently implied rather than investigated; storms, floods and disasters are sometimes linked to climate change,

but the larger context of a transformed world, only occasionally structured these representations.

Frequently, what Donna Harraway (1988) famously called the "god trick" view, denies the details of practical struggles related to climate change in particular places, reinforcing a sense of a global problem—a terrifying prospect that "requires" big science and technocratic planning by great powers (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015). This is the imperial administrator's view of the world; not the view from the desperate refugee in part of the contemporary carceral archipelago built by metropolitan states on Lampedusa, Lesbos or Christmas Island. Viewed from there, things are likely to look somewhat different; the fences and guard towers that supposedly provide security for residents of the prosperous suburbs of the Global North are precisely what prevent migrants from gaining access to health services, food, shelter and employment. Who has "human security" is very much a matter of geography and how practical matters of bureaucracy play out at international borders in terms of who is admitted and who is not (Mountz, 2010).

Failure to understand how geopolitics is shaping the future configuration of the planet both through processes of globalization directly, and indirectly by all the ecological and geophysical transformation the global economy entails, may indeed bring the world to future climate wars (Dyer, 2008). But if this kind of geopolitics returns, with all the rhetorical force of the cartographies of enmity that it implies (Dalby, 2013), it will be because of failures of geographical imagination to understand geopolitical forces in motion and the complex causalities of an interconnected global economy that has already set in motion very considerable geophysical transformations (Parenti, 2011). Precisely because of these geophysical transformations, discussions of solar radiation management and other attempted technical fixes to global warming are also being discussed. Given the failure, at least so far, to tackle the issues of climate change with the seriousness they need, the possibilities of artificially adjusting the global temperature by engineering means are on the agenda (Burns and Strauss, 2013).

Such attempts to artificially manipulate weather patterns in particular regions or the temperature of the planet as a whole have the potential to cause serious political conflicts. If attempts to change rainfall patterns by cloud seeding to enhance agricultural productivity in a particular region have trans-boundary effects then international politics will be engaged. Given the large uncertainties in weather system behavior it might be hard to prove that weather modification in one place is related to droughts of storms elsewhere, but the perception that this is the case might be enough for serious political dispute. The potential for conflict is there, even if, given the interconnectedness of the global system, it is clear that careful international cooperation would be essential for any scheme to possibly succeed (Horton, 2013).

Once again such discussion emphasizes the importance of the contextualizations that structure geopolitical discussions. While the appearance of nuclear weapons and subsequently intercontinental ballistic missiles changed the context

of super-power rivalries, in the process dramatically heightening both the dangers of great power conflict and the speed with which crises could spiral out of control, this changed context has shaped practices of global security. Restraint is necessary, a matter of "negarchy" in Daniel Deudney's (2007) terms, where security requires limiting the use of force and constraining the temptations to try to use war as a strategy of statecraft. Now the Anthropocene makes it clear that this understanding has to be extended to grapple with the transformation of the biosphere and the potentially destabilizing consequences of climate change in particular if land-use changes, methane leakages and other greenhouse gas emissions are not dealt with in the immediate future. Restraint on these matters is now key in geopolitics for survival reasons in similar ways to the issue of nuclear weapons in the Cold War period. International leaders have been slow to realize this, and alarmist stories of imminent disaster have not led to appropriate recontextualization in North American policy making circles despite President Obama's clear designation of these new climate dangers to global security.

The political economy of fossil fuel extraction in North America explains part of this; the enthusiasm for fracking in particular in recent years promised rapid wealth for those in the industry. This, however, has to be understood as related to the larger political campaign from the right wing in both Canada and the United States where corporations have lavishly funded political agendas anathema to the steps needed to constrain carbon emissions and move towards a new post-fossil fuel economy (Mayer, 2016). The cultural politics of climate change denial involve the construction of various forms of othering in the anthropocentrism that underlies the refusal of environmentalist claims (Jacques, 2009). Powerfully reworked in the climate denial movement, assumptions of an autonomous humanity, somehow separate from the surrounding context, are key to this rhetoric. Once again this is an explicit formulation of spatial separation, one that then invokes hostility and danger from outside, and physical force as the solution to problems that may result. The ecological interconnections that shape humanity's context are once again denied, as modernity in general, and classical geopolitics in particular, has so long done in the powerful dualisms that structure modern thinking (Kearns, 2009). These include a separation of culture from nature, civilization from primitive barbarism, urban accomplishment from rural backwardness, industrial acumen from non-Western tradition, and consumption "here" from production and pollution "there."

The failure to see the interconnections across these supposed separations have long been the focus of environmentalist thinking, at least since Alexander von Humboldt took Goethe's insights about nature into the rainforests of South America and formulated the ideas of human induced climate change as he investigated the changing hydrologies resulting from deforestation (see Wulf, 2015). The struggles over climate change link these long-term political struggles into recast discussions of responsibility and the attribution of blame and geopolitical arguments about peripheral dangers and metropolitan action that once again obscure the motive forces

that matter in causing rapid change. Challenging these formulations remains a key task for scholars wishing to make a useful contribution to climate geopolitics; ones made all the more urgent as the earth system science of the Anthropocene charts the trajectories of transformation in ever increasing detail. The geographic context for politics in the future is being shaped by current decisions about political economy and energy systems in particular; that point is now unavoidable in any consideration of the future of geopolitics.

Anthropocene geopolitics

The Anthropocene, the new geological age we are living in, suggests that while technology is crucial to human changes it is also part of the overall transformation of the biosphere –the context for humanity that we are actively reassembling, often with disastrous consequences for other species and their habitats. Much more so than in the earlier age of science we now understand the interconnectedness of life, its various substrates, and its adaptations. We, too, understand that humanity has endangered its own existence in previously unimagined ways, and the political struggles are very much about reshaping the earth, material transformations designed to enhance particular modes of life and power and prestige among certain groups of humanity (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016).

These efforts are having cumulative effects that amount to a new geological era, one in which the geophysics of the planet are interlinked in numerous ways with human activities, ones that are causing climate change, acidification of the oceans and mass extinctions simultaneously. All of this suggests that we need to add a specifically geophysical understanding to the operations of power, linking physical transformations of context into our understandings of power, prestige and the search for security of various types. We are, as the U.S. military likes to put it, "shaping the future." But how that future is to be shaped is a matter of geopolitics; a matter in part of collective deliberations, and also the attempts by certain people to control the process and effectively decide on the physical configuration of the future biosphere and its components (Dalby, 2016).

The longstanding suggestion from earth systems thinking that our conceptions need a second Copernican revolution where life is now understood as a key part of the planetary system (Schellnhuber, 1999), rather than a surficial afterthought, is instructive here. We are not "on" earth. We are earth. We have reversed the geological processes of carbon sequestration by our processes of combustion, and as such the key to both human powers and the earthly context in which they play out are tied to these geophysical transformations. The consequences for how we rethink geopolitics, and how we think about creating a world for humanity that stays fairly close to the circumstances of the last ten thousand years of earth history that have facilitated the emergence of civilization, rather than accelerate the destabilization of the planetary system into something unpredictable and likely disastrous for much

of humanity, is now the key task for intellectuals of whatever academic disciplinary background engaging geopolitics.

Geopolitics is now about how the world is being remade, and how the strategies to do this relate to the types of knowledge, representations and legitimations invoked in the arguments about who should rule and what kind of a future should be produced to whose advantage. Failure to think about this new understanding of the world and how it is being shaped by geopolitical choices may lead to the kind of future water wars that so worry the climate security analysts, and novelists like Paulo Bacigalupi (2015) in his depiction of violence in his imagined future of the American South West in *The Water Knife*. Such dystopic futures are avoidable if politicians tackle institutional problems appropriately. Making the rapidly changing geographies of the present the key point in geopolitical analyses is essential to both sensible scholarly analysis and appropriate policy advice. It requires directly challenging geographical formulations that inform populist and nationalist invocations of endangered "here"s and threatening external "there"s. Not least, this is the case because it is the consumption of fossil fuels, historically mostly "here" in North America and Europe, that is now causing the increasing storms, floods, droughts and disruptions that set people "there" in motion.

Geographical verities are not permanent; change is accelerating and our policies and our politics need to embrace these insights so that collectively we can shape a future conducive to human flourishing in a rapidly changing world. The task for scholars, analysts and policy advisors now is to work out how to share a crowded and rapidly changing world. Traditional geopolitics was about trying to dominate a divided world while ignoring the connections across the boundaries between supposedly autonomous regions, and in so far as such modes of thinking and action have returned, they make the urgently necessary tasks of constructing new institutions and practices for sharing a rapidly changing world all the more difficult.

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10

From Geopolitics to Astropolitics

Albert J. Bergesen

The role of geography is essential for the study of terrestrially bound politics (geopolitics). Orbital space is increasingly populated with satellites, space stations and space planes becoming increasingly congested, competitive, competitive, politicized and even weaponized. Human politics are, therefore, no longer limited to terrestrially bound politics. As such it would seem reasonable that the role of space is as essential for the study of politics (the idea of astropolitics) as terrestrial geography has been for the study of earth bound politics (the idea of geopolitics). This chapter provides some preliminary reflections upon this assumption.

Introduction

There is a notable return to geopolitics in the early 21st century, but our theoretical analysis of this activity is quite different from that of classic 19th and 20th century geopolitical thinkers. At the heart of any serious geopolitical analysis is the question of the power and borders of states that in the final instance are enforced by military power.[1] From the GPS of small army units, to identifying and selecting targets for naval, ground, and air force units we see today the indispensable role of satellite obtained and mediated information. This means there can be no serious military analysis without a role for satellites, and since there is no serious geopolitics without some attention to military affairs, there must be a role for space and for something like "astropolitics"[2] to supplement, or even replace, geopolitical analysis.

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1 Even during the previous era of globalization, it was the case that American military power lay behind the seemingly smooth running post-1945 economically globalizing world as well.

2 By astropolitics all that is meant is attention is paid to the role of space as a significant variable in explanatory models of politics and international relations. For examples of astropolitical analysis, see 2 Dolman (2001) and the journal *Astropolitics: An International Journal of Space Politics and Policy* (http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fast20/current;). For a more sociological perspective on space studies see The Astrosociology Research Institute (http://www.astrosociology.org/index.html).

If we think of geopolitics as focusing upon the physical environment's constraints and opportunities it places upon political behavior, geo and astro emphasize identical deployments of environmental effects separated in time. That is, since the emergence of anatomically modern humanity some 200,000 years ago humanity and its societies and politics have been limited to the surface of the earth; its geography in effect. Such geographic effects have been the primary extra-human determinant of political structure, process, and conflict.

These effects still exist, obviously, but since the Wright brothers flew their first airplane in 1903 humanity's struggle against gravity has progressed rapidly: by 1957 they launched a satellite (Sputnik); by 1956 they put a man in space (Yuri Gagarin); by 1969 they put men on the moon (Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin); by 1971 they put a habitable space station in orbit (Salyut 1); and since 2000 they have maintained a continuously inhabited International Space Station (ISS). As for the future, they are making plans for manned missions to Mars. As such, space enters theoretical discourse as a new domain of effect upon the political, hence the concept of astropolitics.

The human presence in space has increased dramatically since 1957. Today there are currently 4256 satellites orbiting the planet but only 1419 of these are operational according to the Union of Concerned Scientists. These include 713 dealing with communications, 374 with earth observation and science, 160 with technology, demonstration, and development, 105 with navigation and global positioning, and 67 with space science. Also, some 65 countries have launched these satellites, with the largest number being the United States (576), China (181), and Russia (140) (Lavender, 2016).

On the economic front, there is an increasing number of established aerospace companies, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Airbus, and BAE Systems along with new start-ups such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, World View, Virgin Galactic, and Moon Express, that are involved in space tourism, asteroid mining, launch services, satellite construction, and other ancillary activities tied to commercializing Space. There is also a growing residential presence in space illustrated by the fact that the International Space Station (ISS) has been continuously inhabited since 2000. If decommissioned as planned in 2024 it would have been a habitable orbital platform of greater longevity than many terrestrial nation-states.[3] Also, the Chinese presently have a manned space lab (Tiangong-2) which they plan to turn into a space station in 2020. The Russians, who earlier had a space station, are also planning another one in the near future. There are also plans by the commercial enterprise Axiom to launch their own space station and "work is underway to establish the world's first

3 The ISS has not been continuously inhabited by the same set of individuals. Astronauts from different nations come and go.

private, international commercial space station, a complex that would serve a global community of sovereign and private astronauts" (David, 2017).

Finally, of course, there are plans by the United States, China, a Russian-European Union consortium, and with private interests to go to Mars in the 2030s if not before. At present, there are 6 active satellites from India, Russia-European Union, and the United States orbiting Mars, and the *Opportunity* and *Curiosity* rovers from the United States continue to map, photograph and test samples on Mars. There are also plans for the China and a Russian-European Union space consortium to land rovers on Mars in the near future. Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the UK have planned lunar landing missions over the next 15 years.

There is a clear geopolitics centering on national rivalries, arms races, space races, and security concerns among the United States, Russia (earlier the USSR) and China at the minimum with perhaps India, Japan, and Europe being added as well. It would seem, that not only the political and commercial, but civil society as well is establishing footholds in orbital space.

Obviously virtually all humanity remains earth bound, and what satellites, space stations, and deep space probes exist are but extensions of the social, political, and economic dynamics on earth. Taking a geopolitical stance on space activity is totally warranted. But the dramatic victory over gravity since 1903, also suggests a continuation of the human migration story that began in Africa and took humanity and its social structural relations around the globe by the later 19th century, suggests dramatic change that warrants further inquiry. No sooner had human social relations linked the globe at the end of the 19th century (the modern world-system), by the start of the 20th century humanity found ways to lift off from its terrestrial home and venture for a few minutes into the air above it; and then, by 1961 launch a human into orbit.

We are obviously at the very early stages of anything like humanity permanently living in space, hence having social relations and forming potential sovereign space entities (like nation-states) in orbit. The movement into space is also dramatic and extensive with the promise of more to come. Based upon this assumption, you can view humanity's beginning movement into space as an extension of terrestrial sociology and geopolitics, or as a new chapter in the human migration story. Chapter one would be out of Africa and around the planet. Chapter two is off the planet and into space. If geopolitics has dealt with terrestrial politics then the present signs of a coming migration off earth naturally leads us to consider some distinctly astropolitical and astrosociological issues. A beginning discussion of a few preliminary issues occupies the rest of this chapter.

Moral positions on leaving earth

We can start with the moral issue that is raised by the increasingly realistic possibility of humanity becoming a multi-planet species. Up till now, the predominant

moral philosophy of human/environment relations has been various versions of environmentalism, which has been accompanied by the idea of the Anthropocene—a new geological epoch where, "human beings have become the primary emergent geological force affecting the future of the Earth System . . . [where] scientific evidence suggests that the period from around 1950 on exhibits a major spike, marking a Great Acceleration in human impacts on the environment"(Foster, 2016, 9). Having done this, the moral burden follows upon human shoulders to undo, fix, repair, or somehow quit harming the earth if not restoring it to some original state. This position is also tied with ideas about the inalienable rights of nature itself to its own existence (Deep Ecology moral philosophy) and the accompanying environmental morality to stay terrestrial and fix the environmental degradation humanity has produced.

In opposition is a fledgling moral impulse tied to the notion of humanity's cosmic essence as a multi-planet species. Marx theorized the realization of our species being as the overcoming of our alienated labor by transcending the class ownership of the means of production and the realization of our pure species essence. For the stay on earth morality, the imperative is to stay and end environmental degradation thereby overcoming our alienation from nature/earth.

Are we then, religious beings alienated from our god, or a biological species being alienated from ourselves, or a natural being alienated from earth, or finally, are we cosmic beings separated from the cosmos by staying here on earth? If we are alienated cosmic beings, are we overly attached to earth when we should instead seek our full realization—not our religious, or species, or natural, but our cosmic being—by seeking some kind of union with the cosmos itself? And if the mechanisms for redemption have been rites and creed for a religious being; social movement participation and secular activism for species being; green consciousness, a sense of oneness with the planet and environmental action for a natural being; what is the practice tied to a realization of cosmic being? Would it be space travel or colonizing Mars? Who knows. The moral tension is just starting; for every argument about human destiny as a multi-planet species, there is the counter that we were born on earth and meant to live on, and to repair, earth.

Earth from space: A species wide collective identity

Obviously, the view of earth from space engenders a more unified picture of humanity. It has often been said that traveling out into space is like earlier voyages across the world's oceans, and from "sea faring people" we now speak of being a "space faring species." The distinction between "a people" which is more national, or ethnic, and "a species" which is a more trans-national, humanity wide, implies that identity is an important step toward the emergence of a humanity wide collective identity.

Earthly geographic distinctions lead to a focus upon intra-earth variation, such as between continents and oceans, which are foundational theoretical oppositions for geopolitical ideas like sea power and land power. It also advanced the notion of the Indian Ocean/South China Sea as the great 21st century hydrocarbon highway, or the North European Plain and Eurasian Steppes as historical invasion highways.

When it comes to space, though, the contrast is with the globe as a whole; not just its sea people, or land people, or maritime or continental states/empires, nor for that matter is it capitalist (the United States) or communist (China) space programs either. With some 80 countries having their own satellites with the leading space powers (the United States, Russia China, India) accounting for 43% of the world's population, it is not a reach to conceive of this migration into space something of a species wide endeavor.

Space, then, fosters a global consciousness or self-conception different from that of, say, world-system linkages. Going to, or seeing earth from, space yields an undifferentiated wholeness absent in the terrestrial core, periphery, semi-periphery distinctions of a world-system. While a world-system is global in scope it is regional in essence; for example, core, periphery, semi-periphery; developed countries vs. underdeveloped ones; the global North vs. the global South. The world in political economic terms is clearly a divided one of haves and have nots; parts not wholes. The unity conveyed is that of inequality and hierarchy[4] whereas the world from space is easier seen as a single essence.[5]

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4 This is not to say that highlighting global inequities is not important and a reality not to be patched over by a false sense of global unity when it does not exist.

5 If we think of earth's terrestrial surface and its orbital space as both part of its larger nature, and if geopolitics holds any water, then it may be that the eternal opposition of maritime and continental states, will in the end, trump the overall stitching together of the world-system as a political economic global formation. In classic geopolitical thinking, we have always noted the maritime/continental oppositions: Athens vs. Sparta, maritime Europe (Britain, France, Netherlands, Spain) vs. continental Europe/Eurasia (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia), and in Political Economy of the World-System (PEWS) terms, the hegemons of Wallerstein's (1974) capitalist world economy have all been economically dominant and hegemonic sea powers (Spain, Netherlands, Britain, the United States today). For all the theorizing about the autonomy of the social over the mechanical geographic, it remains the case that neither Germany, nor Russia, nor Austria-Hungary nor any continental state, no matter how "capitalist" its social structure might seem, has ever been the hegemon of the world-system.
If orbital space is but another "environment" like terrestrial geography, then it too should also have demonstrable effects upon human social relations. Even at these earliest of stages of the Second Great Human Migration (earth to space) we can see distinct social science effects of space, namely, that earth, the world, the planet, human kind, are all seen and often conceptualized as a singularity. It is not that one cannot see, say, core and periphery or rich and poor countries from space, but that the distance plus the orbiting property lead toward a singularity. That is the view from space and, as noted earlier, the view of space from earth suggests a commonality, not a division, of humanity on earth.

Orbital/terrestrial relations

So yes, there is a burgeoning debate over the morality of leaving vs. staying on earth and yes, the view from space seems to stimulate a broader collective identity for humanity than might be available from just the dynamics of terrestrially developed world-systems, world economies, and international state systems. But, are there issues other than these which might benefit from an astrosociological, or astropolitical perspective?

The answer I think is yes, and it begins with assuming that the present expansion into space will only continue and accelerate. From the perspective of rising or lowering space agency budgets, or the rise and fall of space races, continued migration into space may or may not be the case. But if we take a broader perspective and look back just a century ago with the 1903 Wright brothers' first flights through today's space stations, the OSRIS-Rex mission to sample minerals from the asteroid Bennu, and plans by a number of countries for not just a return to the moon but by the 2030s to have manned missions to Mars, movement off planet has been undeniable accelerated.

If we now apply the continued expansion into space assumption, with the present reality of low earth orbit space stations, we can further assume that the habitable presence of humanity in orbital space will increase in the future. This would yield an extension of the terrestrial nation-state into orbit, and one could further speculate about the possibility that some of these may in the future become sovereign orbital political entities.

Therefore, we can conclude that for the first time since the emergence of anatomically modern humanity 200,000 years ago that it now occupies more than one physical platform, e.g. terrestrial earth and orbital space stations. While the number of humans living in orbit are both extremely small and for short durations, it still seems reasonable to assume that both number and duration will only increase throughout the 21st century.

The political in orbit

To grasp potential issues in orbital/terrestrial political relations, consider for a moment Max Weber's (1946) classic definition of the modern state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state." This definition certainly characterizes sovereign political forms on terrestrial earth, which have geographically defined borders. These fixed[6] lines on the ground limit

6 These terrestrially fixed boundaries/borders can be challenged, expanded, contracted, and in some instances, disappear altogether, as in the historical case of Poland and the present national boundary of where eastern Syria ends and western Iraq begins. But this is an unstable state of

the number of borders terrestrial polities can have. Today's Germany, for instance, in any single day has stationary Weberian borders with nine countries (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Luxembourg, and Denmark). In Germany, on one side of their border, is the German military; on the other side those of France, Austria, Poland, and so forth.

But in orbit, overhead, circles an American, or Russian, or Chinese satellite, or for that matter one of 80 or so other countries owning satellites. Using the speed of the International Space Station at 17,500 mph these extensions of political into orbit, circle the earth every 90 minutes and combined with the rotation of the earth on its axis, they pass over a great many of the world's countries everyday. It is safe to assume that 21st century space powers are developing weapons for their satellites. For the sake of our exposition here, let us say that their satellites are armed with a powerful laser weapon capable of hitting targets within terrestrial states below them. Whereas Germany has nine militaries arrayed on her terrestrial borders she has, in principle, many more national militaries passing overhead. If we project Germany's Weberian boundaries upward through the atmosphere (which is already politicized) into orbital space, then Germany would have many more than nine military forces on her extended borders multiple times a day. Virtually all of the world's terrestrial states possess militaries; close to a hundred now have satellites; if these come to be armed, then we can imagine a world in which every country shares a space border with every other country, that is, a Russian armed satellite passes over much of the world's terrestrial states, as does the Chinese equivalent pass over Russian national territory.

The concept of an "international state system," then has to follow states into space, yielding two potential versions: the Terrestrial State System (TSS), which has been with us since Westphalia (1648) if not before in different formats, and the Orbital State System (OSS) which represents national military satellites in orbit, along with the interaction of the TSS/OSS system. This is probably an existing reality already and if not then certainly it will become one as the 21st century unfolds.

Multi-domain battlefield

Having introduced the notion of national and weaponized satellites in what is already a militarized space environment, the question of military strategy arise. While the academy is just beginning to focus upon potential elements and issues of Astro-IR the military has already begun to recognize space as an emerging domain of political conflict along with the domains of land, air, sea, cyber, and electromagnetic. If war is the continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, 1989) then the

political being and lines are redrawn. The political history of the world may be one of shifting boundaries, but it is nonetheless the history of boundaries—e.g. geographic borders—and that is the point here.

multi-domain battlefield is also the continuation of multi-domain international relations by other means. Three-dimensional chess is a good metaphor for both multi-domain military and political international relations.

Reference is often made to the "global geopolitical chessboard" as somehow grasping the totality of political/military international relations, but upon a moment's reflection it becomes clear that this is outdated in a universe of permanent terrestrial political formations (nation-states) and permanent orbital political assets (satellites, space stations, etc.). The advent of space forces a major re-think of basic social and political theoretical frameworks, such that the "global" is now just one domain (the terrestrial) and the "chessboard" is not spatially hierarchical (land/sea, air, space).

Consider too, the concept of the world-system (Wallerstein, 1974). If "world" means the world that some people know, e.g. not the globe as a whole, then that world today includes presently politicized orbital space as well. Yet the "political economy of the world-system" perspective only focuses upon planetary affairs, which for historical analysis is sensible, but not for the future. If "world" means terrestrial earth then that meaning is also outdated. As with Weber's (1946) geographic definition of the state, until now international relation, or world-systemic, or world-societal analysis has been entirely terrestrial analysis. As such, geopolitical theory was appropriate prior to the Space Age, but with the conquest of gravity[7] came the start of human migration off planet and as such the opening for the space social sciences, such as astropolitics and astrosociology. As strange as this sounds today, imagine what something like astrophysics, astrochemistry, astrobiology would have sounded like prior to the Space Age.

Orbital/terrestrial social relations

At present astropolitical and astrosociological approaches to humanity in space are largely applications of extant theory to space activities as something of a new dependent variable. Further, such studies are largely limited to earth bound activities: national space races, the ins and outs of space law, the advent of start-up commercial space enterprises, the organizational aspects of space agencies, and disaster

7 Technological innovation can also be seen as part of the gravity struggle. For instance, the invention of the wheel, while clearly a means to ease human labor, aid economic development, transport, communication and war, is also, an innovation that aided the fight against gravity's weight upon human efforts to widen their lateral and hierarchic social relations. The same logic holds for the boat, as moving on water, like rolling on land, lessens gravity's hold. More recent victories would include 18th century French hot air balloons and late 19th century English heavier than air gliders. Wheel, boat, flight, and orbit: milestones on the road to victory over gravity. Given that our gravity well was created by the earth's mass, the anti-gravity struggle is also a struggle against the earth itself; an obviously contentious claim.

research on incidents like the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger. These are all legitimate objects of study, obviously.

I would like to suggest, though, that astrosociological and astropolitical theory should be more similar to geopolitical theory[8] than either sociological, political science, or international relations theory, in that space should constitute an independent variable in explanatory models of human social and political relations.

The reasoning here is straightforward. If it makes sense to identify effects derivable from the geographic environment of humanity upon their social relations,[9] then it is also reasonable to consider space effects if and when they become a relevant part of human social relations. If it makes sense to theorize constraints and imperatives posed by continents, oceans, mountains, plains, steppes, or biomes, on international politics then when the international becomes the orbital it is necessary to consider aspects of space as much as oceans and continents in any political or social analysis.

Where do we start in considering properties of outer space in models of human behavior and social order? There may be many, but one I would like to focus upon here centers on the implications for humanity to be split between two fundamental physical platforms, earth and orbital space. Again, when all of humanity was earth bound the platform variable was absolute and unvarying, hence only entered into intra-terrestrial variation models, such as those of geopolitics. Continental states vs. maritime states, sea power vs. land power, and so on and so forth. But what happens when the environmental factor moves from intra-environments (land, sea, etc.) to inter-environments (earth, orbit)? This leads to the question: *Does existence upon a platform in constant motion (space station) in relation to another platform (earth) affect the interaction between individuals upon the two platforms*?

Einstein's Problem

Individuals on space stations circle individuals on planet earth. That is obvious. From the point of view of those on the space station, though, it is individuals on earth who are moving while individuals on the space station are stationary *vis-à-vis* each other. And, conversely, from the point of view of those on earth it is individuals

8 Classic geopolitical theory places geographic variation at the heart of its explanatory hypotheses: it is *sea* power, or *land* power, or the *North European Plain* and *Eurasian Steppes* that are invasions highways, or the *Indian* and *South China Seas* that are hydrocarbon highways. The rise of Critical Geography among professional geographers has turned the tables, where now it is the social construction of, or the political use of, land, seas, oceans, steppes and plains that constitute the independent variable.

9 For the moment, we will leave aside the Anthropocene idea that it is not nature→society, but society→nature→society, or perhaps, humanity→nature→humanity, or, for some capitalism→nature→humanity. Or, from a Deep Ecology perspective with an emphasis upon the inalienable rights of nature, it is just humanity/capitalism→nature.

on the space station that are moving. Individuals interacting with each other upon either earth or space station are stationary *vis-à-vis* each other. This in turn has sociological implications, for it facilitates their forming stable social relations with each other. On the other hand, individuals on the space station and individuals on earth have more difficulty interacting with each other as both are in motion to each other, which could potentially undermining social relations between them.

Again, this was to be expected for the dispersion of humanity was co-terminus with a single reference platform, earth, allowing for the emergence of stable social relations. Einstein's Problem, though, arises when humanity comes to be dispersed over more than one platform, such as habitable space stations and perhaps within the century lunar and Martian settlements. Such stable interaction for all humanity, is not possible when humanity is dispersed across two platforms (earth, orbit) that are in a different, but constant motion *vis-à-vis* each other.

It is, therefore, not interaction that leads to social order, but common fixed platform position that makes sustained, fixed, formalized, interaction possible—social order, or for that matter society, or states, or world-systems. The differences being ones of scale not ontological essence, as there are micro social systems (small groups, dyads, marriages), macro social systems (societies), and world-systems (the modern-world system, world-society, world-culture). Contrary to present theory, human interaction does not at t-1 lead to social order at t-2; they are one and the same. There have never been individuals without social relations nor social relations without individuals. Their false separation was a product of not understanding the role of platforms and hence having to take humans at t-1 to be the origin of human social relations at t-2 and then said relations the origin of societies at t-3. This means that humans cause humans, or society causes society, or the history of mankind is the history of humanity is the history of class struggles (Marx and Engels, 2002) or the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity (Durkheim, 2014) or *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies, 1940) or traditional to rational legal authority (Weber, 1958).

In effect with platform relativity absent a kind of absolute universalism prevails. All that seems necessary is just individuals and then groups, and then organizations, and then societies, and then world-systems of individuals. Nothing else matters. Certainly, geography is held constant—all humans exist only on earth. One platform; ergo, an absolute universal universe within which the human drama unfolds. The only thing that varies, hence the only variable seen as relevant to explain social change, is social life itself. Therefore, the hermeneutic bubble that is the social. It leads to all sorts of extreme claims that are not questioned, like the "social construction of reality" or "if things are defined as real they are real in their consequences," leading to the universal wish that cancer was defined as unreal and hence does not exist.

Einstein's Problem is what do we make of cross-platform social relations? We can begin to tackle this question by formalizing the ingredients to some degree.

The lack of experiencing the motion of platform's A and B, provides the stationary existence of individuals A' and B' such that their individual motion (interaction) allows its interpretation to be that of actors A' and B' and not platforms A and B. In this way actors A' can form society S in orbit O, or S_O, as can actors B' form society S on earth, E, S_E. Within social systems S_O and S_E all the laws of classic sociological theory operate.

That is Marx, Weber, Durkheim and all theories up to today hold among individuals on any fixed platform that is, on earth or on a space station, or in the future other celestial bodies.

An earthly example

At present there are a) few people in a constant motion circling earth and b) they exist as extended agents of the terrestrial nation, doing something like a tour of duty in space, analogous to national ships on the high seas. A true test of Einstein's Problem (do relativity effects bleed into sociology) cannot be adequately performed at this time. Hints can no doubt be found in memoirs of astronauts, reports of their interpersonal relations, and while in orbit, their feelings toward their terrestrial nation and social relations back on earth.

Having said this, there is some supporting evidence here on earth. Remember the general principle: individuals on platforms in constant motion do not experience that motion amongst platform peers but do in their relationship to others on other platforms. Again, people on trains and space stations experience themselves as stationary and observe others on train-stations and earth as moving by them. Trains were Einstein's example; I am using space stations here, but carts, wagons, horses, oxen, camels and so forth could also be seen as platforms in motion and nomads the individuals upon those platforms.[10] Trains pass train-stations; space stations pass countries on earth; and nomads pass towns and other settlements. There is, therefore, a relativity of motion experienced between nomads and townsfolk. Therefore, the social relativity model would not only be present between earth and orbit but also on earth between nomads and townspeople.

To nomads the townspeople are in motion and they are at rest, and of course, they are in motion to those in towns. Interestingly, and I suppose understandable in terms of which groups came to constitute the dominant civilizations, states, and empires, we have applied the motion property to but one platform people, the "nomads" but not to the other, the "townspeople," even though, in fact, from each of their own reference platforms they are stationary and the other is in motion. It is as if we attribute an absolute motion to them while we take individuals in towns as

10 I would like to thank Beksahn Jang for this observation. Nomads include Huns, Mongols, Bedouins, Cheyenne, Comanche, Kiowa and others peoples.

absolutely at rest, but there, in fact, is no absolute state of rest or motion, or translated into sociology, there are neither absolute nomads nor absolute townspeople.[11] This labeling phenomena is solved when we also realize that social scientists are themselves utilizing the larger earth platform as their reference point, such that, to them, as to those in towns, it is the "nomads" who are moving, when in fact that is only a relative state of being.

So, for example, think of what Einstein's Problem poses to ideas of social construction of realities, hermeneutics, world-views, cosmologies and even culture itself as a trans-individual collective agreement, if each side sees the other as moving and themselves as stationary. In effect, if a hypothetical society were comprised of individuals on earth and in orbit, or in town and nomadic tribe, would it be possible for a coagulation of sentiment to occur to socially construct "reality" when, say, half of this hypothetical society views the other half as in motion and they stationary and vice versa? On first glance it would seem to be a problem, if for no other reason than what is meant by things "social" are things agreed upon between individuals, but individual A, say a Mongolian upon a constantly in motion wagon-platform experiences individual B in the Russian town she passes, as passing her, while the Russia experiences the Mongolian as passing her. How, then, do we get trans-AB agreement on a socially constructed reality when the laws of physics prohibit such a reality from existing?

Again, classic sociology concepts and theory hold on the nomad platform and the town platform. But again, if it is correct to say "the embankment is in motion relative to the carriage," then the town is in motion relative to the nomadic tribe, and of course as the "carriage is in motion relative to the embankment" (Einstein, 1956 [1916], 39), so, obviously, is nomadic tribe is in motion relative to the town.

But again, note. The obviousness of motion and nomads is only a relativity effect where we assume the reference platform of earth. Hence stationarity or being at rest seems natural, obvious, and a universal fact of nature, when in fact it is not. It is understandable that most of humanity is earth bound residentially such that "nomads" are the exception numerically, but that probably was not always the case. If earlier human social life was characterized as hunter-gatherer societies, then the nomadic was the norm, not the exception. That the settled came to dominate the nomadic is

11 So, for instance, a dictionary definition of nomadic centers on "roaming about from place to place" which assumes absolute spatial space that can be fixed such that one can determining going from "place" to "place." Similarly, "roaming" also assumes absolute fixed universal space as the backdrop for towns (stationarity) and nomads (motion) when in fact there is no absolute space nor motion, but only platform relative space and motion. Here we see the omnipresence of earth the platform in social science explanation. As individuals on a moving train do not experience themselves in motion, so people on earth also experience themselves as stationary and as earth is the universe of humanity what turns out to be a relative platform has been theorized as an absolute universal stationary background. Again, none of this was realized until humanity came to exist upon other non-earth platforms, like space stations.

also true; that most of us are settled and so take our natural earthly reference point is also true. But what is not true is that this is an eternal state of the universe, but it is instead, a condition of a particular platform whose relative existence has only come to our attention with the advent of 21st century space station existence.

If we are dealing with human political and social relations solely on earth then geopolitical principles hold. If though, humanity is edging toward a trans-platform existence, where earth as a whole is now but one possible platform, then if not astrosociology or astropolitics, some special theory of relativity informed analysis will soon become mandatory to fully understand human social and political existence into the 21st century.

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